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Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2022] QIRC 293

Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2022] QIRC 293

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 293

PARTIES:

Harry, Amelia

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2022/539

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

4 August 2022

MEMBER:

Knight IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

Final submissions filed 25 May 2022

ORDER:

The appellant is refused an extension of time in which to commence the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – appeal under s 197 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) – where appellant appeals internal review confirming the decision to refuse the appellant's application for an exemption from complying with the requirements of Health Employment Directive No 12/21 Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements – where appeal commenced out of time – where appellant did not make an application for an extension of time in which to commence appeal – whether appeal should be allowed to be commenced within a longer period – extension of time refused

LEGISLATION AND

INSTRUMENTS:

Directive 11/20 – Individual employee grievances

Health Employment Directive No 12/21 – Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements cls 7, 8, 10

Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld) s 51A

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 17

Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 226

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 562B, 564

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 197

CASES:

Biel v Mansell (No 1) [2006] 2 Qd R 199

Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298

Crandon v Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority t/as Seqwater [2021] QIRC 248

Crothers v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 097

Edwards v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 91

Forsyth-Stewart v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 395

Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129

Purnell v Workers' Compensation Regulator; Ex parte State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 141

Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182

Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 039

Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133

Tucker v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 145

Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 227

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Ms Amelia Harry is employed by the State of Queensland through Queensland Health ('the Department') as a Registered Midwife within the maternity ward of the Rockhampton Hospital.
  2. [2]
    On 11 September 2021, Queensland Health issued the Health Employment Directive No 12/21 – Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements ('the Directive') concerning the mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirements for certain staff employed by Queensland Health. The Directive was issued pursuant to s 51A of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld).
  3. [3]
    Clause 7 of the Directive sets out the employees to which the Directive applies. Relevantly, it applies to all health service employees who are employed to work within a hospital or other facility where clinical care or support is provided.
  4. [4]
    Clause 8 of the Directive provides that, unless an employee to whom the Directive applies is exempt under cl 10, the employee must receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 30 September 2021, receive a second dose by 31 October 2021 and either provide to their line manager or upload into the designated system evidence of having done so no later than seven days after receiving each vaccine.
  5. [5]
    In her role as a Midwife within the Rockhampton Hospital, Ms Harry falls within one of the groups identified within the Directive who were required to receive a vaccination by the specified date.[1]
  6. [6]
    Clause 10 of the Directive provides that an employee does not have to comply with the Directive where they are granted an exemption. The Directive provides that an application for an exemption will be considered by the Department:
  1. (a)
    where an employee has a recognised medical contraindication;
  2. (b)
    where an employee has a genuinely held religious belief; or
  3. (c)
    where another exceptional circumstance exists.[2]
  1. [7]
    On 5 October 2021, Ms Harry requested an exemption to the mandatory vaccine requirements, identifying a recognised medical contraindication as the basis for the application.
  2. [8]
    On 25 January 2022, the Department wrote to Ms Harry seeking further information from her treating medical practitioner to support her request for exemption.[3] Ms Harry responded on 22 February 2022 saying she was unable to provide the information sought, and further advised she also held genuine religious beliefs that she wished to be considered.[4]
  3. [9]
    Attached to the correspondence was a further 'Employee COVID-19 vaccine exemption application form' which identifies that Ms Harry practices 'Naturism', a religion which endorses 'supporting physiological health and immunity as God has given us, with specific minimal medical intervention'.[5] Ms Harry identifies she is presently the sole leader of Naturism.
  4. [10]
    Ms Harry's request for an exemption was refused on 11 March 2022, and she subsequently sought an internal review of the decision to refuse her request.
  5. [11]
    In a decision letter dated 31 March 2022, Mr John Burns, Health Service Chief Executive, Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service, informed Ms Harry an internal review of her exemption application had been completed, and the decision to refuse the exemption application had been confirmed ('the Internal Review Decision').
  6. [12]
    By appeal notice filed 28 April 2022, Ms Harry seeks to appeal the Internal Review Decision under ch 7 pt 1 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld). Such an appeal proceeds under ch 11 pt 6 div 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act').[6] It is not by way of rehearing, but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at and the decision-making process therein.[7] Its stated purpose is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.[8]
  7. [13]
    However, s 564(1) of the IR Act provides that an appeal to the Commission must be commenced within 21 days of receiving the decision appealed against unless the Commission allows the appeal to be commenced within a longer period under sub-s (2).
  8. [14]
    Notwithstanding the fact it is dated 31 March 2022, Ms Harry indicates within her appeal notice she received the Internal Review Decision on 1 April 2022. She has also ticked a box confirming the appeal is being lodged within 21 days after she received the Internal Review Decision.
  9. [15]
    However, although she appears to have made attempts to file her appeal within time, Ms Harry's appeal was not successfully filed in the Industrial Registry until 28 April 2022, meaning it was lodged six days out of time.
  10. [16]
    Although Ms Harry has not applied for an extension of time to lodge her appeal, out of fairness to her, I have considered whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to allow her to do so.
  11. [17]
    For the reasons that follow, I consider Ms Harry should not be granted an extension of time in which to commence her appeal.

