Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)
[2025] QIRC 90
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- Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[2025] QIRC 90
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Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[2025] QIRC 90
Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)[2025] QIRC 90
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | Vickers v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2025] QIRC 090 |
PARTIES: | Vickers, Hazel (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (Respondent) |
CASE NO: | PSA/2025/4 |
PROCEEDING: | Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a disciplinary action decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 26 March 2025 |
DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: | Notice of Appeal (9 January 2025) Respondent's submissions (3 February 2025) Appellant's submissions in reply (24 February 2025) Respondent's further submissions (28 February 2025) |
HEARD AT: | On the papers |
MEMBER: | Pidgeon IC |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY –PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appeal against a disciplinary action decision – where there is a jurisdictional objection on the basis that the matter has been filed out of time – consideration of the merits of the appeal – where the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction |
LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: | Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 38(2) Discipline Directive (05/23) cls 9.5, 9.6 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 530A, 562B(4), 562C(1), 564(2) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 91(1)(b), 92, 101(1)(b) |
CASES: | Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 428 Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 293 Redman v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 20 Stacey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 220 |
Reasons for Decision
Introduction
- [1]Ms Hazel Vickers ('the Appellant') is employed by the State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney General) ('the Respondent') as a Principal Lawyer (PO6.l).
- [2]Ms Vickers appeals the decision of Ms Corynne Scott, Assistant Director-General, Corporate Services, Department of Justice ('the decision-maker') dated 10 December 2024 to impose the disciplinary action of a reduction in classification level from Principal Lawyer (PO6.01) to Senior Lawyer (PO5.1) and a resultant change in duties.
- [3]It appears from her grounds of appeal and submissions that Ms Vickers also appeals the disciplinary findings decision provided to her on 28 October 2024. The Respondent submits that this decision is not appealable as the 21-day timeframe for appealing that decision has expired.
- [4]The Respondent raises a jurisdictional objection on the basis that Ms Vickers' appeal was filed in the Industrial Registry out of time.
Appeal principles
- [5]Section 562B(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act') provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against and 'the purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable'.
- [6]Findings made in the decision which are reasonably open on the relevant material or evidence before the decision-maker should not be expected to be disturbed on appeal.
- [7]A public sector appeal is not an opportunity for a fresh hearing, but a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker.
- [8]In deciding this appeal, s 562C(1) of the IR Act provides that the Commission may:
- confirm the decision appealed against; or
…
- For another appeal— set the decision aside, and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.
Legislative framework
- [9]Section 131 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act') lists various categories of decisions against which an appeal may be made. Section 131(1)(c) provides that an appeal may be made against a disciplinary decision.
- [10]Section 129 of the PS Act relevantly states:
129 Definitions for part
…
disciplinary decision means a decision under a disciplinary law to discipline—
- a person (other than by termination of employment), including the action taken in disciplining the person; or
- a former public sector employee by way of a disciplinary declaration made under section 95, including if the disciplinary action that would have been taken was termination of employment.
- [11]Section 133 of the PS Act explains who may appeal a disciplinary decision:
133 Who may appeal
…
- for a disciplinary decision—a public sector employee or former public sector employee aggrieved by the decision if the employee is entitled to appeal under a directive
- [12]Section 562B of the IR Act states for an appeal against a promotion decision or a disciplinary decision under the PS Act, the Commission must decide the appeal having regard to the evidence available to the decision-maker when the decision was made;[1] but may allow other evidence to be taken into account if the Commission considers it appropriate.[2]
Jurisdictional objection – the appeal was filed out of time
- [13]Ms Vickers filed her appeal notice on 9 January 2025. In the fifth section of that form, she indicates that the date she received the decision was 9 January 2025. It appears that in nominating that date, Ms Vickers is referring to the written advice of the reduction of her classification dated 8 January 2025. However, it is clear from the first paragraph of the Schedule attached to the appeal notice that Ms Vickers is appealing a decision which is dated 10 December 2024.
Ms Vickers believes her appeal was filed in time
- [14]Ms Vickers says that she received advice from the Industrial Registry stating that her 21-day appeal period would expire on 9 January 2025, accounting for the Christmas closure from 24 December 2024 with the reopening of the Registry on 2 January 2025. In these circumstances, Ms Vickers says that her appeal has been filed in time.
