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Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2022] QIRC 151

Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2022] QIRC 151

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 151

PARTIES:

Davies, Brian James

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

(Respondent)

CASE NO.:

PSA/2022/249

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

5 May 2022

HEARD AT:

On the papers

MEMBER:

McLennan IC

ORDER:

  1. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SERVICE APPEAL – where appellant applied for an exemption to the Health Employment Directive No. 12/21 – where respondent refused appellants exemption application – where appellant applied for internal review of refusal to grant exemption – where upon review the respondent upheld the original refusal – where appellant filed appeal out of time – whether timeframe for appeal should be extended – where appellant did not provide an explanation for delay – consideration of prejudice – where prospects of success are limited

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 194

Health Employment Directive No. 12/21 cl 7, cl 8, cl 10

CASES:

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298

Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland [2010] ICQ 35

Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 089

Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20

Graffunder v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 076

Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129

Megan Reimers v Aramaki Company (Australia) t/a Camira Child Care Centre [2002] 170 QGIG 23

Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232

Sunny v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 119

Tonia Shelley v McRoberts Agency [2009] 190 QGIG 189

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Brian Davies (the Appellant) is employed by Queensland Health, State of Queensland (the Respondent) as a Wardsman / Patient Support Assistant at Nambour General Hospital.[1]
  1. [2]
    The Health Employment Directive No. 12/21 (Directive 12/21) mandates, inter alia, that particular groups of health service employees must receive the COVID-19 vaccine.[2]
  1. [3]
    Directive 12/21 became effective from 11 September 2021.[3]
  1. [4]
    Relevantly, cl 8 of Directive 12/21 provides the following:

8.1 Existing employees currently undertaking work or moving not a role undertaking work listed in a cohort of Table 1, must:

  1. have received at least the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021; and
  2. have received the second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 31 October 2021.

An existing employee must provide to their line manager or upload into the designated system:

  1. evidence of vaccination confirming that the employee has received at least the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by no later than 7 days after receiving the vaccine.
  2. Evidence of vaccination confirming that the employee has received the second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by no later than 7 days after receiving the vaccine.

The requirements of this clause 8 do not apply to existing employees who have been granted an exemption under clause 10 of this HED.

  1. [5]
    The Respondent categorised Mr Davies' role as falling within "Group 2" under cl 7.1 of Directive 12/21 which covers employees who work in a hospital or other facility where clinical care or support is required.[4]
  1. [6]
    On 30 September 2021, Mr Davies submitted an exemption application under cl 10.2 of Directive 12/21 on the basis of "other exceptional circumstances" and with reference to a letter from Kennedy Spanner Lawyers dated 27 September 2021.[5]
  1. [7]
    On 15 November 2021, the Respondent advised Mr Davies of its decision to refuse his exemption request. This original refusal was conveyed in correspondence from Mr Colin Anderson, Executive Director People and Culture at Sunshine Coast Hospital and Health Service (SCHHS).
  1. [8]
    On 26 November 2021, Mr Davies requested an internal review of the decision to deny his exemption application.[6]
  1. [9]
    On 14 January 2022, the Respondent advised Mr Davies that an internal review of the original exemption refusal had been conducted and the Respondent had determined to further deny the exemption request (the Exemption Decision). The Exemption Decision was conveyed in correspondence from Mr Andrew Leggate, A/Chief Information and Infrastructure Office at SCHHS.
  1. [10]
    On 11 February 2022, Mr Davies filed an Appeal Notice with the Industrial Registry.

