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Handley v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 116

Handley v Commissioner of Police[2024] QDC 116

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Handley v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 116

PARTIES:

MARTIN DAVID HANDLEY

(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

DC 90 of 2023

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

26 July 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Southport

HEARING DATE:

29 February and 26 April 2024

JUDGES:

Wooldridge KC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Appeal dismissed.
  1. The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent, fixed in the amount of $1800.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE – an appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant was convicted of an offence of Disobeying the speed limit pursuant to regulation 20 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) – where the appellant was fined $183 and ordered to pay costs of $105.35 – where the appellant contends the learned Magistrate could not have been satisfied of the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt – where the appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court of Queensland and the validity of the prosecution – where the appellant suggests he has been denied procedural fairness – where the appellant contends the sentence imposed was excessive.

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223, 225

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9(9)(a), 179C

State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) s 157(2)

Transport Operations (Road Use Management Act) 1999 (Qld) ss 114(8), 120(2A), 123C

Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) rr 20, 21

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Dafydd v The Commissioner of Police [2013] QDC 12

Elliott v Commissioner of Police [2014] QDC 161

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Holden v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 217

House v The King (1936) 5 CLR 499

Hubner v Erbacher; Hubner v Morely [2004] QDC 345

Jones v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 113

Lee v Lee (2019) 372 ALR 383

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612

Parsons v Raby [2007] QCA 98

Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550

R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550

R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209

R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216

Stoneman v The Commissioner of Police (District Court of Queensland, Kingham DCJ, 30 November 2012)

White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121

Woodhead v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 14

Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584

Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

AM Baker-Smith for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the respondent

Background

  1. [1]
    The appellant was charged with an offence of Disobeying the speed limit in contravention of regulation 20 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management–Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) [“Queensland Road Rules”].
  2. [2]
    The matter proceeded to trial on 17 March 2023. The learned Magistrate found the appellant guilty of the offence. He was convicted, fined $183, and ordered to pay costs of $105.35. He was given 30 days to pay.
  3. [3]
    On 14 April 2023, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal seeking to appeal the orders made on 17 March 2023. The Notice of Appeal did not expressly provide whether the appellant was seeking to appeal against his conviction and/or sentence specifically. However, the appellant has since indicated that he seeks to appeal against both his conviction and his sentence.

Nature of the appeal

  1. [4]
    The appeal is brought pursuant to section 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) [“the Act”].
  2. [5]
    Subject to any granting of leave to adduce new evidence, an appeal pursuant to section 222 of the Act is by way of rehearing on the evidence before the Magistrates Court.[1] 
  3. [6]
    To succeed on the appeal the appellant must establish that the order the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error.[2] An appellate court is required to conduct a real review of the evidence, and the learned Magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination on the factual and legal issues presented, giving due deference to the view of the Magistrate at first instance.[3] That includes giving due weight to factual findings, where supported by evidence and reflecting opinions reached on the credibility of the witnesses, mindful of the advantage of the Magistrate to have observed the witnesses giving evidence.[4]
  4. [7]
    The powers of a Judge on an appeal under section 222 of the Act are prescribed in section 225 of the Act, which provides:

“225 Powers of judge on hearing appeal

  1. On the hearing of an appeal, the judge may confirm, set aside or vary the appealed order  or make any other order in the matter the judge considers just.
  1. If the judge sets aside an order, the judge may send the proceeding back to whoever made the order or to any Magistrates Court with directions of any kind for the further conduct of the proceedings including, for example, directions for rehearing or reconsideration.
  1. For subsection (1), the judge may exercise any power that could have been exercised by whoever made the order appealed against.

…”

The proceedings before the Magistrates Court

  1. [8]
    Regulation 20 of the Queensland Road Rules provides:

20  Obeying the speed limit

A driver must not drive at a speed over the speed limit applying to the driver for the length of road where the driver is driving.

Maximum penalty—40 penalty units.

  1. [9]
    The charge brought against the appellant was in the following terms[5]:

…that on the 6th day of February 2022 at Palm Beach in the Magistrates Court District of Gold Coast, in the State of Queensland one Martin David HANDLEY being the driver of a vehicle namely a car drove at a speed over the speed limit namely 70 kilometres per hour applying to the driver for the length of road, namely Gold Coast Highway Palm Beach, where the said driver was driving and it is averred that the said car is a vehicle as defined in section 4 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 and it is averred that the said Gold Coast Highway is a road as defined in schedule 4 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995.

  1. [10]
    The offence is a prescribed offence for the purposes of Part 7 Division 2 Transport Operations (Road Use Management Act) 1999 (Qld) [“TORUM”][6]. Section 114, within Part 7 Division 2 provides as follows:

“114  Offences detected by photographic detection device

  1. If a prescribed offence happens and the offence is detected by a photographic detection device, a person is taken to have committed the offence if the person was the person in charge of the vehicle that was involved in the offence at the time the offence happened even though the actual offender may have been someone else.
  1. If the actual offender is someone else, subsection (1) does not affect the liability of the actual offender but the person in charge and the actual offender can not both be punished for the offence.
  1. It is a defence to a camera-detected offence, other than an unregistered or uninsured offence, for a person to prove that—
  1. the person was not the driver of the vehicle at the time the offence happened; and
  1. the person—
  1. has notified the commissioner, the chief executive or the SPEA administering authority of the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at the time the offence happened; or
  1. has notified the commissioner, the chief executive or the SPEA administering authority that the person did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained the name and address of the person in charge of the vehicle at the time the offence happened.

