Young v State of Queensland[2025] QDC 100

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Introduction

1. [1]
   There are two applications before the court. The first application was made on 18 June 2025 by the defendant for orders to be made pursuant to rule 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) that the entirety of the statement of claim filed on 8 January 2025 be struck out. The second application was made by the plaintiff on 26 June 2025 for a declaration that the defendant is deemed to have admitted the allegations contained in paragraphs 2-22 of the statement of claim.
2. [2]
   The plaintiff commenced the proceeding by claim on 8 January 2025 for damages of negligence in the amount of $726,542.60. The plaintiff claims that while employed by the Queensland Parliamentary Service (QPS), where she worked as an electoral office staff member reporting to a former state parliamentarian Mr James Madden, she was, amongst other things, subjected to bullying and harassment by Mr Madden.
3. [3]
   The plaintiff alleges that the State of Queensland owed her a duty of care which it breached in failing to, among other things, manage work-related psychological health and safety. By reason of that negligence and breach of duty the plaintiff claims she has sustained an adjustment disorder, mixed anxiety and depressed mood. The plaintiff claims damages for her injuries including general damages, aggravated damages, past economic loss, future economic loss and special damages.
4. [4]
   In response to the statement of claim the defendant filed a notice of intention to defend and defence on 27 February 2025. The defendant denies it owed any duty of care to the plaintiff and asserts that it was not the employer of the plaintiff and there is no vicarious liability for the alleged negligent acts and omissions of Mr Madden. The defendant’s position is that, as a matter of law, the State of Queensland is not an agent or delegate of the QPS.

Relevant Legislative Requirements

Strike-Out Applications

5. [5]
   The Court may strike out all or part of the pleading under rule 171 of the UCPR as follows:

171 Striking out pleadings

1. This rule applies if a pleading or part of a pleading—

1. discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or
2. has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or
3. is unnecessary or scandalous; or
4. is frivolous or vexatious; or
5. is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

2. The court, at any stage of the proceeding, may strike out all or part of the pleading and order the costs of the application to be paid by a party calculated on the indemnity basis.
3. On the hearing of an application under subrule (2), the court is not limited to receiving evidence about the pleading.

Deemed Admissions

6. [6]
   Pursuant to rule 166(1) of the UCPR:

1. An allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by an opposite party required to plead to the pleading unless—

1. the allegation is denied or stated to be not admitted by the opposite party in a pleading; or

2. rule 168 applies.

7. [7]
   Rule 166(4) of the UCPR states:

4. A party’s denial or non-admission of an allegation of fact must be accompanied by a direct explanation for the party’s belief that the allegation is untrue or can not be admitted.

8. [8]
   If rule 166(4) is not complied with a party is taken to have admitted the allegation.^[1]
9. [9]
   A party is permitted to plead a conclusion of law or raise a point of law if the party also pleads the material facts in support of the conclusion or point.^[2]

Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld) (CPA)

10. [10]
    The CPA is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to proceedings by or against the Crown.
11. [11]
    Section 8 provides for the mode of proceedings by and against the “Crown”:

8 Proceedings by or against the Crown Mode of proceeding

(1) Subject to this Act and any other Act or law, a claim by or against the Crown may be made and enforced by a proceeding by or against the Crown under the title the ‘State of Queensland’.

12. [12]
    “Crown” is defined section 7 of the CPA to mean “the Crown in right of the State of Queensland and includes a corporation representing the Crown, constituted by or under any Act or incorporated or registered under the Corporations Act”.

Parliamentary Service Act 1988 (Qld) (PSA)

13. [13]
    The PSA establishes a parliamentary service which provides support services to the Legislative Assembly.
14. [14]
    The following sections of the PSA are relevant to this matter:

18 The Clerk of the Parliament

1. There shall from time to time be appointed an officer of the Legislative Assembly to be known as the Clerk of the Parliament.
2. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Governor by commission on the recommendation of the Minister after consultation with the Speaker

19 Functions of the Clerk of the Parliament other than as chief executive of parliamentary service

The Clerk of the Parliament shall be responsible for—

1. the noting of all proceedings of the Legislative Assembly;
2. the carrying out of such duties and the exercising of such powers as may be conferred on the Clerk by law or by the standing rules and orders, customs and practices of the Legislative Assembly.