Jurisdiction

The decision subject of this appeal

  1. [11]
    On p 3 of the Appeal Notice, Mr Davies identifies the type of decision being appealed:

I am appealing a decision made (or failed to be made) under a directive issued in accordance with s 53, s 54 or s 54A of the Public Service Act 2008 which allows me to appeal. I have used my employer's individual employee grievances process before lodging this appeal. Please provide the directive: 12/21 Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements (HED 12/21)

  1. [12]
    Section 194 of the PS Act identifies the categories of decisions against which an appeal may be made. Section 194(1)(a) of the PS Act provides that an appeal may be made against "a decision to take, or not take, action under a directive". However, as Deputy President Merrell noted in Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),[7] Directive 12/21 does not allow employees to appeal. Upon review of Directive 12/21, I agree and conclude that the Exemption Decision is more appropriately characterised as a "fair treatment decision", i.e., a decision which Mr Davies contends is unfair and unreasonable and which is appealable under s 194(1)(eb) of the PS Act. On that basis, I am satisfied the Exemption Decision is appealable.

Timeframe to appeal

  1. [13]
    The Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (the IR Act) requires that an Appeal Notice be lodged within 21 days after the decision appealed against is given.[8] 
  1. [14]
    The Exemption Decision was dated 14 January 2022 and the Respondent submits it was received by Mr Davies on 17 January 2022.[9] It is not clear exactly when the Exemption Decision was given to Mr Davies and Mr Davies did not rebut the Respondent's submission about when he received it nor did he present any indication himself. 
  1. [15]
    Assuming Mr Davies was given the Exemption Decision no later than the date he received it on 17 January 2022, the deadline for filing the Appeal Notice was 7 February 2022.
  1. [16]
    Mr Davies filed the Appeal Notice with the Industrial Registry on 11 February 2022. That is, four days out of time.
  1. [17]
    I am empowered by the IR Act to extend the time for giving an appeal notice.[10]

Should time for filing be extended?

  1. [18]
    The IR Act does not provide any criteria against which I am to determine whether or not to extend time. The question of whether to extend the time for filing an appeal notice is fundamentally an exercise of discretion. Such an exercise must be undertaken judicially and according to the rules of reason and justice, not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.[11]
  1. [19]
    Mr Davies bears the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of an extension of time to file the appeal.[12] In that regard, I note the reasoning of McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor:

A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature's judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period, notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated. Against this background, I do not see any warrant for treating provisions that provide for an extension of time for commencing an action as having a standing equal to or greater than those provisions that enact limitation periods. A limitation provision is the general rule; an extension provision is the exception to it.[13]

  1. [20]
    In Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd,[14] Hall P set out the following considerations:
  • the length of the delay;
  • the explanation for the delay;
  • the prejudice to the Appellant if the extension of time is not granted;
  • the prejudice to the Respondent if the extension of time is granted; and
  • any relevant conduct of the Respondent.
  1. [21]
    Some additional considerations were provided by Linnane VP in Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited.[15] These considerations were usefully summarised by Thompson IC in Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services[16] and are paraphrased below:
  • the 21-day time limit must be respected and should not easily be dispensed with; and
  • the Appellant's prospects of success at a substantive hearing are always a relevant matter where it appears an Appellant has no, or very limited, prospects of success. In that instance, the Commission would not normally grant an extension of time.
  1. [22]
    Those cases were considering s 74(2)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). However, they were answering substantively the same question as in this case - that is, what should inform the exercise of my discretion in extending the time to bring proceedings? As such, I find their assessment of the relevant factors to be highly persuasive in informing the exercise of my discretion. 
  1. [23]
    Additionally, my discretion is informed by the purpose of the PS Act, including promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of government entities.[17] In that regard, I am guided by the commentary of French CJ in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University:

Also to be considered is the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a court is seen to accede to applications (seeking the exercise of a discretion) made without adequate explanation or justification.[18]

  1. [24]
    I will now consider the circumstances in this matter against the abovementioned factors to determine whether I should exercise my discretion to hear this Appeal out of time.