…”

  1. [11]
    The prosecution relied upon a number of documentary exhibits in proof of the charge against the appellant.
  2. [12]
    Exhibit 1 was a photograph depicting a grey wagon style vehicle, bearing rear number plate 483SSH, travelling on the opposite side of the carriage way from where the photograph was taken. Data on the image records the photograph to have been taken by Vitronic system PS-930039 at 13:07 on 6 February 2022 at location code 756291003, the speed limit for the location to have been 70km/hr, and the speed at which the vehicle was travelling to have been 78km/hr. Exhibit 2 was a zoomed photograph depicting the number plate of the vehicle in Exhibit 1 – 483SSH.
  3. [13]
    Each of Exhibits 1 and 2 were accompanied by a certificate entitled “Certificate (Image Taken by an Approved Photographic Detection Device)” produced pursuant to section 120 TORUM. In each instance the certificate stated that the image was properly taken by the identified photographic detection device serial number 930039, the details of which are printed on the image in Exhibit 1, and at the location of “Gold Coast Hwy, Palm Beach” at 13:07 on 6 February 2022. Consequently, pursuant to section 120(2), Exhibit 1 and 2 were evidence of the things depicted in the image, what was depicted happening at the specified location and time, the accuracy of the image, and that any requirements prescribed by regulation about the operation and testing of a photographic detection device were complied with for the specified device at all material times.
  4. [14]
    Exhibit 4 was a certificate, entitled “Certificate (Camera Site Number of the Traffic Camera Coding Manual)” produced pursuant to section 123C(3) TORUM, and an accompanying document from the Traffic Camera Coding Manual in relation to the relevant camera site code number 756291003, evidencing the speed limit for the site was “70”, consistent with the location code and speed limit of 70km/hr depicted on the image in Exhibit 1.
  5. [15]
    Exhibit 3 was a certificate entitled “Certificate (Photographic Detection Device – Test)” produced pursuant to section 120(2A) TORUM. The certificate was evidence that, as stated in the certificate, the photographic detection device used to take the images in Exhibits 1 and 2, and named in the certificate accompanying Exhibits 1 and 2:
    1. had been tested at 11am on 6 December 2021, in accordance with
      1. (i)
        the specifications of the device’s manufacturer; and
      1. (ii)
        any further requirements about calibration testing prescribed under a regulation; and
    2. the photographic detection device was found to be producing accurate results at the time of testing;

and further that the device was producing accurate results for one year after the specified date of testing.

  1. [16]
    Exhibit 10 was a certificate produced pursuant to section 123C(1), Schedule 1 Item 10 of TORUM. The certificate was relied upon to evidence that the vehicle depicted in the photographs in Exhibits 1 and 2 and bearing registration number 483SSH was registered to Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd, as well as the address for that entity included within the records of the Chief Executive of the Department of Transport and Main Roads.
  2. [17]
    Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6 were each certificates produced pursuant to section 157(2) State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld). Collectively, the certificates stated – and were relied upon to evidence – the following matters:
  1. On 14 February 2022, an Infringement notice for the offence of Exceeding the Speed Limit on 6 February 2022 at 13:07pm, in relation to a vehicle bearing the registration 483SSH, was served by post on Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd at a specified address.
  2. On 14 March 2022, the appellant gave the Registrar a valid declaration[7] pursuant to section 114(8) TORUM, nominating himself to be the driver of the vehicle in the offence.
  3. On 18 March 2022, the Infringement Notice served 14 February 2022 was withdrawn, and a new Infringement notice for the offence of Exceeding the Speed Limit on 6 February 2022 at 13:07pm in a vehicle bearing the registration 483SSH, was served by post on the appellant at a specified address.
  4. The appellant had not given the Registrar an illegal user declaration, known or unknown user declaration, or sold vehicle declaration for the offence.
  1. [18]
    At the time of Exhibit 5 being tendered, the appellant identified that the declaration that he had made (to which Exhibit 5 referred) was that he was “THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE VEHICLE”, not that he was the driver. That was accepted by the learned Magistrate to be correct, and her Honour noted that, to that extent, the wording of Exhibit 5 did not reflect the true position. 
  2. [19]
    Exhibit 8 is a copy of the infringement notice served on Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd, referred to in Exhibit 5, and the original Statutory Declaration under the hand of the appellant, being the declaration referred to in Exhibit 5.[8] The infringement notice provided details of the alleged offence of Exceed speed limit in speed zone by less than 13km/hr (Organisation) – that at 13:07 on 6 February 2022 the vehicle bearing registration 483SSH, being a vehicle registered to Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd, was travelling at an alleged speed of 78km/hr in a 70km/hr zone. The infringement notice included copies of the images tendered as Exhibits 1 and 2 at trial. The infringement notice specified the appellant’s options to pay the amount due, submit a declaration, or elect to proceed to court. The amount due to be paid, if the fine were to be paid, being a fine issued on a corporation, was $919. The notice provided that a person need be an Executive Officer of a corporation to submit a declaration on behalf of the corporation.
  3. [20]
    The appellant signed the declaration in his purported capacity as Director of “A Airtemperature” of an address which was consistent with the address of Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd to which the original infringement notice was sent. The declaration is completed as having been signed before a Justice of the Peace. The declaration as completed, included the following being declared by the appellant, “conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act”:

“I MARTIN DAVID HANDLEY of A AIRTEMPERATURE, DIRECTOR, of [ADDRESS]… Do solemnly and sincerely declare that at 13:07 on 06/02/2022 THE PERSON IN CHARGE* OF THE VEHICLE REGISTRATION NUMBER 483SSH WAS: MARTIN DAVID HANDLEY [DOB] [LICENCE NUMBER] [ADDRESS].[9]

That is, the appellant nominated himself as the person in charge of the vehicle at the time of the offence.