Respondent's submissions regarding the jurisdictional objection
- [15]The Respondent says that any appeal against the decision of 10 December 2024 was to be made within 21-days of receipt of the decision letter. The Respondent says that the statutory timeframe for filing the appeal against the decision fell on 31 December 2024 and as a result, Ms Vickers' appeal, filed on 9 January 2025, is seven-days out of time.
- [16]The Respondent notes that on 9 January 2025, Ms Vickers emailed the Industrial Registry to clarify whether the 21-day timeframe for lodging her appeal had lapsed and that she was told that she had until 9 January 2025 to file the appeal. However, the Respondent notes that the advice provided by the Registry was incorrect and inconsistent with the Commission's Christmas Closure Notice.
- [17]The Respondent says that the 21-day period from receipt of the decision on 10 December 2024 ended on 31 December 2024 and that as this fell within the Commission's closure period, the last day for Ms Vickers to file her appeal was 2 January 2025 when the Commission reopened. The Respondent cites s 38(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) in support of this position.
- [18]The Respondent submits the following:[3]
- The importance of the application of statutory time limits has been consistently recognised[4] and should not easily be dispensed with.[5] Extensions to legislative timeframes should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances.[6]
- Notably, when Ms Vickers emailed the Commission on 9 January 2025, the timeframe for appealing the Decision had already passed. Ms Vickers took no action to appeal the Decision until after she received the letter dated 7 January 2025 (which she says she received on 8 January 2025) confirming the implementation of the Decision. Accordingly, the advice provided by the Industrial Registry on 9 January 2025 cannot be relied upon by Ms Vickers to excuse the late filing of the Appeal noting the appeal period had expired seven days before any advice was sought by Ms Vickers.
- Ms Vickers had not provided an acceptable reason to depart from the legislatively prescribed timeframe, despite the onus being upon her to do so.[7] Ms Vickers is a lawyer who works in personal injuries litigation. A solicitor with Ms Vickers' experience[8] ought to be aware of the importance of meeting appeal timeframes.
- The very limited prospects of success of the Appeal (as reflected in these submissions) is also a relevant consideration as to whether she should be granted an extension of time to file her Appeal.[9]
- [19]With reference to Stacey v State of Queensland (Department of Education),[10] the Respondent says that to the extent Ms Vickers seeks to appeal the disciplinary findings decision communicated to her by letter dated 28 October 2025, that appeal is over six-weeks out of time.
Ms Vickers' submissions in reply – jurisdictional objection
- [20]In her reply submissions, Ms Vickers submits that in considering the jurisdictional objection, the Commission should have regard to 'not only the legislative timeframes', but also, '…reasons for delay, the diligence upon the Appellant has acted to exercise her rights (sic), and the resulting prejudice and consequence to the parties if the appeal is not allowed'.[11]
- [21]Ms Vickers says that she is not an employment lawyer and has never been the subject of any disciplinary proceedings in her career, nor has she dealt with the procedure and practice of the Commission, particularly as it relates to the PS Act.
- [22]Ms Vickers submits that she does not have the financial resources to allocate to legal representation or advice, and that the available support and advice from her union has been limited.
- [23]Ms Vickers submits that she sought a review of the discipline process on 17 November 2023 on the basis that the Respondent has not complied with positive performance management processes. Further, she says that on 5 December 2023, she sought a statement of reasons from Mr Cooper, Crown Solicitor, regarding the decision to extend her suspension. Ms Vickers appears to submit that these matters are related to the disciplinary proceeding and outcome and therefore, should all be considered together.[12]
- [24]Ms Vickers says that she has been and remains 'severely impacted emotionally and psychologically traumatised by the manner at which (sic) the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted over the past 20 months'. Ms Vickers submits that she has increasingly needed more time to manage the emotional impact of receiving and preparing correspondence in this matter.[13]
- [25]Further, with regard to the appeal process, Ms Vickers submits:[14]
- The Appellant is battle weary and is keenly aware of the arduous process of lodging an appeal, the additional time required prior to a decision, and the complexity of the appeal process itself. She is intimidated and fearful of the Respondent and the consequences of lodging an appeal which is likely to be not worth it, given the processes involved and the likely outcomes experienced by others in similar circumstances.[15] A lot of time and energy has been expended by the Appellant to advocate for herself and maintain her resolve and the strain thereof has taken its mental and physical toll on the Appellant. This appeal process is an additional psychological burden because it is extremely stressful to recall, retell, and relive painful experiences.