Length of delay

  1. [25]
    The Appeal Notice was filed four days out of time.
  1. [26]
    The 21-day appeal period has been determined by the legislature to be the appropriate period for a person to file an appeal. That is clearly stated in both the IR Act and the Exemption Decision.[19]
  1. [27]
    The character of the delay, be it excessive, reasonable or otherwise, takes its colour from the surrounding circumstances.[20] It is true that in some cases delays of several weeks have been considered to be not excessive.[21] However, in such cases the delay is usually accompanied by a substantial explanation such as natural disasters, extraordinary personal circumstances such as a major health issue, or the like. There is no evidence that is the case here.
  1. [28]
    In conjunction with the reasons that follow, I find that a delay of four days is significant and unreasonable in these circumstances.

Explanation for the delay

  1. [29]
    In the Directions Order issued 16 February 2022, Mr Davies was directed to file and serve written submissions in further support of the Appeal by 4:00pm on 23 February 2022. I included an underlined note in the Directions Order that provided "The Appellant's submissions should address why the Appeal should be heard out of time." Out of fairness to Mr Davies I included that note to firstly draw the matter to his attention, notify him that I would be considering whether to hear the Appeal out of time and provide him with an opportunity to present submissions.
  1. [30]
    Mr Davies did not comply with the Directions Order and so on 2 March 2022, the Industrial Registry emailed the parties to advise the following:

A Directions Order was issued on 16 February 2022 directing Mr Davies to file submissions in support of his Appeal Notice by 4:00pm on 23 February 2022. That direction has not been complied with. Further, no communication was received from Mr Davies requesting an extension of time before that due date.

This point of non-compliance with Directions combined with a lack of communication with the Industrial Registry seeking an extension of time enlivens the question as to why this Appeal should not be dismissed under r 45 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld).

Mr Davies, please provide an explanation as to why the Directions Order has not been complied with by 4:00pm on 3 March 2022. If you do not intend to proceed with the Appeal, a Form 27 Request to discontinue proceeding should be filed and can be accessed here: Forms | Queensland Industrial Relations (qirc.qld.gov.au).

  1. [31]
    On 5 March 2022, Mr Davies replied:

Sorry for the late reply. With the severe weather event I have been unable to access my emails.

I was under the impression I had submitted all relevant documents. My apologies. I'm not entirely sure what it is you are after that i am supposed to submit. I did get an email from QIRQ saying that i did not attach everything, but replied directly to that email and added it. Please advise.

  1. [32]
    On 7 March 2022, the Industrial Registry replied (emphasis added):

Through the attached Directions Order issued 16 February 2022, Commissioner McLennan directed that you file and serve on the Respondent written submissions in support of your Appeal and asked that those submissions address why the Appeal should be heard out of time. We note you have provided a few lines in support of your Appeal at page 4 of the Appeal Notice, however the Directions Order provides the opportunity for you to expand on those submissions and at the very least should include reasons for why your Appeal should be heard out of time.

  1. [33]
    In light of the weather events at that time and the circumstances Mr Davies had outlined in his 5 March 2022 correspondence, I directed that Mr Davies file and serve written submissions in further support of the Appeal Notice and in response to the Respondent's submissions by 4:00pm on 14 March 2022. Again, I included the note, "The Appellant's submissions should address why the Appeal should be heard out of time."[22]
  1. [34]
    Mr Davies filed written submissions on 14 March 2022. However, those submissions did not provide an explanation for the delay in filing his Appeal Notice.
  1. [35]
    The 21-day time period for an Appeal Notice to be filed has been legislated and in the absence of a compelling reason for the delay I will not extend the time for filing. Failing to provide an explanation at all means that Mr Davies has failed to offer an adequate explanation or justification for the delay.
  1. [36]
    Mr Davies bears the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of an extension of time to file the appeal.[23] Mr Davies has not discharged that onus.