  1. [21]
    As was identified by the learned Magistrate in the course of her reasons, pursuant to section 114 TORUM, where a prescribed offence happens – Disobeying the speed limit being a prescribed offence – and the offence is detected by a photographic detection device, a person is taken to have committed the offence if they were the person in charge of the vehicle that was involved in the offence at the time the offence happened. That is so even though the actual offender may have been someone else.
  2. [22]
    Exhibit 9 was a copy of the Infringement Notice which was then issued in relation to MARTIN DAVID HANDLEY[10], referred to in Exhibit 6. The details of the alleged offence remained the same as in the earlier Infringement Notice issued in relation to Handley Investments Australia Pty Ltd, other than the omission of “(Organisation)” from the “Offence” title. The notice indicated the reduced penalty of $183, and one penalty unit, reflecting that the penalty was in relation to an offence by an individual rather than a corporation.
  3. [23]
    Exhibit 11 was a copy of a form entitled “Intention to Challenge or Dispute”. The appellant completed the form with his name “MARTIN DAVID HANDLEY”, date of birth, residential address, email address and telephone number.
  4. [24]
    Where the form required the “Court hearing details” to be entered, the appellant crossed-out the reference to “Magistrates Court” and wrote “A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION THAT CONFIRMS TO CHAPTER 111 OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION ACT 1900 (UK)”.
  5. [25]
    The appellant ticked a box to indicate that he intended to challenge “that a traffic control device or sign was visible”. Under the heading “Grounds for this challenge/dispute”, the appellant wrote:

“SPEED SIGNS NOT CLEARLY VISIBLE

NO WARNING SIGN OF A RADAR TRAP IN THE AREA”.

  1. [26]
    The appellant also ticked boxed indicating that he intended to challenge/dispute “the accuracy of a photographic detection device”, “the image from the photographic detection device”, and “a marking or writing made by a photographic detection device”. Under the heading “Grounds for this challenge/dispute”, the appellant wrote:

“I REQUIRE PROOF THAT THE PHOTO “EVIDENCE” HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED, ALTERED, PHOTOSHOPPED, ENHANCED, OR MANIPULATED IN ANY WAY

NO MAN MADE DEVICE IS 100% ACCURATE

WHAT DEGREES OF INACCURACY IS ALLOWABLE IN THE SETTING UP AND PERFORMANCE OF THE DEVICE. WHERE WAS THE POWER SOURCED?”

  1. [27]
    At the commencement of the hearing, the prosecutor informed the learned Magistrate of the appellant having lodged a notice of intention to challenge the accuracy of the device and the positioning of the speed signs.  In response to the appellant’s notice of challenge, the prosecutor indicated that the prosecution intended to call two witnesses, Senior Constable Anthony Vickers who was the officer performing speed camera duties at the relevant site and time when the appellant’s vehicle was said to have been photographed exceeding the speed limit, and Steven Simons, Principal Advisor at the Mobile Camera Road Operations Group, Queensland Police Service.
  2. [28]
    After the aforementioned exhibits 1 to 11 were tendered, and prior to any witnesses being called, the learned Magistrate explained to the appellant that the onus was on the prosecution to prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. As to the witnesses to be called, her Honour informed the appellant as follows:

HER HONOUR:Once their evidence-in-chief is concluded, you will have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It is important that if there is anything the witness has said that you disagree with, it is important that you raise that issue with the witness in cross-examination. Also, if at the end of the day there’s a version of events which you’re going to ask I need to accept, and the witness is in a position to comment on that version of events, you will need to ask the witness to do so as a matter of procedural fairness, so that I can see what the witness has to say about what you have to say, essentially.

  1. [29]
    The learned Magistrate also informed the appellant that at the close of the prosecution case he would be called upon to make an election as to whether he wanted to give evidence and/or call evidence, that he was under no obligation to do so, but that the Court could only act on matters of which there was evidence before it. If he or other witnesses did give evidence, that would be subject to an oath or affirmation, and the witness would also be liable to cross-examination. The appellant was given the opportunity to ask any questions he may have had.

Evidence of Officer Vickers

  1. [30]
    Senior Constable Anthony Ross Vickers gave evidence that he was stationed with the Camera Forensic Crash Unit. He had completed the Vitronic speed camera course, being the type of camera he was operating on the day of the offence charged. On the offence date, he was located on the Gold Coast Highway at Palm Beach, south of Thrower Drive, on the western side of the road. There were speed signs facing both north and southbound traffic in the approach to the area where he was positioned. 
  2. [31]
    Exhibit 12 was a photograph, of two 70km/hr speed signs, which were facing – and would be passed by – traffic that was travelling south along the Gold Coast Highway  after having passed the intersection with Thrower Road. The photograph was not taken on the day of the offence, however Officer Vickers gave evidence that he had on the day seen two 70km/hr speed signs with placement as depicted in the photograph.[11]
  3. [32]
    The officer then travelled south, over the bridge into Currumbin, before turning around, and travelling back in the direction from which he had come to station his vehicle on the western side of the Gold Coast Highway (being the opposite side from where the photograph in Exhibit 12 was taken). In doing so, he also observed 70km/hr speed signs facing the traffic travelling north bound at the location.
  4. [33]
    Regulation 21 of the Queensland Road Rules provides that the speed limit applying to a driver for a length of road to which a speed limit sign applies is the number of kilometres per hour indicated by the number on the sign. Here, that was 70km/hr.
  5. [34]
    The officer gave evidence that he set up the vehicle in compliance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and completed all required checks before commencing deployment. He executed the speed camera’s “self-tests”. The outcome of those tests indicated to the officer that the camera was in working order. No faults were shown.
  6. [35]
    Before the officer had left the police station, he had logged into a program which provides sites for the camera. That detail would then be downloaded onto a USB, and the USB then placed into the laptop on the computer. A site description would be depicted on the screen. When set up in the right location, matching the descriptor of the specified site, the border around the site description changes from red to green. The officer gave evidence that he confirmed that he was at the intended location – the border having changed to green. He also entered required data into the program. The main details to be entered were how many lanes (of traffic) there are, how far the vehicle is from the first lane of traffic, the height of the speed camera to the road, and the speed limit. The program then displays an indication as to how strong the “signal” is, to allow the operator to be satisfied that the camera is tracking correctly. A test photograph is taken to ensure that the image captures vehicles within the required “frame”.[12] 
  7. [36]
    The officer then monitored traffic through the screen on the camera. When a vehicle is detected (to be speeding), the camera makes an audible sound and a photo will appear on the laptop screen. At 1:07pm the camera detected a vehicle travelling southbound in the right hand lane. A copy of the photograph taken was tendered as Exhibit 13.
  8. [37]
    The officer gave evidence that he was satisfied that the camera was working correctly on the day. A further “self-test” of the device occurred when the camera was turned off, which indicated that the camera was in proper working order.
  9. [38]
    In cross-examination, the officer accepted that he did not document all of the visual observations he made of all the vehicles that were detected by the device on the day. He maintained that he had heard the laptop make an audible noise when a silver coloured vehicle (by implication, the vehicle depicted in Exhibit 13) travelled past, and that he had included that detail in his statement as something he recalled, and not because he was asked to include it by someone else.

