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Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health)[2020] QIRC 86

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health)[2020] QIRC 86

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2020] QIRC 086

PARTIES:

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees

(Notifier)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Health)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

D/2019/114

AND

PARTIES:

State of Queensland (Department of Health)

(Applicant)

V

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

B/2019/70

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

15 June 2020

MEMBERS:

Merrell DP

Pidgeon IC

Dwyer IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

Pursuant to sub-r 41(2)(d) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, the application in existing proceedings filed bythe Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees on 29 January 2020, for a decision pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, to dismiss, or refrain from hearing or further hearing Matter No. B/2019/70, be heard first and separately to the joint hearing of Matter No. D/2019/114 and Matter No. B/2019/70

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – ARBITRATION IF CONCILIATION UNSUCCESSFUL – DECLARATORY RELIEF – joinderof arbitration of industrial dispute and application for declaratory relief – application in existing proceedings to dismiss industrial cause because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest – whether application to dismiss industrial cause should be heard by Full Bench first and separately to the hearing of the joined proceedings – application to dismiss industrial cause should be heard first

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 463, s 531, s 541 and s 544

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 6 and r 41

CASES:

Campbell v Queensland [2019] ICQ 18; (2019) 291 IR 171

Dr Wayne Shipley & Ors v Metro South Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 071

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589

Tallglen v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130

Thiering v Daly [2011] NSWSC 1345; (2011) 83 NSWLR 498

University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 59 ALJR 481

APPEARANCES:

Ms L. Doust of Counsel instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers for the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees

Mr A. Herbert of Counsel instructed by McCullough Robertson Lawyers for the State of Queensland (Department of Health)

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    By decision dated 21 May 2019 in Dr Wayne Shipley & Ors v Metro South Hospital and Health Service ('Shipley'),[1] Vice President O'Connor declared that certain named Senior Medical Officers ('SMOs'), who worked in the Emergency Department at the Beaudesert Hospital, were entitled to the Emergency Department Speciality Allowance ('the ED allowance') contained in cl 4.14.3 of the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Certified Agreement (No.4) 2015 ('MOCA 4').[2]
  1. [2]
    On 16 September 2019, the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees ('the Union') notified the Commission of an industrial dispute. The dispute concerns the Union's claim that the decision in Shipley should be applied to other hospitals and SMOs, although it presently seems to be limited to the Proserpine Hospital.  The State of Queensland, through the Department of Health ('the Department'), opposes the extension of the outcome of Shipley to any other workplaces on the basis that Shipley was not correctly decided.
  1. [3]
    The dispute was allocated to Industrial Commissioner McLennan. It was not resolved and is to be arbitrated.
  1. [4]
    On 5 December 2019, the Department filed an application seeking a declaration and orders that sub-cl 11.24.3 of the Medical Officers' (Queensland Health) Certified Agreement (No.5) 2018 ('MOCA 5')[3] and sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4 apply only to persons who meet the following eligibility requirements:
  • the person must be employed as a senior medical officer;
  • the person must be engaged to work in an Emergency Department under an extended hours roster within the meaning of clause 11.4 of MOCA 5 (and clause 4.3 of MOCA 4); and
  • the person must work all the rostered hours under the extended hours roster in that Emergency Department. ('the Department's application for declaratory relief')
  1. [5]
    On the same date, the Department filed an application seeking that the two matters be joined and determined together by a Full Bench or, in the alternative, they be referred separately for determination by a Full Bench.
  1. [6]
    On 29 January 2020, the Union filed an application, pursuant to s 541(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the Act'), for a decision that the Commission dismiss, or refrain from hearing or further hearing the Department's application for declaratory relief ('the Union's application to dismiss').
  1. [7]
    On 19 February 2020, Industrial Commissioner McLennan ordered both matters be joined and heard by a Full Bench ('the joined proceedings').
  1. [8]
    At the mention of the joined proceedings on 27 March 2020, the Union indicated that it wanted to proceed with its application to dismiss. A question then arose as to whether the Union's application to dismiss should be heard first. Directions were made that the parties file brief written submissions about that question.
  1. [9]
    The question for our determination is whether the Union's application to dismiss should be heard first and separately to the joined proceedings.
  1. [10]
    For the reasons given below, we have decided that the Union's application to dismiss should be heard first and separately to the hearing and determination of the joined proceedings.