20 Functions of the Clerk of the Parliament as chief executive of parliamentary service

1. Subject to this Act, to the control and direction of the Speaker and to policies (if any) from time to time determined by the Speaker, the Clerk, as the chief executive of the parliamentary service, shall be responsible to the Speaker for the efficient and economical management of the parliamentary service.
2. The Clerk may make recommendations to the Speaker with respect to any matter for consideration by the Speaker and shall take such steps as are necessary to implement those policies and decisions of the Speaker that require action to be taken by the parliamentary service.

3. The Clerk is to be the employing authority, for the Legislative Assembly, of parliamentary service officers and employees

23 Parliamentary service

1. There is hereby established a parliamentary service.
2. The parliamentary service is not an instrument of the Executive Government.
3. The parliamentary service shall consist of—

1. officers of the Legislative Assembly being—

1. the Clerk who shall be the chief executive of the parliamentary service; and
2. other officers required to sit at the table of the House; and
3. the parliamentary librarian; and
4. the chief reporter; and (b) other officers of and employees in the parliamentary service

26A Officers and employees employed under this Act

Officers and employees of the parliamentary service are to be employed under this Act, and not under the Public Sector Act 2022.

Defendant’s Submissions on Strike-out Application

15. [15]
    The defendant submits that the State of Queensland is not the correctly named defendant and contends the appropriate defendant is the employer of the plaintiff, who was the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly.
16. [16]
    The defendant relies in support of its contentions on:

    1. the statutory framework of the PSA; and
    2. sections 7 and 8 of the CPA.
17. [17]
    The defendant submits that the phrase “Crown in the right of the State of Queensland” in section 7 of the CPA means the Executive Government of Queensland. Neither the Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Service or Clerk are part of the Executive Government pursuant to section 23(2) of the PSA and therefore the State of Queensland is not the correct entity to be sued in this proceeding. The State is not the employer of the plaintiff.
18. [18]
    In support of the contention that the Clerk is the appropriate defendant to be named in the proceedings, the defendant relied on the following matters arising pursuant to the PSA:

    1. the Clerk is not an employee of the Crown but an officer of the Legislative Assembly who exercises power independently of Executive Government;^[3]
    2. Officers and employees of the QPS are employed under the PSA and not under the Public Service Act 2022 (Qld);
    3. the Clerk is the employer of officers and employees of the parliamentary service;^[4] and
    4. the Clerk is a legal person capable of being sued.
19. [19]
    The defendant submits that the whole of the statement of claim should be struck out under rule 171, UCPR.

Plaintiff’s Submissions on Strike-out Application

20. [20]
    The plaintiff submits the proper defendant to the proceeding is the State of Queensland and relied in support of that contention on the following:

    1. the Defendant’s admission that the Plaintiff was employed by the QPS;
    2. the decision in Carey v State of Queensland [2021] QIRC 358 (Carey) which the plaintiff asserts supports a finding that a person employed by the QPS was employed by the State of Queensland, and the State of Queensland was the proper respondent to the claim;
    3. the ABN on the Plaintiff’s payslips during the relevant period is listed as being associated with a State Government Entity; and
    4. section 8 of the CPA.
21. [21]
    The plaintiff also relied on the following cases:

    1. Sneddon v The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly [2011] NSWSC 508 (Sneddon); and
    2. Greguric v Department of Works, Queensland [1988] 2 Qd R 545 (Greguric).
22. [22]
    The plaintiff disputed the defendant’s interpretation of the PSA because there is no express statement in the PSA that the QPS or the Clerk are legal entities capable of being sued. The plaintiff drew an analogy with the Queensland Ambulance Service where employees of the QAS have been held to be employees of the State.^[5]
23. [23]
    The plaintiff asserts that the defendant has fallen into the type of error contemplated by Williams J in Greguric:^[6]

Whilst government departments hold themselves out as the employers of public servants, and purport to deal as such with members of the public, it is not surprising that it is only a lawyer who can fathom the mysteries, realise that there is no such legal entity as a government department despite the representations it makes, and appreciate that the only legal entity is the State of Queensland. But even the lawyers sometimes, quite understandably, fall into the error of believing that a government department purporting to “hire and fire” employees existed in law and was the relevant employer.

Consideration

24. [24]
    The Crown is a representative of the executive government. The CPA provides that claims made against the Crown or the executive of the State of Queensland which are enforceable by a “proceeding” may be made under the title the “State of Queensland”. If there is no proper claim that can be enforced by a proceeding to be made against the Crown, it is improper to have joined the State of Queensland to the proceeding.
25. [25]
    Section 23 of the PSA establishes the Parliamentary service. Section 23(2) expressly states that “the Parliamentary service is not an instrument of the executive government”. What does this mean? The rules of statutory construction are well-known. The interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred.^[7] In Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573 the High Court held:

[44] The application of the rules will properly involve the identification of a statutory purpose, which may appear from an express statement in the relevant statute, by inference from its terms and by appropriate reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose of a statute is not something which exists outside the statute. It resides in its text and structure, albeit it may be identified by reference to common law and statutory rules of construction. 