Evidence of Stephen Simons

  1. [39]
    Stephen Simons also gave evidence for the prosecution. He gave evidence that he had been the Principal Advisor at Mobile Camera Operations Group at the Queensland Police Service since February 2017, and that prior to that he was at the Road Safety Camera Office, and a Traffic Camera Officer from mid-2012. He was a police officer for almost 20 years. He had extensive training and experience in the operation of the Vitronic Poliscan device, and had reviewed tens of thousands of deployments throughout his time at the Road Safety Camera Office.
  2. [40]
    Mr Simons gave evidence of the required set up process for the device, and how the system would alert the operator to any error in the process. On the occasion when the appellant’s vehicle was photographed, the deployment complied with requirements, the necessary test shots were taken, and the device was operating as Mr Simons would have expected throughout the deployment. Mr Simons also gave evidence that he had himself verified that the GPS co-ordinates of the location where the device was set up were in accordance with the parameters for the specified camera site.
  3. [41]
    In cross-examination of Mr Simons, the appellant sought to challenge the accuracy of the device by emphasising suggested differences between the circumstances of calibration in a controlled laboratory environment, as compared to those in “the real world”. Mr Simons identified in cross-examination that a test report for the device referred to accuracy to be +/- 2km/hr (up to 100km/hr). The device was calibrated to NATA requirements. Mr Simons also gave evidence that of the 76 Vitronic Poliscan devices in the possession of the Queensland Police Service, each had continued to be calibrated every year, they were still in service, and not one device had ever failed calibration.
  4. [42]
    Mr Simons did not accept the proposition that the light pulses utilised by the device were interfered with by changing temperature, changing humidity or random radio interference. It was accepted that some aspects of weather – such as heavy rain and glaring sun – may impact the quality of the photograph, but that was distinct from the accuracy of the speed detection. If a police vehicle were moving or rocking hard enough that the validity of the reading were impacted, the image would be discarded by the device. The device will only generate a photograph if there is sufficient data provided to generate an accurate reading. Any error would stop the operation of the device. When the appellant queried if a photograph had ever issued in circumstances where it was later found that there were errors with the deployment of the device, Mr Simons denied this.
  5. [43]
    Mr Simons gave further evidence in relation to the “frame” that Officer Vickers gave evidence of, as depicted in Exhibits 1 and 13. Mr Simons referred to the frame as the “template”, being the trapezoid shape over the rear of the vehicle. He referred to three rules for adjudicating on an image taken by the Vitronic device:
  1. The template must contain a part of the rear wheel and/or a part of the numberplate;
  2. No other vehicles may be travelling in the same direction in the same or adjacent lane, within the template; and
  3. The bottom edge of the template must be below the wheels of the vehicles.

Mr Simons observed that the image here complied with each of those three requirements. An inspection of Exhibits 1 and 13 confirms that to be the case.

  1. [44]
    As concerns the data block depicted on the image taken by the camera, Mr Simons stated that the time and date is known by the device, as the device is connected to GPS and the internet, but is confirmed by the operator. He otherwise confirmed the details depicted on the data block to reflect the serial number of the device, the site location number for the site as contained in the Traffic Camera Coding Manual, the speed limit for the location as entered by the operator, being 70km/hr, and the speed at which the vehicle was detected travelling, being 78km/hr. He gave evidence that there is no way for the operator to manually change the information depicted in the data block. The only details that can be entered into the device by the operator are the site (location) code and the speed limit. When the system takes a speed measurement it encrypts the file and “locks it down” in the laptop, such that the operator has no means of accessing it. The file is then transferred to the Road Safety Camera Office. Further evidence was given by Mr Simons as to the means of secure storage of, and restricted access to, that restricted file. A copy of that file is then decrypted by a separate program which produces the images which are then in turn utilised, including for infringement notices.
  2. [45]
    Further, having received the Notice of Intention to Challenge, Mr Simons had undertaken further processes to confirm the integrity of the image. He accessed the evidence folder, and using the decrypting software, created a further copy. He compared it to the image he had certified for court (Exhibit 1) and gave evidence that the image was the same.
  3. [46]
    In cross-examination, the appellant asked Mr Simons if he could prove that the device or the data had not been hacked. The learned Magistrate indicated that she would accept the proposition that it was “fairly self-evident” that nothing is incapable of being hacked, and that “we live in a world where there is the capacity for people who are determined to do so to hack into protected information”.
  4. [47]
    Mr Simons gave evidence that there had not been unlawful or unauthorised access of the device or its data in the time he had been with the QPS.  Further, the file is a “bespoke” product requiring the possession of the particular software, unique to this system, to access it, as well as the token/password to open it, and that would in any case only allow the image to be viewed, not altered. Additionally, Mr Simons gave evidence that having accessed the file, he knew “without doubt” that the photo produced was the photo captured at the time, as it also bore the same file creation date and time, which would not be the case had there been any modification to the image or data. That the separate number plate image was of poorer quality was simply a result of being a cropped image, which pixelates.
  5. [48]
    At one point the appellant indicated that he could “go on” but felt his questioning was becoming a bit “laboured”, and so he would end his questioning. The learned Magistrate informed the appellant that she did not wish for him to feel restrained, and this was the one chance he had to cross-examine, after which the appellant asked further questions.
  6. [49]
    At the close of the prosecution case, the appellant indicated that he did not wish to give or call evidence. The learned Magistrate outlined the elements of the charge to the appellant and invited the appellant to make such submissions as he wished to, as to why she should not be satisfied on the evidence before her that the prosecution had proved the elements of the offence. The appellant referred to his history of driving safely and never having hurt anybody. When asked if he had anything else he wanted to say as concerned if the prosecution had proved the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant replied “Not that I can think of right now”.