The relevant statutory and legal principles

  1. [11]
    Section 541 of the Act provides:

541  Decisions generally

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following-

  1. (a)
    make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;
  2. (b)
    dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers-
    1. the cause is trivial; or
    2. further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
  1. (c)
    order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.
  1. [12]
    The value judgment incorporated in s 541(b)(ii) of the Act is a broad one.[4]
  1. [13]
    Rule 41(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 ('the Rules') provides that the Commission may make a directions order about the conduct of a proceeding on the application of a party or on the initiative of the Commission.  Sub-rule 41(2)(d) provides that a directions order may relate to the scheduling of conferences, mediation conferences, preliminary hearings and hearings before the Commission.
  1. [14]
    Rule 6 relevantly provides that the purpose of the Rules is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Commission at a minimum of expense.
  1. [15]
    We are of the view that some of the principles applied in determining whether or not to conduct a trial of separate or preliminary questions under civil procedure rules,[5] provide a sound guide in considering the question of whether the Union's application to dismiss should be heard first.  From a review of the cases, the following is a summary of those principles.
  1. [16]
    First, the power to order the separate determination of an issue is a discretionary power which must be exercised judicially, but cannot otherwise be fettered.[6]
  1. [17]
    Secondly, a court is obliged to seek to give effect to the overriding purpose of the applicable rules.[7]
  1. [18]
    Thirdly, a court begins with the proposition that it is ordinarily appropriate that all issues in the proceeding should be disposed of at one time.[8]
  2. [19]
    Fourthly, the separate determination of an issue may prove to be an appropriate procedure where:
  • the resolution of that separate issue will have the effect of resolving the entirety of the litigious controversies or of substantially narrowing the field of litigious controversy; or
  • there is a clear demarcation between that issue and all other issues in the case, including issues going to the credit of witnesses.[9]
  1. [20]
    Fifthly, the separate determination of an issue may prove to be an inappropriate procedure where:
  • there are intertwined issues of fact or law between the separated question and the other questions such that the determination of the separate question will not have any substantial effect upon the width of the field of litigious controversy;[10]
  • there is a commonality of witnesses and issues of credit as between the separate issue and the other issues in the case which will or may necessitate a ruling on the credit of one or more of the common witnesses, thus possibly precluding the same judicial officer from again dealing with the matters going to the credit of the common witnesses;[11] or
  • there is a possibility that the resolution of the separate issue will not finally determine the issue but will merely result in an appeal from the decision in relation to that separate issue, creating a multiplicity of proceedings, interruption of the court and the undesirable fragmentation of the proceedings.[12]
  1. [21]
    Finally, the experience of courts suggests the separation of proceedings often does not result in the quicker and cheaper resolution of proceedings as anticipated, but often has the reverse effect, merely causing added delay and expense to the resolution of the litigation; thus, before an issue is to be separately determined, it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings.[13]

The Union's argument

  1. [22]
    By way of summary, the Union's argument proceeds on three grounds.
  1. [23]
    First, it is the nature of the power contained in s 541(b) of the Act, that it may be exercised prior to proceeding to a hearing.[14]
  1. [24]
    Secondly, the vice to which the Union's application to dismiss is directed will only be addressed if the power is exercised before the parties, and the Commission, expend resources preparing the substantive matter.[15] In this regard, the Union further contends:[16]
  • the decision in Shipley involved the question of the proper construction of sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4 and the decision in that matter resulted in an interpretation of that sub-clause which is binding on the Health Service, the Department and the Minister;
  • the Department did not appeal Shipley;
  • the declarations sought by the Department that SMOs perform all work in the Emergency Department in order to be entitled to the allowance is contrary to the position conceded by the Health Service before Vice President O'Connor;
  • the Department now seeks to agitate an argument about the proper construction of sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4 (and by extension the equivalent provision in MOCA 5) that could have been raised in Shipley;
  • the Department's application for declaratory relief is effectively an attempt to appeal Shipley without satisfying the Commission as to why leave should be given to pursue such an appeal outside the time allowed;
  • the Department's application for declaratory relief is effectively an attempt to appeal Shipley on the basis of further evidence and arguments without satisfying the Commission as to why it should be entitled to do so, given the principle articulated in University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2);[17]
  • if the Department was seeking to adduce the evidence it now proposes to rely upon in an appeal of Shipley, it could not meet the usual test given all the material was demonstrably available to the Department at the time of Shipley; 
  • the matters now sought to be relied upon by the Department, which could have been raised in Shipley, are inconsistent with the principle in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [18]  ('the Anshun principle'); and 
  • the Anshun principle is that:
  1. –a party will be estopped from bringing an action which, if it succeeds, will result in a judgment which conflicts with an earlier judgment; and
  2. –contradictory judgments are those, not pronounced in the same cause of action, but which appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect of the same transaction.[19]
  1. [25]
    The Union then contends:
  • because Shipley was decided adversely to the Department, and that the Department did not appeal Shipley, the Department's application for declaratory relief is tantamount to an abuse of process because it is designed to produce a result contrary to that in Shipley which will render the acquittal of the resources of both the Commission and the parties in Shipley; 
  • it is not desirable in the public interest for the State of Queensland and its agencies to conduct industrial relations in such a way when, as Vice President O'Connor observed in Shipley,[20] the Department was well aware of the deficiencies in sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4;[21] and
  • on the face of the evidence currently before the Commission, there is a proper basis to exercise the powers sought and it would defeat the purpose of that application not to exercise such power prior to requiring the Commission and the parties to devote time and resources to the hearing of the substantive application.[22]
  1. [26]
    Thirdly, the Union submits that:
  • its application to dismiss can be heard in the space of a single day, or perhaps a little more, and that it only wishes to cross-examine one of the Department's witnesses, namely Ms Rachel Borger, Director of Industrial Relations of the Department;[23]
  • the Department's application for declaratory relief relies on evidence from five witnesses extending over some 500 pages and the Union has not yet filed any evidence in relation to that application;[24] and
  • the Union and the Department have not filed any evidence in respect of the arbitration of Matter No. D/2019/114, that matter is likely to involve detailed  consideration of the circumstances at Proserpine Hospital and it could not be assumed that the evidence and submissions in that matter could be dealt with in a short time and would be likely to take many hearing days involving substantial costs on all sides and the deployment of considerable resources of the Commission.[25]