- Simultaneously, the Appellant has had to contend with inquiries from the Legal Services Commission as well as the Queensland Law Society about these matters and provide submissions and responses received during this period.
- The Appellant also must weigh whether the Appeal justifies the burden involved, particularly when considered against competing demands and the time and investment of resources required of higher priority including caring for her family. Where personal urgent needs take precedence, enforcement and realisation for rights take second place.[16] If the Appellant fails in this Appeal, she must return to work in the very same Crown Law team of which the circumstance of the appealed decision arises. The Appellant is especially stressed that the Respondent has given very little consideration about any of her professional and personal circumstances since commencing employment in 2019: (1) increasing and ultimately heavy and excessive workload (equivalent to three fulltime lawyers); (2) inadequate paralegal and secretarial support; (3) extremely challenging personal circumstances particularly from August to November 2023; 5) (sic) sale and transfer of residences between November 2022 and March 2023; and (6) personal illness and emergency surgery in March until her return to work in April 2024. Despite providing evidence of a six-week recovery plan, the Appellant was denied access to long service leave.
- [26]Ms Vickers says that it is a matter of judicial notice that government offices, law firms and most businesses close before, during and after the Christmas period and that this limited her ability to confer and seek appropriate advice. Ms Vickers says that she directly communicated with the Industrial Registry regarding the end date of the appeal period and upon receiving advice, acted immediately.[17]
- [27]Ms Vickers says that she was 'forced to isolate herself from friends and extended family and social activities to comply with the Respondent's direction of confidentiality resulting in a lack of social connection and receiving little emotional and psychological support apart from her husband since June 2023'.[18]
- [28]Ms Vickers says that the appeal is necessary as she wishes to 'maintain her personal and professional integrity and seeks to obtain a fair record of what has transpired since 2023 and be able to dispel the cloud of suspicion surrounding these events and live with dignity'.[19]
- [29]Ms Vickers says that while prejudice to the Respondent is presumed in circumstances where there is a delay of an appeal, the Respondent has not provided submissions in that regard except to insist on compliance with timeframes. Ms Vickers notes that the Respondent failed to file its submissions on time on 31 January 2025 and that hard copy submissions were filed on 3 February 2025, with a copy provided to her by email on 5 February 2025, reducing the time available for her to prepare her response by 21 February 2025.
- [30]With regard to prejudice to herself, Ms Vickers says that she was suspended from work on 3 June 2023 and the decision was made on 10 December 2024, a period of 18-months later. She says that she continues to experience extended social isolation and professional stagnation until a decision is made in March 2025 (which I understand to be a reference to this decision). Ms Vickers says that she 'must be able to satisfy her own conscience that she has fully exercised her appeal rights considering the permanent and indelible impact of this matter upon her quality of life'.[20]
Respondent's submissions in reply – jurisdictional objection
- [31]The Respondent confirms that its submissions dated 31 January 2025 were emailed to Ms Vickers on 31 January 2025. The Respondent notes that there were emails between the Respondent and Ms Vickers on 5 February 2025 regarding attachments not being received. The Respondent says that Ms Vickers was not disadvantaged by the delay in receiving the submissions noting that she also had difficulties in filing her submissions and they were not received by the Department until 24 February 2025.
- [32]The Respondent repeats its submission that any appeal against the disciplinary finding of misconduct is out of time and says that her submissions relating to the finding of misconduct were 'comprehensively addressed in the disciplinary process'.
- [33]Regarding Ms Vickers' submissions set out above stating that she does not practice employment law and about her understanding of the disciplinary process, the Respondent states that correspondence sent to Ms Vickers was written in plain English and was capable of being understood by a lay person.