Relevant Principles

  1. [18]
    The IR Act relevantly provides:

564 Time limit for appeal

  1. (1)
    An appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal must be started, as required under the rules, within the appeal period.
  1. (2)
    However, on an application made during or after the appeal period, the industrial tribunal may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period.
  1. (3)
    In this section—

appeal period, for an appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal, means the period within 21 days after—

...

  1. (d)
    if, under another Act, the decision is given in another way—the decision is given in the other way.
  1. [19]
    The power to extend time to appeal is fundamentally an exercise of discretion, being the statutory power conferred by s 564(2) of the IR Act.[9] Although seemingly unfettered, the discretion must be exercised judicially, according to the rules of reason and justice.[10]
  2. [20]
    In considering whether to allow an appeal to be lodged out of time, the Commission will be guided by relevant, albeit non-exhaustive, principles that inform the exercise of the discretion.[11] Those principles are well established,[12] and I do not consider it necessary to repeat them in detail other than to reflect that, generally, the Commission will have regard to the following:
  1. (a)
    the length of the delay;
  2. (b)
    the explanation for the delay;
  3. (c)
    the conduct of the respondent;
  4. (d)
    the prejudice to the appellant if the discretion is not exercised; and
  5. (e)
    the prejudice to the respondent if the discretion is exercised.[13]

Parties Submissions

  1. [21]
    On 4 May 2022, I issued directions requiring written submissions as follows:
  1. 1.The Appellant file in the Industrial Registry, and serve on the Respondent, written submissions (of no more than five pages in length and any relevant attachments) in support of the Appeal by 4.00 pm on 11 May 2022.
  1. 2.The Respondent file in the Industrial Registry, and serve on the Appellant, written submissions (of no more than five pages in length and any relevant attachments) in response to the Appeal Notice by 4.00 pm on 18 May 2022.
  1. 3.If needed, the Appellant file in the Industrial Registry, and serve on the Respondent, written submissions (of no more than two pages in length and any relevant attachments) in reply to the submissions of the Respondent, by 4.00 pm on 25 May 2022.

...

  1. [22]
    The Department raised the issue of the appeal being out of time in its submissions filed 18 May 2022. As the pertinent parts of those submissions are relatively brief, it is convenient to set them out in full:
  1. 2.The Appeal is lodged in relation to a decision of 31 March 2022 by Mr John Burns, Health Service Chief Executive, Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service (CQHHS) to confirm the decisions not to approve, and to not accept, Ms Harry's two applications for an exemption from the requirement to receive a COVID-19 vaccination.
  1. 3.Ms Harry was emailed Mr Burns' decision on 1 April 2022. In the Appeal, Ms Harry confirms she received the decision on 1 April 2022. Accordingly, the Appeal was due to be filed by 22 April 2022. The Appeal is therefore six days outside of the 21-day limitation period.
  1. 4.Mr Burns' decision expressly told Ms Harry she was required to file any appeal within 21 days. Ms Harry has not provided any explanation for her failure to file the Appeal within the statutory time limit. Ms Harry did not file any written submissions in support of her Appeal by 11 May 2022 as directed to do so.
  1. 5.The importance of the application of statutory time limits has been consistently recognised. Ms Harry is appealing a decision to confirm the refusal of her application for an exemption from COVID-19 vaccination on the grounds of a medical contraindication, and a decision to not accept her application for an exemption on the grounds of a genuinely held religious belief, a process which commenced on 5 October 2021. In the context of a 21-day limitation period, the delay by Ms Harry is significant.
  1. 6.Extensions to legislative timeframes should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances. Parliament has legislated a 21-day time period for an appeal to be filed and the existence of compelling reasons for any delay are required to extend this timeframe. Ms Harry has provided no such reasons. The Commission should therefore decline to hear the Appeal on the basis it is out of time and has limited prospects of success (for the reasons outlined below).[14]
  1. [23]
    Ms Harry did not file submissions by 11 May 2022 as directed. Although she did file submissions on 25 May 2022 after receiving the Department's submissions, she did not address the Department's concerns regarding the appeal being lodged out of time.