The Department's argument

  1. [27]
    The Department's argument, in summary, is based on four contentions.
  1. [28]
    First,[26] having regard to the authorities concerning s 541 of the Act, the underlying principle is that a party will never be denied its right to be heard on the merits of its case unless the claim is so obviously untenable and/or amounts to an obvious abuse of the processes of the Commission.  The Department contends that under the Act, the Commission is to be guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole[27] and may make decisions it considers necessary in the interests of justice in proceedings before it.[28]
  1. [29]
    Secondly, as a matter of efficiency and discretion, the successful prosecution by the Department of its application for declaratory relief will result in a binding decision concerning all employees in Queensland bound by the certified agreements in question; and such a result is vastly preferable to the Department's successful defence of the dispute notified by the Union which would result only in a binding decision concerning the limited cohort of employees in contention in the dispute.[29]
  1. [30]
    Thirdly, issues raised by the Union as a 'public interest' justification for its application to dismiss are not meritorious.[30] In particular, the Department submits that:
  • the Shipley decision was only limited to the context of a dispute between the Department and certain disputants employed at the Beaudesert Hospital and the parties to that dispute are bound by the answers they received to the questions put in that case;[31]
  • the answers given in Shipley did not declare any construction of sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4 and none of the parties to that matter requested that the decision in Shipley be made so as to be binding on all unions, hospitals and medical officers in Queensland, and Vice President O'Connor plainly did not make such an order;[32]
  • the concessions made by the Department in Shipley were made incorrectly and, as a consequence, the public interest does not operate to prevent a party from changing its view over time, and urging the Commission to adopt that view, irrespective of whether that opinion was the same as the one which had been previously expressed in earlier proceedings;[33]
  • there is a very great public interest in ensuring that parties who believe that a past concession was made in error not be compelled to mislead the Commission and other parties by being prohibited from expressing that party's true view to the Commission in later proceedings;[34]
  • the Department's application for declaratory relief is not an appeal or analogous to an appeal, the Department does not seek to, and cannot, overturn the declarations made in Shipley, and (by citing s 463 of the Act)[35] it submits that the decision in Shipley is only binding on the Department in respect of whom the declarations were expressly directed, none of whom are involved in or affected by the present proceedings;[36] and
  • the Anshun principle has no application because:
  1. –it only prevents parties to an inter partes dispute from seeking to relitigate the dispute between themselves on a different basis to that upon which they conducted earlier proceedings and in respect of which a binding determination of the rights of those parties has been made; and
  2. –the parties to Shipley and the parties in the Department's application for declaratory relief are different, the party (the Union) now seeking to protect the result in Shipley and to resist the bringing of the Department's application for declaratory relief did not participate in Shipley and was therefore not the beneficiary of any decision which it might be able to claim a right to protect;[37]
  • the Department, by legitimately utilising a readily available original proceeding under the Act to obtain from the Full Bench a binding determination as to the correct interpretation of the ED allowance based upon full and proper evidence, in circumstances where it will submit that the earlier opinion of Vice President O'Connor should not be followed or applied, cannot be said to be abusing the Commission's processes;[38] and
  • the Union is not invoking the public interest in this matter, and despite its submissions, its interest in this matter is purely a private interest concerned with adopting, without any challenge or evidence which may demonstrate to the contrary, answers to particular questions in a previous matter for which personal benefits may flow to its members.[39]
  1. [31]
    Fourthly, as the Union has foreshadowed that it intends to apply the decision in Shipley to SMOs working at 27 hospitals across Queensland, the real efficiency lies in a binding declaration as to the true interpretation of the relevant clauses in MOCA 4 and MOCA 5.[40]
  1. [32]
    The Department therefore submits that the resources of the Commission and the parties would be more efficiently used if the substantive hearing of the arbitration of the dispute and of the Department's application for declaratory relief, were heard in conjunction with the Union's application to dismiss in a combined hearing because separating out the Union's application to dismiss, which it submits is based upon extraordinarily weak and unsustainable grounds, for a separate preliminary hearing would be a pointless and unproductive waste of the Commission's time.[41]