The appellant’s arguments on this appeal

  1. [50]
    The appellant seeks to rely upon grounds of appeal as contained within a three page insert to the Notice of Appeal.
  2. [51]
    The matters raised by the appellant within that document which related to the evidence adduced at trial included the following:
  1. The prosecutor had informed the learned Magistrate that the appellant had signed a statutory declaration saying that he was the driver at the time of the offence. That was not true.
  2. It is unjust that the prosecution were entitled to rely upon the photo produced by the device as evidence.
  3. The learned Magistrate unfairly placed more weight on the prosecution witnesses than the appellant’s assertions.
  4. The learned Magistrate could not have been satisfied of the guilt of the appellant of the offence beyond reasonable doubt because:
    1. a.
      The device was never calibrated or tested on cars, which meant that it was not reliable for that purpose;
    1. b.
      The device was not earthed, and so random radio interference can also affect the device accuracy;
    1. c.
      The absence of fixed constant temperature control within the vehicle in which the camera was being operated meant that the device would not remain calibrated;
    1. d.
      The appellant produced evidence that the device has inaccuracy of +/- 2km under 100km per hour, such that the speed stated on the infringement notice cannot be accurate and is incorrect;
    1. e.
      The prosecution had not excluded the possibility of hacking of QPS computer systems by way of cyber attack resulting in false or unreliable data;
    1. f.
      The prosecution had not excluded the possibility of corruption of data in the course of transferring of relevant data between devices;
    1. g.
      The appellant had produced evidence of there being an ability to hack the system; and
    1. h.
      The appellant had demonstrated that the data produced by the camera had been altered before being produced at court.
  1. [52]
    The appellant raised various other grounds which related to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to hear the matter, and the validity of the prosecution, as well as suggesting that he had been denied procedural fairness. The appellant complained that after the learned Magistrate told the appellant that he was speaking “gobbly-gook”,[13] the appellant shut down as he did not wish to contract with the government.
  2. [53]
    The appellant also sought to appeal against the sentence imposed.
  3. [54]
    On 12 May 2023 the appellant filed an outline of argument in support of his appeal replicating the content of the Notice of Appeal.
  4. [55]
    In light of his being a self-represented litigant, and the appellant’s complaints that he was either unable or not permitted to progress submissions he wished to make before the Magistrates Court, the appellant has been afforded a degree of leniency in his approach to his submissions to this Court.
  5. [56]
    The appellant has also filed documents entitled “further argument” on 23 June 2023 and 3 July 2023. The hearing of the appeal proceeded across two dates.  After the hearing commenced, the appellant was also permitted to file further written submissions identifying the parts of the record said to be of relevance to his submissions. The appellant did not file an application for leave to adduce evidence, but did provide further material that he wished the Court to receive.

Leave to adduce evidence

  1. [57]
    As I have already identified, subject to any granting of leave to adduce new evidence, an appeal pursuant to section 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) is by way of rehearing on the evidence below.[14] 
  2. [58]
    Pursuant to section 223(2) of the Act, the District Court may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or new evidence if the Court is satisfied that there are special grounds for so giving leave.[15] 

Unsigned affidavits

  1. [59]
    The appellant has sought to refer the Court to unsigned affidavits, said to reflect signed affidavits that were sent to prosecutions prior to the hearing in the Magistrates Court. It became evident in the course of the appeal hearing that as concerned the material provided to this Court, the appellant may have confused what documents were said to have been exhibited to the affidavits sent to prosecutions.
  2. [60]
    The material related to the appellant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court and the validity of the prosecution. It is questionable whether any of the material could be classified as “evidence”. The appellant has made submissions consistent with the content of those documents on this appeal, and those submissions have been contemplated. To the extent that the documentation is relied upon as evidence that such matters were raised with police prosecutions ahead of the hearing, that is not a matter that need be established by the appellant to now make those submissions, given their nature. That being so, as I understand the appellant’s position, he did not press an application for leave to adduce the documents as evidence. In any event, I am not satisfied that there are special grounds for leave to be given to adduce that material as additional evidence on this appeal.

Further argument of 21 June 2023

  1. [61]
    On 21 June 2023 the appellant filed a document entitled “further argument” which exhibits correspondence dated 3 April 2023 from the Director of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Section of the Strategy and Governance Branch of the Australian Government. That correspondence is the response that is said to have been generated by the author and received by the appellant to a freedom of information request made by the appellant to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on 3 April 2023 seeking the following:

Law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution, binding on all the courts judges and people of every State and every part of the Commonwealth for the valid creation of a title for the King to adopt in relation to Australia and its territories. I seek the document or instrument containing the enumerated head of power to create the Act known as the Royal Styles and titles, made under the constitution, binding on all the courts, judge, and people of every state and every part of the Commonwealth.