Conduct of the Respondent

  1. [37]
    Through the Exemption Decision, the Respondent advised Mr Davies of his appeal rights including the timeframe within which an appeal should be filed:

If you are not satisfied with my decision in relation to the internal review of your grievance you may lodge a public service appeal. A public service appeal must be lodged with the Industrial Registry within 21 days of you being notified of my decision. Further information can be obtained from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) on telephone 1300 592 987. Alternatively, you may refer to the QIRC appeals guide available at www.qirc.qld.gov.au.[24]

  1. [38]
    That Mr Davies seemingly did not read or understand the timeframe as prescribed by the Respondent is certainly regrettable but not a sufficient or compelling reason to dispense with the legislative timeframes for filing an appeal. Further, it is certainly not the fault of the Respondent. 
  2. [39]
    The Respondent's advice of the appeal period supports the proposition that the length of the delay was unreasonable, and that a failure to explain the delay is unacceptable.[25]

Prospects of success

  1. [40]
    An Appellant's prospects of success at a substantive hearing is a relevant consideration.[26] I note the guidance on this factor provided by President Hall in Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland (emphasis added, citations removed):

In addition to these factors, the prospects of an application succeeding at a substantive hearing are also relevant, so that where it appears that an applicant has no, or very limited, prospects of success, the Commission should not grant an extension of time. However, the occasions for rejecting an application for an extension of time on the ground that the applicant has poor prospects of success will be few, and generally, the merits of an application are part of the general consideration of all relevant factors. In assessing the prospects of the substantive application succeeding, in the context of deciding an application to extend time, the merits or lack thereof of the substantive application must be clear cut, and will usually flow from formation of a view that there is an obstacle that no amount of evidence can overcome. Cases where a view may be formed so adverse to the applicant as to justify the refusal to extend time on that ground, will be rare.[27]

  1. [41]
    I have reviewed Mr Davies' arguments in support of an exemption which fall under the following themes:
  • breach of human rights;
  • no risk assessment provided;
  • willingness to undertake alternative measures;
  • research suggests the COVID-19 vaccination does not prevent people from catching or spreading COVID-19;
  • staff work with unvaccinated patients daily;[28]
  • general concerns, including about the impact of Direction 12/21 and receiving the COVID-19 vaccination;
  • requested information has not been provided;
  • lack of consultation;[29]
  • lack of opportunity to obtain advice;
  • not possible to give free and informed consent;[30]
  • coercion; and
  1. [42]
    I have also considered the Respondent's submissions for why it contends the Exemption Decision is fair and reasonable, outlined at [16] - [33] of its submissions filed 2 March 2022.
  1. [43]
    The arguments against receiving the COVID-19 vaccination presented by Mr Davies are largely analogous to those presented in the following matters which I have recently decided:
  • Graffunder v State of Queensland (Queensland Health);[32]
  • Sunny v State of Queensland (Queensland Health);[33] and
  • Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health).[34]
  1. [44]
    In Graffunder, I broadly considered concerns around receiving the COVID-19 vaccine at [55] - [63] and accepted that "vaccine hesitancy and conscientious objection, by themselves, are not considered exceptional circumstances." I concluded:

Clearly the Respondent does not dispute that Ms Graffunder has concerns about reacting to the vaccination or compatibility with her human rights. With respect to Ms Graffunder's various concerns, simply put, seeking an exemption because one is concerned of an adverse reaction, lack of consultation, the lawfulness of Directive 12/21, a lack of medical evidence or compatibility with human rights are not unusual or extraordinary circumstances.[35]

Ms Graffunder has also raised several issues with the accuracy and quality of evidence behind the COVID-19 vaccine. In doing so, Ms Graffunder refers to her own research as well as news articles. Again, the issue for Ms Graffunder is that her concerns are not 'exceptional' and on that basis, the Respondent had a fair and reasonable cause to refuse her exemptions request.[36]

  1. [45]
    In Graffunder, I considered arguments raised with respect to human rights at [59] - [62] and found that the Respondent's consideration of human rights did not render the decision unfair or unreasonable.
  1. [46]
    At [64] - [70] of Graffunder, I considered arguments raised with respect to informed consent. I ultimately concluded:

Ms Graffunder argues that she neither accepted nor rejected the mandate under Directive 12/21 but requires further and better particulars so that she can make an informed decision. In my view, the fact that Ms Graffunder has not received answers to the remaining queries or has not been satisfied with certain responses does not constitute an "exceptional circumstance". In light of that finding, I reject Ms Graffunder's arguments that the Exemption Decision was unfair and unreasonable on this basis.[37]

  1. [47]
    In Sunny, I considered alternative, less restrictive options:

Ms Richards determined there was no other less restrictive yet effective way to ensure the readiness of the health system in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic to protect the lives of all who are associated with WMH. Mr Sunny's role requires direct contact with patients and a range of clinical and non-clinical employees. I am not convinced that there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose of Directive 12/21.[38]

  1. [48]
    At [63] - [65] of Sunny, I also considered consultation obligations and risk assessments:

The Respondent submits that prior to the introduction of Directive 12/21, the Respondent complied with its obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) to consult with employees and with the registered unions representing employees. That consultation included dedicated meetings with registered unions representing employees employed within the Department. Mr Sunny did not respond to these submissions despite being given the opportunity to do so.

Further, the Respondent submits it conducted appropriate risk assessments prior to the implementation of Directive 12/21. The Respondent submits it is impracticable for the Department to conduct a personalised risk assessment for each affected worker but they undertook risk assessments for the whole workforce in satisfaction of their obligations under the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 (Qld). The Respondent contends the Director-General of Queensland Health received regular briefings from the Chief Health Officer regarding the risks of COVID-19 including a specific briefing on employees identified as working in high-risk roles. From these briefings, the Director-General satisfied himself that there was a demonstrable level of risk. Mr Sunny did not respond to these submissions despite being given the opportunity to do so.

I conclude that these remaining matters raised by Mr Sunny evince his personal preference not to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. I do not consider those matters to render the Exemption Decision unfair or unreasonable.

  1. [49]
    The Respondent in this matter addressed consultation at [8] of its written submissions.[39] Mr Davies did not specifically respond to these submissions despite being given the opportunity to do so.
  1. [50]
    Ultimately, each matter needs to be assessed on its own merits. Mr Davies' circumstances are different to Ms Graffunder's, Mr Sunny's and Ms Clarke's circumstances however the arguments raised are very similar and the excerpts above tend to show how those arguments have fared in the past. Overall, upon review of Mr Davies' specific circumstances and arguments, I have not drawn any new argument that renders the Exemption Decision unfair or unreasonable. The other matters raised have been considered and rejected before and I conclude that Mr Davies' prospects of success are extremely limited.

Prejudice to Mr Davies

  1. [51]
    Mr Davies will suffer some prejudice should the Appeal be dismissed for filing out of time. The obvious prejudice is that he would lose the opportunity for an independent review of the Exemption Decision, and any subsequent relief.
  1. [52]
    That outcome is of course not an insubstantial detriment to Mr Davies, who seeks to appeal a decision to not grant him an exemption against receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.
  1. [53]
    However, I have concluded above that Mr Davies has limited prospects of success and therefore while I accept there is some prejudice to Mr Davies, I do not consider that to be significant.

Prejudice to the Respondent

  1. [54]
    It is important to note that delay itself is considered to give rise to a general presumption of prejudice to the Respondent.[40] Furthermore, minimal additional prejudice to the Respondent in and of itself is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.[41]
  1. [55]
    I understand that the Respondent is assessing a large volume of exemption requests and is processing a large volume of employees through disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, a delay in filing an appeal is a delay in the overall process. This prejudice is compounded by my conclusion that the Appeal has low prospects of success.
  1. [56]
    For those reasons, I find that the Respondent would suffer some prejudice should I decide to exercise my discretion to hear the Appeal out of time.