Should Ms Harry Be Granted an Extension of Time to Lodge Her Appeal?

Length of Delay

  1. [24]
    As noted above, Ms Harry's appeal was filed six days out of time. The Department characterises this delay as 'significant'. Certainly, this Commission has previously considered delays of similar length to be significant.[15] Consequently, I agree with the Department's characterisation and consider this weighs against Ms Harry in the circumstances of this appeal.

Explanation for the Delay

  1. [25]
    The Department argues a departure from the legislated timeframe should only be allowed in 'exceptional circumstances' which requires the existence of 'compelling reasons for any delay'.[16]
  2. [26]
    Ms Harry has not provided any explanation for, or acknowledgment of, the fact her appeal has been filed out of time, notwithstanding the fact the Department raises this as a jurisdictional issue in its submissions.
  3. [27]
    However, having reviewed correspondence between Ms Harry and the Industrial Registry, it appears Ms Harry attempted to file her appeal on Friday, 21 April 2022. Unfortunately, Ms Harry's appeal notice was not accepted for filing on this date because it had not been properly completed.
  4. [28]
    The Industrial Registry contacted Ms Harry the following Monday asking whether she intended to appeal a decision under Part A of the notice (a promotion appeal) or Part B (another kind of public service appeal) and requested she resubmit the completed form as soon as practicable. Ms Harry did not respond to that email.
  5. [29]
    The Industrial Registry contacted Ms Harry again on 28 April 2022 asking whether she intended to file a completed appeal notice, at which point she responded with a correctly completed form. This is the date Ms Harry commenced her appeal.
  6. [30]
    As the above correspondence occurred before the appeal was commenced, the Department was unfortunately not copied and would not have been aware of Ms Harry's attempts to lodge an appeal.
  7. [31]
    While I accept Ms Harry made some attempts to commence her appeal within time, I consider it is incumbent on parties to ensure they file material correctly and within the timeframes prescribed by either legislation or this Commission. I would have been somewhat more sympathetic to Ms Harry's position had she responded to the Industrial Registry or taken steps to correct her omission in a timely manner. Instead, it was not until the Industrial Registry persisted in trying to assist Ms Harry that she filed the completed form.
  8. [32]
    I also note the onus is on Ms Harry to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay. She has not done so. Instead, it has been left to the Commission to glean some understanding of the circumstances from correspondence which was not raised by her.
  9. [33]
    Coupled with Ms Harry's failure to address the Department's submissions regarding the appeal being out of time and the other factors considered within these reasons, I consider Ms Harry's failure to disclose an adequate reason for her delay weighs against granting her an extension of time.

Statutory Timeframe

  1. [34]
    As is clear from s 564 of the IR Act, an appeal, including a public service appeal, must be brought within the appeal period unless the Commission allows the appeal to be started at a later time.
  2. [35]
    Ms Harry did not file her appeal within 21 days of receiving the Internal Review Decision. That failure is not merely an irregularity which can be rectified under r 226 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld).[17]
  3. [36]
    There is nothing in the material before me which suggests the statutory timeframe ought to be supplanted.
  4. [37]
    Further, although I note she did not make an application for an extension of time to lodge her appeal, it cannot be said Ms Harry was not aware of the statutory timeframe or the opportunity to make such an application.
  5. [38]
    The Form 89 – Appeal Notice Ms Harry filed contained a section titled 'Appeal Entitlement Checklist'. That checklist requires the person wishing to lodge an appeal to confirm their employment status and whether the appeal is being made 'within 21 days after [the appellant] was given the decision'.[18]
  6. [39]
    Where the appeal is not made within 21 days, there is the option to tick a box which states as follows:

I am applying for an extension of time to lodge my appeal notice after 5.00 pm on the 21st day after I was given the decision. The reason I could not lodge my appeal within the 21 day time frame is:

  1. [40]
    Space is then provided for the person to set out the relevant reason. As mentioned above, Ms Harry did not tick this box when she resubmitted her appeal notice.
  2. [41]
    Further, after Ms Harry filed her appeal, the Industrial Registry emailed her and the Department on 29 April 2022 confirming receipt of the notice and attaching a stamped copy bearing the Commission seal dated 28 April 2022. Within the body of that correspondence, there was a hyperlink to the 'Public service appeal guide' ('the Appeal Guide') published by this Commission.
  3. [42]
    Section 3.7 of the Appeal Guide provides:

3.7 Are there any time limits?

There are time limits on appealing decisions. An appeal notice (Form 89 – Appeal Notice – Public Service Act 2008) must be received by the Industrial Registrar no later than 5.00 pm on the day that is the 21st day after:

  • for a promotion decision - the day the decision is publicly notified; or
  • otherwise - the day the Appellant was given the decision appealed against.