  1. [62]
    The correspondence identifies avenues of enquiry undertaken by staff of the Department, and then provides the outcome of the appellant’s application, being that the author was satisfied that reasonable steps had been undertake to locate the documents to which the appellant had sought access, that the author was satisfied that the documents do not exist with the Department’s record holdings, and that the author had therefore decided to refuse access to those documents pursuant to section 24A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
  2. [63]
    The appellant seeks to rely upon that correspondence to support his submission that the prosecution does not have authority to prosecute his case. The correspondence does not advance that submission. The appellant has otherwise made submissions to the Court reflecting the content of the documentation. That being so, as I understand the appellant’s position, he did not press an application for leave to adduce the documents as evidence. In any event, I am not satisfied that there are special grounds for leave to be given to adduce that material as additional evidence on this appeal.

Further argument of 3 July 2023

  1. [64]
    On 3 July 2023 the appellant filed a document entitled “further argument” to which he has exhibited documentation identifying his election to have the charge determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and correspondence from the State Penalties Enforcement Registry confirming that his request had been approved, as well as documentation said to constitute or relate to his birth certificate.
  2. [65]
    It is evident that the matter proceeded to hearing, as elected by the appellant. The material evidences nothing further, and does not advance the submissions of the appellant. Accordingly, any leave to adduce the material attached to “further argument” filed 3 July 2023 – to the extent maintained by the appellant – is refused.

Further material

  1. [66]
    Following the adjournment of the appeal hearing part-heard, the appellant indicated an intention to consider whether he was to bring an application to adduce any further evidence. He confirmed that he did not intend to do so. In the course of submissions when the hearing resumed, the appellant produced a document headed “Test Report”[16], dated 8 December 2021, which on its face states that further to a test conducted at a NATA Accredited Laboratory in Victoria on 6 December 2021, the Vitronic speed camera system in question, serial number 930039, “was found to produce results within the manufacturer’s specified speed accuracy of +/- 2km/hr up to 100km/hr…”.
  2. [67]
    The document was in existence and in the possession of the appellant at the time of the trial, and it appears that the document informed questions asked by the appellant of Mr Simons in cross-examination. Even if leave were given to adduce the certificate as further evidence on this appeal, the matters evidenced by the document do not advance the appellant’s contentions on this appeal any further than the evidence that was adduced before the Magistrates Court. Accordingly, leave is refused.

Further consideration of the appellant’s grounds as relate to the evidence adduced at trial and the finding of guilt

  1. [68]
    The appellant acknowledged that he was “in charge” of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence. That one of the certificates incorrectly referred to the appellant as having provided a declaration that he was the driver did not alter the effect of the evidence otherwise before the Court. There was no evidence before the Court that the appellant or any particular individual was the driver. The appellant did not nominate any other individual to have been driving the vehicle. It was unnecessary for the Court to positively find that the appellant was the driver. If the Court were satisfied that the elements of the offence had otherwise been established, the appellant was liable for the offence.
  2. [69]
    Provided the legislative pre-requisites were complied with, the prosecution were entitled to avail themselves of the evidentiary provisions they did, in proof of the prosecution case. That the appellant may consider such legislative provisions to be “unfair”, does not alter that position. The appellant was entitled to indicate as he did, that aspects of that evidence were challenged. 
  3. [70]
    There was evidence – both from the exhibits and the evidence of Senior Constable Vickers – of the relevant speed limit for the location having been 70km/hr. Although a Notice of intention to challenge was completed with respect to the location or visibility of the speed signs, the applicable speed limit (or the indication of that) to motorists at the location was not a matter of focus of either the cross-examination by, or submissions of, the appellant. 
  4. [71]
    There was also evidence that the appellant’s vehicle was travelling at 78km/hr when photographed, as alleged. The learned Magistrate considered the issues raised by the appellant through his questioning of the witnesses – that the device may have been faulty or inaccurate, that there may have been environmental factors which influenced the reading, or the image could have been corrupted, including as a result of a hacking event. Similar submissions were made by the appellant before this Court. While the onus was on the prosecution to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, the learned Magistrate correctly observed that there was no evidence before her which suggested any of those circumstances to have occurred here. There was, however, evidence supporting the accuracy of the speed camera device, and therefore the reading. Further to the documentary evidence adduced, each of Senior Constable Vickers and Mr Simons gave evidence of the testing and operation procedures in relation to the deployment of the device, and that no issues were identified. The evidence of Mr Simons was to the effect that unless and until the required safeguards are attended to, and there is no error arising, a photographic image will not be captured. The specific image complied with the requirements for use. There was no evidence of the presence of environmental factors adversely impacting the device or the reading. There was also evidence adduced supporting the conclusion that there were no issues with the integrity of the image and associated data.
  5. [72]
    Before this court, the appellant submitted that the learned Magistrate unfairly gave more weight to the expert witness. In reality, the Magistrate was making her determination on the evidence before her. While I have had regard to the submissions made by the appellant before me – both in writing and orally – so too must this Court’s decision be based on a review of the evidence that was before the learned Magistrate.
  6. [73]
    I do not identify any error in the reasons or decision of the learned Magistrate.

The appellant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court and the validity of the prosecution; Whether the defendant was denied procedural fairness

  1. [74]
    At the commencement of the hearing, the appellant confirmed that he appeared on his own behalf without legal representation. He entered a plea of not guilty to the charge as read. The following exchange then occurred:

DEFENDANT: Can I say something else?

HER HONOUR: Yes.

DEFENDANT: I am here by special appearance. I elected to have my hearing heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and the police replied my request had been approved. So is there a second magistrate coming?

HER HONOUR: No

DEFENDANT: So I do not consent to the jurisdiction of this Court.