The Union's application to dismiss should be heard first and separately 

  1. [33]
    In our view, the Union's application to dismiss the Department's application for declaratory relief should be heard first and separately to the joined proceedings.  There are a number of reasons for this.
  1. [34]
    First, having regard to the purpose of the discretion conferred on the Commission by s 541(b) of the Act, as determined from the plain words used in that provision, there is merit in the principal submission made by the Union that the nature of the power contained in s 541(b) is that it may be exercised prior to proceeding to a full hearing.  That is to say, it is clear that one of the purposes of the provision is to confer discretion

to refrain from conducting a substantive hearing where such a hearing is not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

  1. [35]
    Secondly, it seems to us that there is a demarcation between, on the one hand, the hearing and determination of the Union's application to dismiss and, on the other hand, the considerations in arbitrating the dispute notified by the Union and the questions to be determined in the Department's application for declaratory relief.
  1. [36]
    While the hearing and determination of the Union's application to dismiss will not resolve the entirety of the litigious controversies between the parties, if there is merit in the Union's application to dismiss and it is granted, it would have the effect of narrowing the issues between the parties.  That would then be the arbitration of the dispute about the extent to which the decision in Shipley may and should be extended to other Emergency Departments.  
  1. [37]
    Conversely, if the Union's application to dismiss is unsuccessful, then the Department's application for declaratory relief will be heard and determined in circumstances where the dispute between the Department and the Union will be resolved on the merits of that dispute, namely, whether or not the ED allowance in sub-cl 4.14.3 in MOCA 4 and in sub-cl 11.24.3 in MOCA 5 should only apply to the persons who meet the eligibility criteria referred to in the Department's application for declaratory relief, as opposed to whether the declaratory relief sought should be denied on other grounds.
  1. [38]
    Thirdly, any decision we make in respect of the present matter must give effect to the overriding purpose of the Rules, which is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Commission at a minimum of expense.  The hearing and determination of the Union's application to dismiss could be heard in a day. Of the persons who have filed and served affidavits on behalf of the Department, only Ms Borger is required for cross-examination. It may be that Ms Borger's credit is put in issue in the Union's application to dismiss. While there is a possibility of Ms Borger being a witness in subsequent proceedings, where her credit could also be in issue, we are of the view that the other issues we have referred to outweigh that consideration. 
  1. [39]
    That is, the purpose of the discretion conferred in s 541(b)(ii) of the Act and the probability that matters would be narrowed between the parties and potentially reduce costs to the parties and promote the more efficient use of the Commission's time and resources, weigh in favour of hearing the Union's application to dismiss first and separately.
  1. [40]
    For these reasons, we have determined that the Union's application to dismiss should be heard first and separately to the hearing and determination of the joined proceedings.

Conclusion

  1. [41]
    Pursuant to sub-r 41(2)(d) of the Rules, we order that the Union's application to dismiss be heard first and separately to the hearing and determination of the joined proceedings.
  1. [42]
    A further directions hearing will take place before Deputy President Merrell only with a view to making any necessary final directions for the hearing and determination of the Union's application to dismiss.

Footnotes

[1][2019] QIRC 071 ('Shipley').