[45] In this context, reference should be made to s 14A(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Q), which requires a purposive construction of Queensland statutes and is in the following terms:

"Interpretation best achieving Act's purpose

1. In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation."

The term "purpose" is defined to include "policy objective". Section 14A(1) was introduced into the Acts Interpretation Act in 1991 but may be taken, as required by s 2 of the Act, to apply to all Acts, including those which predated its enactment.  

[46] Section 14A requires preference to be given to that interpretation which will best achieve the purpose of the Act. …Assuming that s 14A is not intended to displace common law rules outside its sphere of operation, the interpretations from which the selection which it mandates is to be made must be those which comply with the requirements of those rules, none of which is antagonistic to purposive construction.

[citations omitted]

26. [26]
    The PSA establishes a parliamentary service which provides support services to the Legislative Assembly. It establishes the roles of the Speaker and the Clerk and their management and other powers. The PSA defines the employment relationships between the Speaker, Clerk and employees of the PSA.
27. [27]
    Section 20 provides the Clerk is to be the employing authority for the Legislative Assembly, parliamentary service officers and employees. The plaintiff, it is agreed, is an employee in the QPS.^[8] Section 26(1) of the PSA provides that the Clerk may appoint a person as an employee in the Parliamentary service. Section 26A then provides:

officers and employees of the parliamentary service are to be employed under this Act, and not under the Public Sector Act 2022.

28. [28]
    Section 29 of the PSA concerns salaries and conditions of employment. It provides that the Clerk shall determine the remuneration and allowances of employees of the QPS subject to any applicable industrial instrument.^[9] Section 29(3) provides that the Clerk must ensure the remuneration, conditions of employment and other benefits given to Parliamentary service officers and employees are compatible to those of state officers and employees who have similar duties. Section 29 highlights a distinction between employees of the state who are otherwise governed by, among other legislation, the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), and employees employed under the PSA. Section 29(4) again stresses that employees in the Parliamentary service are not officers of the public service. The Clerk has the power to take disciplinary action in relation to an employee in the QPS in circumstances set out in section 40, or to suspend or dismiss an employee (sections 41-42) consistent with the powers given to an employer.
29. [29]
    The content and structure of the PSA demonstrate that the QPS is independent of the Executive Government. It is not acting as an agent of the Crown, and the Crown cannot be held vicariously liable for its actions. It is not controlled by government in order to exercise any government authority.
30. [30]
    Consistent with the PSA:

    1. the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) expressly states that the QPS is not a government entity;^[10] and
    2. the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) provides:
       1. the QPS is not a public service entity;^[11] and
       2. that QPS employees are not public sector employees.^[12] Public service employees are employed in departments or public service offices.^[13]
31. [31]
    The decision of Etter v State of Tasmania [2013] TASSC 65 (Etter) illustrates the necessity of considering the relevant establishing legislation in concluding whether a body is an agent or instrument of the Crown. In Etter, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the State of Tasmania claiming duties owed to her as an employee of the Integrity Commission had been breached. Tasmania’s Crown Proceedings Act 1995 is in similar terms to the CPA. The State of Tasmania argued the Chief Commissioner and Commissioner Board were not acting as agents of the Crown and therefore there was no proper cause of action that could be maintained. The Court considered the Integrity Commission Act 2009 (Tas) which established the Integrity Commission. In Etter the court found that the integrity commission was “created to discharge governmental functions and specifically provided that the commission was an instrumentality of the Crown”.
32. [32]
    The Court in Etter held that by its establishing Act, the integrity commission was an instrument of the Crown referring to several authorities including Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334 (Inglis).
33. [33]
    In Inglis the High Court approached a question of whether the bank was being sued as the Commonwealth on its behalf, by asking the following question (at 338):

…is it, on the one hand, an intention that the Commonwealth shall operate in a particular field through a corporation created for the purpose; or is it, on the other hand, an intention to put into the field a corporation to perform its functions independently of the Commonwealth, that is to say otherwise than as a Commonwealth instrument, so that the concept of a Commonwealth activity cannot realistically be applied to that which the corporation does?