- [34]With regard to Ms Vickers' submissions set out above addressing the hardship and isolation she suffered as a result of a direction to maintain confidentiality, the Respondent presumes this is a reference to the suspension letter of 2 June 2023 directing Ms Vickers to keep the details of the matters in the letter confidential as far as possible. The Respondent says that the letter directed Ms Vickers not to contact staff directly or indirectly 'with regard to these matters' and that this was clearly limited to the concerns listed in the letter and the decision to suspend her from duty. The Respondent says that Ms Vickers was not prohibited from engaging with colleagues in a social setting, provided she did not discuss her suspension or the basis for it. The letter also directed her to keep the details of the matters in the letter confidential as far as possible, and that Ms Vickers was expressly told that she could discuss matters with her 'support person, union, legal representative or employee assistance provider'.
- [35]The Respondent says that Ms Vickers' suspension from duty ended on 10 December 2024 and that she was directed to return to work on 16 December 2024. The Respondent says that Ms Vickers elected to take recreation leave from 16 December 2024 until 20 January 2025 and then asked to extend her leave until 8 March 2025 pending a decision in relation to her appeal. The Respondent says that any ongoing isolation Ms Vickers is experiencing is because of her decision to take leave and not due to any action of the Respondent.
- [36]The Respondent says that processes or inquiries commenced by the Legal Services Commission and the Queensland Law Society are separate from the disciplinary process and that Crown Law was not a complainant about Ms Vickers' conduct to either of these bodies.
Consideration regarding the jurisdictional objection
Legal framework
- [37]A member of the Commission may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period.[21]
- [38]In exercising discretion to extend time to lodge an application or appeal, there are principles that have been used for guidance. Those principles are commonly:
- special circumstances need not be shown, but an applicant for extension must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;
- action taken by the applicant, other than by making an application under the relevant Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question of whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;
- any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension;
- the merits of the substantive application are taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted;
- consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of discretion.[22]
- [39]In Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd,[23] Hall P noted the following matters to consider when deciding whether or not to extend time:
- the length of the delay;
- the explanation for the delay;
- the prejudice to the Appellant if the extension of time is not granted;
- the prejudice to the Respondent if the extension of time is granted; and
- any relevant conduct of the Respondent.
- [40]The application of statutory time limits was addressed by McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor:[24]
A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature's judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated. Against this background, I do not see any warrant for treating provisions that provide for an extension of time for commencing an action as having a standing equal or greater than those provisions that enact limitation periods. A limitation provision is the general rule; and extension provision is the exception to it.[25]
- [41]The Appellant bears the onus of convincing the Commission to depart from the ordinary time limitations and hear the appeal out of time.[26]
Length of delay
- [42]Ms Vickers filed her appeal seven-days out of time. In the context of a 21-day statutory appeal period, this not an insignificant delay.
Explanation for the delay and any action taken by Ms Vickers
- [43]Ms Vickers received the letter on 10 December 2024. As a result, the 21-day period for filing the appeal ended on 31 December 2024. This date was during the Christmas Closure of the Industrial Registry. Therefore, pursuant to s 38(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, the date the appeal notice needed to be filed by was 2 January 2025, upon the Registry re-opening.
- [44]On Ms Vickers' own version of events, she did not contact the Industrial Registry to inquire about the impact of the Christmas Closure on the appeal period until 9 January 2025.
- [45]The letter of 10 December 2024 includes advice to Ms Vickers regarding her appeal rights. On page 8 of the letter, there is a heading, 'Appeal entitlements' in bold font. Ms Vickers is informed that any appeal must be lodged within 21-days of the receipt of the letter.
- [46]To the extent that Ms Vickers may have been advised by the Industrial Registry that the appeal period was extended by the duration of the closure and that her appeal was due to be filed by 9 January 2025, this was incorrect. If Ms Vickers had sought such advice before the date for filing had passed and had relied on incorrect information provided to her, this may form the basis of a reasonable excuse for late filing. However, based on the material before me, the only advice Ms Vickers had received prior to 31 December 2024, or 2 January 2025, when her appeal period expired, was in the decision letter which clearly states that the appeal period is 21-days.
- [47]I do not accept that any advice provided to Ms Vickers on 9 January 2025 to the effect that she had until that date to file her appeal provides a reasonable excuse for late filing in circumstances where there is no evidence whatsoever before me to demonstrate that Ms Vickers took steps to commence her appeal prior to this date.