HER HONOUR: Whether you consent or not, this is the court that has jurisdiction in relation to the offence with which you have been charged and I will proceed to conduct the hearing in relation to this matter.

….

DEFENDANT: Can I just say one more thing. Sorry. I reserve my right not to be compelled to perform under any contract or commercial agreement that I did not enter knowingly, voluntarily or unintentionally.

HER HONOUR: Mr Handley, I’m just going to place this on the record. There are a number of people like yourself who come to the Court and give a speech such as that. That Court of Appeal, which is the highest court in the State of Queensland, has described that sort of submission as gobbledygook. It really does make no sense. The reality is that this is a court constituted under the laws of the State of Queensland. And as someone who has been charged with an offence, this court has jurisdiction in relation to that matter.

  1. [75]
    The learned Magistrate dealt with the appellant’s contentions directly and in a somewhat perfunctory manner.  However, as was observed by her Honour Judge Kingham in Stoneman v The Commissioner of Police[17], arguments that the Commonwealth and State legislatures lack authority to legislate have been repeatedly rejected in courts in Australia.  The Court of Appeal, in hearing an appeal from her Honour’s decision, observed the proposition that an individual was bound by the statutory law of Queensland to be “unremarkable” [18], and it was unnecessary for a Court to answer every incomprehensible contention that may be raised to the contrary[19].
  2. [76]
    The appellant takes particular issue with the learned Magistrate having described his submissions as “gobbledygook”. As the respondent highlights, her Honour was referring to what the Court of Appeal had observed about submissions of a similar vein in Bradley v The Crown [2020] QCA 252.
  3. [77]
    The appellant has represented to this Court that due to his treatment by the learned Magistrate, and the stress of the situation, he was unable to conduct his defence as he had desired and intended. A review of the transcript of proceedings identifies that the learned Magistrate engaged with the appellant as a party to the proceeding. Her Honour sought to ensure that the appellant understood the trial process and that he was mindful of that process in his conduct of his defence. Her Honour also sought to intervene to ensure that the conduct of the prosecution was appropriate, mindful of the appellant being a self-represented litigant. Consistent with the impression that may otherwise be gleaned from a reading of the transcript of the proceedings, at the conclusion of proceedings the appellant thanked the learned Magistrate for her patience. I do not accept that the appellant was not afforded procedural fairness or that the appellant has demonstrated that the manner of the conduct of his trial is such that there has been a miscarriage of justice occasioned. Further, as identified above, the appellant has been afforded every opportunity before this Court to advance what additional matters he may have, due to stress or otherwise, not canvassed before the Magistrate. 
  4. [78]
    The appellant’s complaints, maintained on this appeal, to the effect that he otherwise could not or should not have been charged or prosecuted, are also otherwise without merit. I have not set out in full the content of the submissions and annexures relied upon by the appellant. An amount of the content is of the nature of “pseudo-law”, and a modified form of “straw man” doctrine[20], adopting aspects of a number of the premises often put forward in support of such arguments.
  5. [79]
    Within his written submissions, and at the appeal hearing, the appellant sought to emphasise that he is a living human being; which was acknowledged by the Court. Whether or not the appellant may accept it to be so, he is also a legal person, who is subject to the criminal laws of the State.[21] It is in fact that status of the appellant as a legal person, whereby he is able to commence and be heard on the instant proceedings. 
  6. [80]
    As was remarked by Cash DCJ in Woodhead v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 143 at [11]:

“There exists in Queensland a recognised body of statute and common law. As a society, we have developed techniques and processes for interrogating and developing that law. Those who wish to stand outside the law and ignore long recognised processes must realise they bear the onus of rationally explaining why those almost universally accepted understandings are wrong. Until such time, the claims of such people will continue to be summarily dismissed”.

  1. [81]
    To the extent that the appellant sought to distinguish between his identity as a person and the “identity” named in the infringement notice, charge and related documentation, on the basis of variation in capitalisation – and that he “is not the all-capitals Mr Martin David Handley[22], the all-capitals title being “the two dimensional paper legal person the government uses”[23]– that submission is also without foundation. Further, the appellant completed the Statutory Declaration which was Exhibit 7 at trial. The appellant has also himself at times altered between the use of uppercase and lowercase text in writing his own name as it appears within the documentation. The font is of no consequence.
  2. [82]
    The appellant had a right to be tried according to the laws of the State of Queensland as in force at the relevant time. The appellant’s submissions do not raise any valid challenge that the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) or the regulations made under the Act, including the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) were not validly enacted.[24]
  3. [83]
    While the appellant could elect to have the matter determined by the Court, it was not a matter for the election of the appellant which court had jurisdiction to hear proceedings for that offence.  Nonetheless, the outcome, consistent with the appellant’s request, was that his case was heard in a court of competent jurisdiction to hear the matter – the Magistrates Court.[25]
  4. [84]
    The learned Magistrate was correct to proceed to hear the matter, notwithstanding the appellant’s submissions before her. The appellant having had the opportunity to develop those submissions further before this Court, I am satisfied they are without merit.

Appeal against sentence

  1. [85]
    The appellant also appeals against the sentence that was imposed.
  2. [86]
    Absent demonstration of specific error, to succeed on appeal an appellant need establish that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or unjust such that the appellate court is driven to conclude that the exercise of the sentencing discretion has miscarried in some way, even though precisely how or when may not be readily apparent on the face of the record.[26]
  3. [87]
    The appellant was fined $183, being the amount that the appellant would have been required to pay by way of a fine, had he not elected for the matter to be determined by the Court. While the prescribed fine was not limiting, or determinative of the appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion as to the quantum of the fine to impose, the fine of $183 could not be said to be excessive in all the circumstances. The appellant was also given 30 days to pay, however had indicated that he was able to pay the fine on the day.
  4. [88]
    The appellant’s submissions otherwise focused upon his having been “additionally punished” by the recording of a demerit point and the requirement that he pay an offender levy.
  5. [89]
    It was an automatic legislative consequence, whether the appellant had paid the fine or taken the matter to court, that the appellant would be recorded as having received a demerit point for the offence.
  6. [90]
    Having been sentenced by the Court, the appellant became liable to pay the offender levy, pursuant to section 179C of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The amount of the levy is prescribed by regulation. Section 179C(4) provides that the imposition of the levy is not a sentence (including punishment) and is in addition to any sentence imposed by the court for the offence. Section 9(9)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) further provides that in sentencing an offender, a court must not have regard to the offender levy imposed under section 179C.
  7. [91]
    The appellant has not demonstrated that the sentence imposed was excessive or that the learned Magistrate otherwise erred in her approach to the sentencing of the appellant.