34. [34]
    There are significant relevant differences between the PSA and the Integrity Commission Act in terms of what is expressed about the Commission’s position in relation to government and how officers and employees are engaged. Persons may be appointed under the Integrity Commission Act, but they remain subject to the State Service Act 2000 (Tas) (the equivalent of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld)). Here, it is expressly stated that employees are employed under the PSA and not the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld). The Integrity Commission Act expressly states in section 7(3)(d) the “integrity commission is an instrumentality of the Crown”. Etter demonstrates that if parliament had intended the QPS to be an instrument or agent of the Crown it could have provided for that within the PSA, Public Sector and Public Service legislation. Parliament instead expressed the opposite position was the case in clear, unambiguous language.
35. [35]
    I note also the decision of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Egg Corporation Limited [2016] FCA 69; 337 ALR 573 where White J, referring to Inglis, reiterated:

[97] The determination of whether an entity is part of the Crown as executive is to be made by reference to the legislation by which the body is established or governed and, in particular, the legislative intention, the activities which it undertakes and the nature and extent of the governmental or ministerial control over the body.

36. [36]
    It is clear from the PSA that Parliament did not intend to “put into the field” a Parliamentary service through which it operated. The intention was to create a Parliamentary service which operated independently of the state.
37. [37]
    The Crown has no reserved rights to the QPS and its operations.
38. [38]
    The defendant referred to Frost v Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales [2011] NSWSC 639. In that case the plaintiff sought damages against the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, the State of New South Wales and a Member of the Legislative Assembly, for breach of duty of care to provide a safe workplace. The plaintiff claimed the State of New South Wales owed the same duty of care as the Speaker. The Court held that the Executive is generally considered to be the Government^[14] and held that the plaintiff’s argument that a Member of Parliament is not part of the ‘Crown’ was arguable.^[15] The Court said at [30].

[21]…Whether a statutory corporation or other body can be said to represent the Crown depends upon whether the relevant legislation makes express provision for it so to do, or, if not, whether it is to be inferred from the particular relationship which the legislation creates between the corporation or body and the Crown. By including statutory corporations within the definition of Crown, it makes it clear that they are subject in civil proceedings to the formula proposed in s 5 ss 2. Hence it does not appear that the term “other body” was intended to include a Member of Parliament. Rather, the term “other body” appears to be directed at other Government departments or organisations which represent the Crown.

[emphasis added]

39. [39]
    Frost emphasises that the determination depends upon the existence of an express/inferred position arising out of the relevant legislation.
40. [40]
    In Greguric the plaintiff sought compensation for injuries suffered while performing her cleaning duties at the Executive Building. The defendant named on the writ was “Department of Works, Queensland”. It was not controversial that this name was a not a legal entity as opposed to the Queensland Government, and that the State of Queensland was the proper (correct) defendant. This matter is distinguishable from the scenario contemplated in Greguric because this matter does not involve a government department which is a branch or organ of government^[16] but a separate independent service established by statute and with express statutory language defining the employment relationship and establishing that the QPS is not an agent instrument of the Crown.
41. [41]
    The QPS is not a legal entity. The Clerk is the employing authority. The Queensland Police Service is analogous. In Markan v Queensland Police Service [2015] QCA 22 the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the “Queensland Police Service”. The Court of Appeal held that the Queensland Police Service is a non-existent defendant and that there is no legal entity known as the Queensland Police Service.^[17] This was despite a statutory obligation under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) which required a Queensland Police Service to be established and maintained. On the other hand, the Court noted that there is a Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service, which is an office established by section 4.1 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), is responsible for the efficient and proper administration, management and functioning of the police service. The Court did not need to ultimately determine who the proper defendant should be in that matter.
42. [42]
    In Sneddon the plaintiff was appointed as an electorate officer in an electorate office. She was selected by the member for the relevant seat and the Speaker approved the appointment. The plaintiff claimed she was bullied, victimised and harassed whilst she was working in the electorate office and consequently suffered psychiatric harm. The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the member, the Speaker and the State of New South Wales. The claim against the State of New South Wales was pleaded in negligence, breach of statutory duty and vicarious liability for the member’s conduct. The State of NSW denied any liability. It was not in dispute that the Speaker was the employer of the plaintiff and rightfully named as a defendant.^[18]
43. [43]
    At first instance, Price J referred to the authorities which suggest that the words in the NSW Crown Proceedings Act "in right of New South Wales", (the equivalent to s 8 of the CPA) means:^[19]

[237]… in right of the polity constituted by the State Government: see for example: Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd [1920] HCA 54; (1920) 28 CLR 129 at 152-153 and at 159; McNamara v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2005] HCA 55; (2005) 221 CLR 646 at [54]. But that does not mean that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed against the State for the tortious acts of the third defendant.