- [48]In her appeal notice, Ms Vickers does not provide any further explanation as to the delay in filing her appeal. This is presumably because she believed she was filing it within time and did not need to address a potential jurisdictional issue regarding statutory timeframes.
- [49]Having read the Respondent's submissions, Ms Vickers was put on notice that the Respondent objected to the application being filed out of time. In her submissions of 24 February 2025, Ms Vickers addresses a number of reasons her appeal was filed late. I will address each of those here.
Ms Vickers has never dealt with the procedure and practice of the QIRC, especially related to the Public Sector Act 2022
- [50]I understand that for those who are not familiar with public sector appeal processes in the Commission, understanding the appeals process may require some research. However, I am satisfied that the letter of 10 December 2024 clearly identified that there was an appeal period of 21-days and that the QIRC is the correct jurisdiction in which to file an appeal.
- [51]I am further satisfied that Ms Vickers has the capacity to find publicly available information about the QIRC and public sector appeal processes. Ms Vickers has demonstrated an ability to contact the QIRC and to file an appeal (albeit outside of the required time limits).
- [52]A lack of familiarity with public sector appeal processes and the QIRC jurisdiction is not, on its own, a reasonable excuse for a seven-day delay in filing an appeal.
Ms Vickers is not an employment lawyer, cannot afford legal advice and had limited union representation
- [53]It is not necessary to have legal training or legal representation in order lodge a public sector appeal or undertake the associated process of a public sector appeal hearing. In fact, pursuant to s 530A of the IR Act, legal representation is not permitted for public sector appeal matters.
- [54]While union representation is common in public sector appeal matters, it is not unusual for an individual to represent themselves in the appeal process. There are occasions where individuals prepare their appeal materials with some union assistance or advice, but many people conduct their own appeals.
- [55]Ms Vickers may not be an employment lawyer, but her understanding of, for example, legal research and statutory interpretation would place her at an advantage in navigating the process when compared to self-represented public sector employees who do not hold legal qualifications.
Ms Vickers' previous correspondence regarding disciplinary matters and her suspension with remuneration
- [56]I am unsure of the relevance of these submissions. It appears that in 2023, Ms Vickers wrote to the Public Service Commissioner requesting a review of the discipline process being undertaken against her. My understanding is that she was informed that the Public Service Commission was not able to take any action regarding her request as no discipline process had commenced at that stage. Regarding Ms Vickers' request for reasons regarding the extension to her suspension, I am unable to identify any relevance to the current appeal.
- [57]If Ms Vickers' argument is that she was confused about where to lodge her appeal, this has no basis in circumstances where both the disciplinary decision letter and the disciplinary action letter inform her of her appeal rights and note the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The personal impact of the disciplinary process and suspension
- [58]I understand Ms Vickers' submission to be that as the matter has progressed, she has needed more time to absorb the information communicated to her by her employer and to prepare responses. There is no doubt that the disciplinary process and the appeals process can be a difficult time for those involved. However, the Appeal notice requires only that the employee fill out the form, identify the nature of the appeal, provide brief grounds for the appeal and attach the relevant decision.
- [59]I am satisfied that this was something Ms Vickers would have been able to do within the 21-day appeal period (including the short extension as a result of the Commission re-opening on 2 January 2025). This is particularly in circumstances where Ms Vickers chose to take leave from 16 December 2024 instead of returning to work following the cessation of her suspension with remuneration.
Simultaneously contending with inquiries from the Legal Services Commission and the Queensland Law Society
- [60]I note the Respondent's submission that it has not referred any matters forming part of the disciplinary findings to these bodies. Without more, I am unable to conclude that interacting with the Legal Services Commission or the Queensland Law Society caused Ms Vickers to file her Appeal seven-days out of time.
Isolation because of a direction to maintain confidentiality
- [61]I am satisfied that the direction to Ms Vickers to maintain confidentiality made it clear that she was able to discuss the matter with a support person, union, legal representative or employee assistance provider. I do not accept that the requirement to maintain confidentiality has contributed to the delay in filing her appeal.
Merits of the substantive application
- [62]The merits of the application should be taken into account in determining whether an extension of time should be granted. A preliminary matter to be dealt with prior to considering the merits of the substantive application is the scope of the appeal.