Orders

  1. [92]
    The appeal is dismissed.
  2. [93]
    The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent, fixed in the amount of $1800.

Footnotes

[1]  Section 223 of the Act.

[2]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180-181 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121 at [6]-[8].

[3]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 126-128; McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at [47] per Bowskill J (as her Honour then was); Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 at 5 per Sofronoff P.

[4]See Parsons v Raby [2007] QCA 98 at [23]-[24] and Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 126-127. See also Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 at [43] per French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ; Lee v Lee (2019) 372 ALR 383 at [55] per Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ.

[5] The formatting utilised in the complaint has been retained, given the submissions of the appellant.

[6]See section 113 TORUM.

[7]A copy of the declaration was also tendered as part of Exhibit 7.

[8]Exhibit 7 was a copy of the Statutory Declaration in Exhibit 8, referred to in Exhibit 5, with accompanying oath of service in relation to a copy having been served on the appellant.

[9]   Formatting utilised in the complaint has been retained, given the submissions of the appellant. The appellant’s date of birth, licence number and address were provided within the Statutory Declaration, but have been redacted from the extract here reproduced.

[10]His name is in all capitals on the Infringement Notice.

[11]  While there is some reference to other photographs, the transcript only refers to one of these photographs being admitted and marked as an exhibit, and only one photograph is on the Court file as Exhibit 12.

[12]The frame referred to is also depicted within the photograph of the appellant’s vehicle in Exhibit 13.

[13]Or “gobbledygook” per the Transcript of Proceedings: page 3 line 4.

[14]Section 223 of the Act.

[15]See Holden v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 217 at [24]–[27]. See also Dafydd v The Commissioner of Police [2013] QDC 12.

[16]MFI “C” on the Appeal.

[17]District Court of Queensland, Kingham DCJ, 30 November 2012 at [18], citing Widgee Shire Council v Bonney [1907] HCA 11; Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120; Barton v Beattie & Ors [2010] QCA 100. An application for an extension of time for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was subsequently dismissed: R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209.

[18]See also Hubner v Erbacher ; Hubner v Morely [2004] QDC 345, in particular at [11].

[19]R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209 at page 5.

[20]See R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216.

[21]See R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 at [6].

[22]See Transcript of Proceedings of 29 February 2024 at page 2 line 38.

[23]See Transcript of Proceedings of 29 February 2024 at page 38 line 29.

[24]See also Hubner v Erbacher ; Hubner v Morely [2004] QDC 345; Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451 at [24]-[25]; Elliott v Commissioner of Police [2014] QDC 161.

[25]The accepted legal position is helpfully summarised by Smith DCJA in Jones v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 113 from [24]–[33].

[26]See House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505; Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [58]; R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550 at [28].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Handley v Commissioner of Police

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Handley v Commissioner of Police

  • MNC:

    [2024] QDC 116

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Wooldridge KC DCJ

  • Date:

    26 Jul 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 203 CLR 172
Cite 2 - (2000) 203 CLR 172
Barton v Beattie [2010] QCA 100
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCA 100
Bone v Mothershaw[2003] 2 Qd R 600; [2002] QCA 120
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] QCA 120
Bradley v The Crown [2020] QCA 252
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QCA 252
Dafydd v The Commissioner of Police [2013] QDC 12
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QDC 12
Cite 2 - [2013] QDC 12
Elliott v Commissioner of Police [2014] QDC 161
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QDC 161
Cite 2 - [2014] QDC 161
Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 132
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 132
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Cite 3 - (2003) 214 CLR 118
Harrington v Shoard (No 2) [2023] QDC 14
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QDC 14
Holden v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 217
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QDC 217
Cite 2 - [2018] QDC 217
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
House v The King (1936) 5 CLR 499
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 5 CLR 499
Hubner v Erbacher [2004] QDC 345
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] QDC 345
Cite 2 - [2004] QDC 345
Cite 3 - [2004] QDC 345
Jones v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 113
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QDC 113
Cite 2 - [2023] QDC 113
Lee v Lee [2019] 372 ALR 383
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] 372 ALR 383
Cite 2 - [2019] 372 ALR 383
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2018] 2 Qd R 612; [2017] QCA 255
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] 2 Qd R 612
Cite 2 - [2018] 2 Qd R 612
Parsons v Raby [2007] QCA 98
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] QCA 98
Cite 2 - [2007] QCA 98
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2015) 256 CLR 550
Cite 2 - (2015) 256 CLR 550
R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 209
Cite 2 - [2013] QCA 209
Cite 3 - [2013] QCA 209
R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QDC 216
Cite 2 - [2021] QDC 216
Cite 3 - [2021] QDC 216
Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 331 ALR 550
Cite 2 - (2016) 331 ALR 550
Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QDC 451
Cite 2 - [2010] QDC 451
White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 121
Cite 2 - [2014] QCA 121
Widgee Shire Council v Bonney [1907] HCA 11
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1907] HCA 11
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 207 CLR 584
Cite 2 - (2001) 207 CLR 584
Woodhead v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 143
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QDC 143

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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