44. [44]
    Price J concluded the State was not liable for a minister’s conduct. Vicarious liability is established under section 8 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW).^[20] Price J went on to note that in matters of tort the authorities establish:

[239]… the Crown was not considered liable "if the tortfeasor was executing an independent duty that which the law cast upon him": Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 34; (1986) 160 CLR 626 per Gibbs CJ at 639. In the course of his judgment, Gibbs CJ cited what was said by Dixon J in Field v Nott [1939] HCA 41; (1939) 62 CLR 660 at 675:

"When a public officer, although a servant of the Crown, is exercising an independent duty which the law casts upon him, the Crown is not liable for the wrongful acts he may commit in the course of his execution. As the law charges him with a discretion and responsibility which rests upon him in virtue of his office or of some designation under the law, he alone is liable for any breach of duty."

45. [45]
    The majority of the NSW Court of Appeal found for the plaintiff against all three parties and found:

    1. the Speaker was acting as part of the Executive Government of the State in employing the plaintiff;
    2. the State Member was the Speaker’s delegate;
    3. the "Crown" at least includes the executive branch of government;
    4. the State Member was acting in the "service of the Crown" pursuant to s 8(1) of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 when acting as The Speaker's delegate.
46. [46]
    On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the State of New South Wales was liable because the Member was acting “in the service of the Crown”.^[21]
47. [47]
    That is, the State was liable pursuant to express legislation whereby the Crown is vicariously liable in respect of the tort committed by a person in the service of the Crown. 
48. [48]
    Meagher JA dissented, finding that a member carrying out their duties is not an agent or instrument of the State.^[22]
49. [49]
    Sneddon is not particularly helpful here and caution should be exercised in its application to Queensland matters because of the different legislative frameworks. New South Wales has specific legislation by way of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), which Queensland does not. The Court of Appeal noted:

[27] Pursuant to statutory reforms which commenced in South Australia in 1853 and in New South Wales in 1857, the State is now liable for the tortious conduct of employees, officers, and others in its service, in respect of acts or omissions in those respective capacities.

50. [50]
    Another distinguishing feature of Sneddon as identified by the defendant, is that the plaintiff was appointed under section 47 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) by the Executive Government. Here, the plaintiff was appointed by the Clerk under the PSA. As discussed above, it is expressly stated in the PSA that the Parliamentary Service is not part of the Executive Government of Queensland and QPS employees are not public sector employees.
51. [51]
    The plaintiff also relied on the Industrial Relations Commission decision in Carey. Carey was concerned with an application for legal representation in the circumstances of a case for reinstatement following termination. In that matter Merrell DP found the State was the employer for three reasons:

    1. In his opinion, “despite s 23(2) of the Parliamentary Service Act 1988 providing that the Parliamentary Service is not an instrument of the Executive Government, that does not mean that a person employed by the Clerk as an officer or employee in the Parliamentary Service is not employed by the State”;
    2. The Parliamentary Service is an unincorporated body…There is no provision in the Parliamentary Service Act 1988 which has the effect that a person employed in the Parliamentary Service is employed other than by the State. Despite s 49(1) of the PSA, the State may still be the employer of officers or employees of the Parliamentary Service;
    3. The appointment of employees by the Clerk is analogous to the appointment of employees by chief executives of State government departments pursuant to the Public Service Act 2008, where the chief executives are agents of the State, such that those persons are employed by the State.
52. [52]
    Respectfully, I do not find the reasoning in Carey persuasive because:^[23]