[2]Ibid [73]-[79] (Vice President O'Connor). Clause 4.14.3 of MOCA 4 provided:

Where a SMO works in an Emergency Department under a rostering arrangement in accordance with

Clause 4.3, and the medical officer's rostered hours include working evening shifts Monday to Friday,

and/or shifts anytime on the weekend, an allowance of 25% of base salary is paid in addition to amounts

in Clause 4.14.1 and 4.14.2.

[3]Sub-clause 11.24.3.1 of MOCA 5 is of the same effect of as sub-cl 4.14.3 of MOCA 4.

[4]Campbell v Queensland [2019] ICQ 18; (2019) 291 IR 171, [32] (Martin J, President).

[5]For example, r 483(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).

[6]Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215, [7](1) (Einstein J) ('Idoport').

[7]Thiering v Daly [2011] NSWSC 1345;(2011) 83 NSWLR 498, [19] (Garling J).

[8]Tallglen v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130, 141 (Giles CJ).

[9]Idoport (n 6), [7] (4)(a) and (c).

[10]Ibid [7](5)(a).

[11]Ibid [7](5)(b).

[12]Idaport (n 6), [7](5)(c)

[13]Ibid [7](6).

[14]The submissions filed by the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees on 3 April 2020 ('the Union's submissions'), paras. 13 and 16-17.

[15]The Union's submissions, para. 14.

[16]The Union's submissions, para. 18.

[17][1985] HCA 28; (1985) 59 ALJR 481, 483 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). In that case their Honours relevantly stated:

It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances,

it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new

argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an

opportunity to do so.

[18][1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589.

[19]Ibid 602-604 (Gibbs CJ and Aicken J).

[20]Shipley (n 1), [77] (Vice President O'Connor).

[21]The Union's submissions, para. 19.

[22]The Union's submissions, para. 20.

[23]The Union's submissions, para. 21.

[24]The Union's submissions, para. 22.

[25]Ibid.

[26]The submissions filed by the State of Queensland (Department of Health) on 17 April 2020 ('the Department's submissions'), para. 6.

[27]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 531(3)

[28]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 544(1)(a)(i).

[29]The Department's submissions, para. 9.

[30]The Department's submissions, paras. 13-23.

[31]The Department's submissions, para. 13.

[32]The Department's submissions, paras. 13-14.

[33]The Department's submissions, paras. 16-17.

[34]The Department's submissions, para. 17.

[35]Section 463 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides:

463 Power to make declarations about industrial matters

(1) The commission may, on application by an entity mentioned in section 464, make a

declaration about an industrial matter.

(2) The commission may make the declaration whether or not consequential relief is

or could be claimed.

(3) Subject to chapter 11, part 6, a declaration made by the commission under this section

is binding in a proceeding under this Act.

[36]The Department's submissions, para. 19.

[37]The Department's submissions, para. 20.

[38]The Department's submissions, para. 21.

[39]The Department's submissions, para. 23.

[40]The Department's submissions, paras. 24-25

[41]The Department's submissions, para. 26.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health)

  • MNC:

    [2020] QIRC 86

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Member Merrell DP, Member Pidgeon IC, Member Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    15 Jun 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney General) (2019) 291 IR 171
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 291 IR 171
Cite 2 - (2019) 291 IR 171
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 18
Dr Wayne Shipley & Ors v Metro South Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 71
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 71
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 71
Cite 3 - [2019] QIRC 71
Cite 4 - [2019] QIRC 71
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215
7 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 2 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 3 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 4 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 5 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 6 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Cite 7 - [2000] NSWSC 1215
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1981) 147 CLR 589
Cite 2 - (1981) 147 CLR 589
Cite 3 - (1981) 147 CLR 589
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1981] HCA 45
Cite 2 - [1981] HCA 45
Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 22 ACSR 130
Cite 2 - (1996) 22 ACSR 130
Thiering v Daly [2011] NSWSC 1345
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] NSWSC 1345
Cite 2 - [2011] NSWSC 1345
Thiering v Daly (2011) 83 NSWLR 498
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 83 NSWLR 498
Cite 2 - (2011) 83 NSWLR 498
University of Wollongong v Metwally (1985) 59 ALJR 481
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 59 ALJR 481
Cite 2 - (1985) 59 ALJR 481
University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) HCA 28
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) HCA 28
Cite 2 - (1985) HCA 28

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 592 citations
Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 1573 citations
Byrne v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 134 citations
State of Queensland (Department of Health) v Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees [2023] QIRC 612 citations
1

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