However, the Commission Member may, at any time extend the time for the appeal notice to be filed if they are satisfied there is a reasonable ground for extending the time...

  1. [43]
    Ms Harry was clearly provided sufficient information to understand the timeframes relevant to a public service appeal and how she might obtain an extension to those timeframes if necessary. Although I accept she was required to resubmit her appeal notice, and the boxes ticked by her were likely correct as of 21 April 2022, it was incumbent on Ms Harry to ensure her appeal notice was accurate at the time it was filed, being 28 April 2022.

Prejudice to the Parties

  1. [44]
    Although neither party made submissions with respect to any prejudice they might suffer, there are some observations which might readily be made.
  2. [45]
    I am cognisant of the fact that it is a serious matter to deprive a person of the opportunity to lawfully challenge a decision on appeal. Such a deprivation will usually, if not always, cause prejudice to the appellant.
  3. [46]
    Comparatively, the prejudice that might be experienced by a respondent if an appeal or challenge is brought outside a legislated timeframe ordinarily flows from the inherent difficulty in adequately responding to the appeal or challenge, and the potential unavailability of key evidence, material or witnesses as a result of the passage of time.
  4. [47]
    In the present circumstances, I do not consider the Department will suffer any prejudice if I were to allow Ms Harry's appeal out of time, whereas I accept Ms Harry will suffer prejudice if leave is refused having regard to the nature of the appeal and the serious consequences which might flow in relation to Ms Harry's employment.

Conduct of the Department

  1. [48]
    The Department submits the Internal Review Decision contained clear wording expressly advising Ms Harry of her appeal entitlements.[19] Specifically, under the heading 'External review' Ms Harry was informed of her appeal rights as follows:

External review

If you are not satisfied with my decision in relation to the internal review of your grievance, you may lodge a public service appeal. A public service appeal must be lodged with the Industrial Registry within 21 days of you being notified of my decision. Further information can be obtained from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commissions (QIRC) on telephone 1300 592 987. Alternatively, you may refer to the QIRC appeals guide available at www.qirc.qld.gov.au.

Further information in relation to possible external review options can be found under clause 9.3 Stage 3 – external review of Directive 11/20.[20]

  1. [49]
    Attached to the correspondence was a copy of Directive 11/20 – Individual employee grievances ('the Grievance Directive'). Clause 9.3 of the Grievance Directive relevantly provides:

9.3 Stage 3–external review

  1. (a)
    If the employee who made the original individual employee grievance is dissatisfied with a decision made following internal review, the employee may seek an external review. Depending on the issues raised in the grievance, the avenues for external review may include: 
  1. (i)
    a public service appeal against a decision under a directive, a decision of the CCE under section 88IA to give a direction about the handling of a work performance matter, or a fair treatment decision, as provided for under sections 194(1)(a), 194(1)(ba) or 194(1)(eb) of the PS Act

...

  1. (c)
    Employees seeking more information about the procedures to be followed when making a public service appeal should refer to the QIRC appeals guide.
  1. [50]
    The underlined portion of (c) above, 'appeals guide', contains a hyperlink which, when clicked, opens a page of this Commission's public website where a copy of the Appeal Guide can be accessed. As noted above, the Appeal Guide provides explicit information regarding the time limits which apply to a public service appeal and the fact that the Commission may extend time where there are reasonable grounds to do so.
  2. [51]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that, although not obligated to do so under the Grievance Directive, the Department has taken adequate steps to inform Ms Harry of her appeal entitlements and the timeframes which apply. I am therefore not persuaded there is anything in its conduct which would support the granting of leave to commence the appeal out of time.

Prospects of Success

  1. [52]
    As mentioned above, a public service appeal to the Commission is by way of review of the decision appealed against. If I were to hear Ms Harry's appeal, my role would be to decide whether the Internal Review Decision was fair and reasonable based on the material provided by the parties.
  2. [53]
    The difficulty in this matter is that Ms Harry has filed extremely limited submissions which largely go beyond the scope of this appeal. Although she addresses her reasons for not including sufficient information within her original exemption request, Ms Harry's submissions primarily address:
  1. (a)
    her views regarding the requirement for the government to provide risk assessments in respect of COVID-19 vaccines;
  2. (b)
    concerns regarding freedom of information;
  3. (c)
    the fact the vaccines have been 'provisionally approved' by the Therapeutic Goods Administration and her view that this means it is experimental (vaccine hesitancy);
  4. (d)
    concerns regarding her human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 17;
  5. (e)
    her views regarding transmissibility of the virus from vaccinated staff; and
  6. (f)
    understaffing within Queensland Health.
  1. [54]
    The relevance of such matters has largely been addressed in other decisions of this Commission.[21]
  2. [55]
    Although these reasons do not canvas all of the issues raised in the substantive appeal in extensive detail, having reviewed Ms Harry's appeal notice and the parties' submissions, I am not persuaded Ms Harry's substantive prospects of success are high or even reasonable.