    1. it was concerned with the proper party in the context of industrial proceedings;
    2. there was limited explanation of the findings, despite the words expressed to the contrary of these findings in the PSA;
    3. there was no consideration given to the definition of the Crown and the circumstances under which proceedings can be brought against the Crown by the CPA.
53. [53]
    The conclusions reached are difficult to reconcile in the face of the clear language of the PSA.
54. [54]
    I accept the defendant’s submission that the Deputy President’s analogy with chief executives of State government departments is inapt. Chief executives in government departments appoint/employ persons as part of the Executive branch.
55. [55]
    With respect to the plaintiff’s analogy with the QAS and the decision in State of Queensland v Roane-Spray [2017] QCA 245; [2018] 2 Qd R 511 (Roane-Spray), this is distinguishable from the matter here because the QAS is an unincorporated entity and was found by the Court of Appeal to not represent the State. Roane-Spray concerned whether the State was not liable because it was entitled to the benefit of the protection against civil liability afforded to certain entities performing duties to enhance public safety, in circumstances of emergency, conferred by section 27 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).  This is not applicable here.
56. [56]
    Another analogy is in the case of TAFE. Aside from the board and CEO, TAFE's other staff are appointed under the TAFE Queensland Act 2013 (Qld) and not the Public Service Act 2008.^[24] TAFE is not a government entity. The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission found that employees of TAFE were not employees of the State.^[25]
57. [57]
    A proper interpretation of the PSA, in conjunction with the CPA, leads to the conclusion that the State of Queensland is not the proper defendant in this matter. The Crown in right of the State of Queensland can only be sued in accordance with the CPA.^[26] 

Conclusion

58. [58]
    I am satisfied that the necessary condition required to engage the Court’s power to strike out the plaintiff’s pleading in whole is satisfied. I am satisfied that the defendant is not the proper defendant and therefore the pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the defendant and should be struck out in its entirety under rule 171(1)(a).
59. [59]
    The defendant’s application is upheld.
60. [60]
    As the whole of the Statement of Claim has been struck out, there is no need to consider whether the defendant should be deemed to have admitted any allegations in its defence.

Costs

61. [61]
    The starting point is that costs usually follow the event and are ordered to be paid on a standard basis.^[27] The plaintiff contends that in proceedings governed by the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCA), the ordinary position, under section 316 of the WCA, is no order as to costs. Section 316 of the WCA is qualified by section 318C of the WCA as follows:

An order about costs for an interlocutory application may be made under division 2 only if the court is satisfied that the application has been brought because of unreasonable delay by 1 of the parties.

62. [62]
    The plaintiff complains that the respondent has unreasonably delayed bringing the strike-out application, having been on notice of the plaintiff’s claim against it since the Statement of Claim was filed and served on 8 January 2025. Since that time, there were a number of extension requests from the respondent, with the pleadings finally closing on 27 March 2025. There was some communication between the parties regarding standing and assertions of deemed admissions. No response was forthcoming from the respondent regarding next steps between 1 May 2025 and 18 June 2025 despite the plaintiff’s attempts.
63. [63]
    The respondent filed the strike-out application on 18 June 2025.
64. [64]
    I requested the respondent provide its submissions on costs, but none were forthcoming.
65. [65]
    While there has been some delay by the respondent in furnishing its defence and responding to correspondence, I am not persuaded that it was “unreasonable”. The respondent requested extensions of time based on counsel’s availability. All but one of the requests were granted up to the time the defence was filed on 27 March 2025. It is clearly articulated in the defence that the respondent would contend that it had been incorrectly named as a defendant. The parties exchanged rule 444 and rule 455 correspondence between March and April. Despite being on notice of the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff decided to proceed with her claim which has now been struck out.
66. [66]
    Other than the failure to respond to telephone calls made by the plaintiff’s solicitor to Crown Law between 1 May and 13 June 2025, the plaintiff’s submissions do no articulate why this delay was “unreasonable”. I note the comments of Long SC DCJ in Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation [2012] QDC 36:

[49]… [the] obvious hurdle [in applying s 318C] of having to demonstrate that               “the application was the result of unreasonable delay”, which appears to               encompass something more than the Defendant unsuccessfully taking to a point,               which has resulted in some delay in the progress of the matter.

67. [67]
    Here, the “delay” does not seem overly long and the respondent successfully took the point about the plaintiff’s pleadings.
68. [68]
    Further, my reading of section 318C is that it relates to an application having to be made because of a delay. That is, but for the “unreasonable delay” of one party, the other party had to make the interlocutory application.^[28] The application complained of here was made by the respondent, not the applicant. The cross-application of the applicant was only made after the respondent filed its strike-out application.
69. [69]
    The respondent’s application was not brought as a result of any articulated delay by the plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff submits it has acted reasonably in attempting to progress the matter. There is nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions which articulates that her application had to be brought due to the delay of the respondent. To the extent that this is what was intended to be submitted, there is no explanation for why having heard nothing further from the respondent the applicant then delayed herself in bringing her application.
70. [70]
    Even if I had been satisfied that the criteria under section 318C had been met, given the outcome of the applications, the appropriate outcome in terms of costs is that there be no order as to costs.