Conclusion

  1. [57]
    Mr Davies filed his Appeal Notice four days out of time but has not provided any explanation for that delay.
  1. [58]
    There is a suite of relevant considerations in exercising my discretion to hear an appeal out of time. Foremost, I should be satisfied that Mr Davies has a reasonable ground for extending the time.
  1. [59]
    I have found that the Respondent advised Mr Davies of his rights of appeal, including the relevant timeframe. I am satisfied Mr Davies was provided with all the relevant information he required to file this Appeal within time.
  1. [60]
    The delay is unexplained and therefore I have not been presented with an acceptable reason to depart from the legislatively prescribed timeframe of 21 days.
  1. [61]
    Mr Davies will suffer some prejudice resulting from my decision to decline to hear the Appeal out of time. He will not receive an independent review of the Exemption Decision on this occasion, or the subsequent relief he seeks. However, I do not consider that prejudice to be overwhelming particularly in light of my conclusion that he has limited prospects of success.
  1. [62]
    If I proceeded to hear the Appeal out of time, the prejudice to be suffered by the Respondent is also relevant.
  1. [63]
    For the reasons above, I find that the Appeal was filed out of time, and there is no reasonable ground to extend the time for filing.
  1. [64]
    I have determined not to exercise my discretion under s 564(2) of the IR Act to allow the Appeal to be started within a longer period. On that basis, I dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
  1. [65]
    I order accordingly.

Order:

  1. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Footnotes

[1] Appeal Notice, 11 February 2022, 1; Respondent's Submissions, 2 March 2022, 1 [4].

[2] Health Employment Directive No. 12/21 cls 1, 7-8.

[3] Ibid 1.

[4] Respondent's Submissions, 2 March 2022, 2 [9].

[5] Employee COVID-19 vaccine exemption application form, 30 September 2021, 4.

[6] Email from Mr B. Davies to various contacts of the Respondent, 26 November 2021. 

[7] [2022] QIRC 030, 4 [12].

[8] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564(1).

[9] Respondent's Submissions, 2 March 2022, 1 [2].

[10] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564(2).

[11] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, [2].

[12] Megan Reimers v Aramaki Company (Australia) t/a Camira Child Care Centre [2002] 170 QGIG 23; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 547.

[13] (1996) 186 CLR 541, 553.

[14] (1995) 149 QGIG 777.

[15] (1999) 163 QGIG 20; Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232.

[16] [2013] QIRC 129.

[17] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 3.

[18] (2009) 239 CLR 175, [30].

[19] Letter from Mr A. Leggate to Mr B. Davies, 14 January 2022. 

[20]Tonia Shelley v McRoberts Agency [2009] 190 QGIG 189.

[21] See, eg, Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129.

[22] Email from Industrial Registry to all parties, 7 March 2022.

[23] Megan Reimers v Aramaki Company (Australia) t/a Camira Child Care Centre [2002] 170 QGIG 23; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 547.

[24] Letter from Mr A. Leggate to Mr B. Davies, 14 January 2022. 

[25] Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129.

[26] Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20; Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232.

[27] [2010] ICQ 35, [6].

[28] Appeal Notice, 11 February 2022, 4.

[29] Letter from Kennedy Spanner Lawyers to the Respondent, 27 September 2021 and 28 September 2021.

[30] Letter from Kennedy Spanner Lawyers to the Respondent, 29 September 2021.

[31] Appellant's Submissions, 14 March 2022.

[32] [2022] QIRC 076.

[33] [2022] QIRC 119.

[34] [2022] QIRC 089.

[35] [2022] QIRC 076, 14 [57].

[36] Ibid 15 [63].

[37] Ibid 17 [70].

[38] [2022] QIRC 119, 14 [60].

[39] Respondent's Submissions, 2 March 2022, 2 [8].

[40] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 556.

[41] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 300.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 151

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    McLennan IC

  • Date:

    05 May 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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