Conclusion

  1. [56]
    Ms Harry bears the onus of establishing she ought to be allowed to commence her appeal within a longer period. In my view, and as reflected above, she has not discharged that onus for several reasons:
  1. (a)
    Ms Harry filed her appeal six days out of time, which is not an insignificant delay when weighed against the circumstances of this appeal;
  2. (b)
    Ms Harry has not disclosed any explanation for the delay or attempted to meaningfully engage with the Department's submissions on this issue;
  3. (c)
    although I accept that Ms Harry may suffer some prejudice in being denied the opportunity to appeal the Internal Review Decision, I consider that prejudice is limited having regard to her prospects of success;
  4. (d)
    I am satisfied the Department took adequate steps to inform Ms Harry of her appeal rights, including the statutory timeframe to bring the appeal, and there has not been conduct on its behalf which supports allowing the appeal out of time;
  5. (e)
    the statutory timeframe within which to commence a public service appeal is clear, and must be respected; and
  6. (f)
    having regard to the material presently before me, including Ms Harry's appeal notice and limited submissions, I consider her prospects of success in the substantive matter are very low.
  1. [57]
    Consequently, I am not satisfied that I ought to extend time for Ms Harry to pursue her appeal.

Order

  1. [58]
    I order accordingly.

The appellant is refused an extension of time in which to commence the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] Health Employment Directive No 12/21 – Employee COVID-19 vaccination requirements cls 7, 8.

[2] Ibid cl 10.2.

[3] Department's submissions filed 18 May 2022, Attachment 2.

[4] Ibid Attachment 3.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 197.

[7] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(2); Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5.

[8] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3).

[9] Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777, 778.

[10] Biel v Mansell (No 1) [2006] 2 Qd R 199, 207; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 503.

[11] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344, 348; Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298, 299-300; recently endorsed by the Commission in Forsyth-Stewart v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 395, [17] ('Forsyth-Stewart').

[12] See, e.g., Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129, [3]-[5]; Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182, [31]-[32]; Crothers v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 097, [19]-[23]; Purnell v Workers' Compensation Regulator; Ex parte State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 141, [14]-[17].

[13] Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 227.

[14] Citations omitted.

[15] Forsyth-Stewart (n 11) [18]; Tucker v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 145, [28].

[16] Department's submissions filed 18 May 2022, [6].

[17] Crandon v Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority t/as Seqwater [2021] QIRC 248, [14].

[18] Appeal notice filed 28 April 2022, Part B.

[19] Department's submissions filed 18 May 2022, [4].

[20] My emphasis.

[21] See, for example, Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 039, [34]-[39] (risk assessments) and [40] (transmissibility of vaccinated staff); Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133, [44] (merits of the science behind vaccines and public policy in mandating them); Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030, [61] (vaccine hesitancy); Edwards v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 91, [42] (human rights).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • MNC:

    [2022] QIRC 293

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Knight IC

  • Date:

    04 Aug 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Beil v Mansell[2006] 2 Qd R 199; [2006] QCA 173
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] 2 Qd R 199
Cite 2 - [2006] 2 Qd R 199
Breust v Qantas Airways Limited (1995) 149 QGIG 777
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Cite 2 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 67 IR 298
Cite 2 - (1995) 67 IR 298
Crandon v Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority t/as Seqwater [2021] QIRC 248
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 248
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 248
Crothers v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 97
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 97
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 97
Edwards v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 91
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 91
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 91
Forsyth-Stewart v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 395
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 395
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 395
Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 319
Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 30
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 30
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Cite 2 - (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hunter Valley Dev Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 3 FCR 344
Cite 2 - (1984) 3 FCR 344
Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QIRC 129
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QIRC 129
Cite 2 - [2013] QIRC 129
Purnell v Workers' Compensation Regulator; Ex parte State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 141
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 141
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 141
Sandhu v Wide Bay Hospital and Health Service [2019] QIRC 182
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 182
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 182
Slykerman v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 39
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 39
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 39
Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 133
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 133
Tucker v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 145
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 145
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 145
Ulowski v Miller (1968) SASR 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1968) SASR 227
Cite 2 - (1968) SASR 227

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Philp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 552 citations
Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2025] QIRC 902 citations
1

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