Scope of the appeal
- [63]In her appeal notice and submissions, Ms Vickers seeks to appeal both the disciplinary finding decision of 24 October 2024 and the disciplinary action decision of 10 December 2024. The Respondent states that it is only the disciplinary action decision of 10 December 2024, which is appealable, and that the disciplinary finding decision is several weeks out of time.
- [64]I note the Respondent's reference to the decision of Industrial Commissioner Dwyer in Stacey[27] as authority for the prospect that an 'employee who does not challenge a preceding decision that they are liable to disciplinary action may not later revisit that finding'. However, I also note that there are examples of appeals where the Commission has enabled both the disciplinary finding decision and the disciplinary action decision to be appealed together.[28]
- [65]In this case, it appears clear to me that Ms Vickers made a deliberate decision not to appeal the disciplinary finding decision dated 28 October 2024. That decision found that based on the substantiated allegations, pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the PS Act, Ms Vickers is guilty of misconduct, which is inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of s 91(5)(a) of the Act.
- [66]The letter clearly communicated Ms Vickers' appeal entitlements. The letter informs Ms Vickers that if a decision is made to terminate her employment, her appeal rights under the PS Act lapse. The letter goes on to set out the following:[29]
Therefore, if you wish to lodge an appeal under the appeal provisions of the PS Act about the Disciplinary Finding Decision, you must exercise your appeal rights urgently within 21 days of receipt of this letter and before a decision to terminate your employment (if it were to be made) is implemented.
…
- [67]Ms Vickers was made aware of the implications of choosing not to file an appeal against the disciplinary decision in circumstances where she was being given an opportunity to show cause why the Respondent should not terminate her employment. No such appeal was made. Ms Vickers has not made an application for an extension to file an appeal against the disciplinary finding or provided any explanation for why she did not do so. For these reasons, I find that the decision being appealed is only the disciplinary action decision dated 10 December 2024. Should I exercise my discretion to extend time, the appeal would be confined to that decision.
- [68]There is no doubt that in considering an appeal against a disciplinary action decision, regard must be had to the disciplinary findings in determining whether the disciplinary action taken was fair and reasonable. However, in the circumstances of this matter, the disciplinary findings are not under appeal and will not be disturbed.
- [69]In considering the merits of the substantive appeal, I will have regard to the material before me including: Ms Vickers' show cause response dated 12 November 2024; the Disciplinary Action decision dated 10 December 2024; and the submissions of both parties addressing the disciplinary action decision.
The Disciplinary Findings Decision and Ms Vickers' show cause response
- [70]The Disciplinary Findings Decision/Second Show Cause Notice provided extensive reasons as to why the decision-maker had found Allegation 1 and Allegation 2 to be substantiated. The letter contained conclusions for each Allegation and reasons as to why the decision-maker had established that there were grounds for discipline pursuant to s 91(1)(b) with respect to both Allegations.
- [71]For context, Allegation 1 was '[Ms Vickers has] consistently failed to meet legislative requirements for personal injury litigation and [her] professional obligations as a legal practitioner'. The particulars of that allegation were set out under the following headings: failure to comply with disclosure obligations; failure to comply with the ASCR; failure to deliver legal services diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible; and failure to comply with QGIF's SLA.[30] Allegation 2 was 'Between 10 April 2023 to 18 April 2023, [Ms Vickers] accessed a Workplace Law document without authority'.
- [72]On the basis of those substantiated allegations and findings of misconduct, Ms Vickers was asked to show cause as to why her employment should not be terminated. Ms Vickers' provided a show cause response on 12 November 2024. I have read that letter. The bulk of the letter responds to the disciplinary findings, providing further responses or context regarding each allegation. From paragraphs [62]–[70], Ms Vickers moves to directly address the proposed disciplinary action of termination:[31]
- It is unfortunate that you have taken a very dim view of my character. I have demonstrated values of hard work, loyalty and commitment to my work in the public service for 20 years. The conduct and behaviour I are (sic) accused of are certainly "out of character", and to the extent which I have been at fault, I have taken responsibility and have personally apologised to the offended party – [Redacted]. I have confirmed my understanding of Crown Law (State of Queensland) expectations of solicitor conduct and behaviour particularly to Ms Melinda Pugh, Deputy Crown Solicitor.
- I do not accept that I have been deliberately dishonest or misleading in the matter of [redacted]. In the context of one must choose between divulging personal and personal circumstances (sic), I have chosen to blame my personal circumstances. My explanation of this choice is in my submissions to the Legal Services Commission.
- In conclusion, I am not perfect. No one can perform without making any mistakes or poor judgement in a stressful and/or overwhelming professional situation.
- Over 17 months I have suffered the personal and professional costs incidental to my suspension and the draconian directions that deprive me from the freedom to converse and socialise with professional and personal friends; take advantage of career advancement/progression resulting in financial detriment and the emotional and psychological toll on my mental health due to this protracted process.
- The proposed outcome of this process not only deprives me of my current employment but also carry (sic) deep and significant impact to my future livelihood and ability to earn income for my family.
- I am not a dishonest person nor a negligent and incompetent solicitor. I was never led to believe that my performance was deficient in any way since I was employed to do this work in 2019. I was promoted from a Senior Lawyer to a Principal Lawyer and none of my supervisors have raised concerns about my conduct or work performance at any time specific to these matters now levelled against me. I have asked if there were any issues and none was offered. In fact, Ms Foulds stated that my performance was not at issue (Attachment 3). Crown Law had every opportunity to raise these 'deficiencies' with me but did not.
- To date, I am still unaware of the alleged deficiencies that QGIF has purportedly raised against me. Which again causes me to question why I have been subjected to an unfair process and targeted treatment.
- I have done my best in my job and have worked extremely hard to deliver on the expectations expected from me as a solicitor and a public servant. I have an unblemished record in the public service and as a legal practitioner.
- A fair and reasonable decision would consider the totality of the circumstances affecting me at the time and balance those extra-ordinarily difficult personal circumstances as well as the exceptionally challenging professional situation that Crown Law lawyers were working within since it commenced managing historical abuse claims in 2019 for the State of Queensland.
The Disciplinary Action Decision
- [73]In the disciplinary action decision dated 10 December 2024, the decision-maker notes that Ms Vickers' response of 12 November 2024 continues to:
… make submissions about [her] conduct the subject of the allegations, largely repeating submissions [she has] previously made. As [Ms Vickers has] not raised any new matters, [the decision-maker was] not persuaded to change [her] decision in relation to the disciplinary findings
- [74]On page two of the disciplinary action decision, the decision-maker sets out some particular matters raised by Ms Vickers that were taken into account in considering the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. From page three of the letter, the decision-maker provides the decision on disciplinary action:[32]
Decision on disciplinary action
I have considered very carefully the submissions you make with respect to the proposed disciplinary action. Although you submitted that your employment should not be terminated, you did not make any specific submissions as to any alternative disciplinary action I should take. Having considered your response, I have, on this occasion, determined not to terminate your employment but to take the disciplinary action of a reduction in classification level from PO6 to PO5 and a consequential change in duties from a Principal Lawyer to a Senior Lawyer. You will be placed at the PO5.1 pay point.
- [75]The decision-maker then goes on to state that she has had regard to the serious nature of the conduct. The decision-maker says that for the reasons set out in the disciplinary findings letter of 28 October 2024:[33]
- I was satisfied your conduct amounted to misconduct. I made this finding in relation to both allegations because I was satisfied your conduct outlined above, could not be excused on the basis of your high file load. A high file load does not explain you breaching your professional obligations as a solicitor. You have continued to maintain your conduct was not a serious breach of your professional obligation.
- [76]The decision-maker then provides further explanation as to why she considers Ms Vickers had been 'deliberately dishonest' and still does not understand the seriousness of her conduct. The decision-maker states:[34]
- Your conduct the subject of this disciplinary process has involved dishonesty. You have also been less than candid in your responses during the disciplinary process. This causes me to have serious concerns about your integrity. Honesty and integrity are fundamental qualities for a solicitor. The ASCR imposes duties of honesty, competence and diligence, as well as an obligation to be courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice. In addition, integrity, absolute impartiality and honesty are core values to Crown Law.
- You have acted in a way entirely inconsistent with your obligations as a solicitor and the expectations of employees within Crown Law when representing the State.
- However, as previously acknowledged, I accept that workloads within the GIR team were very high, over an extended period of time. I am informed that file loads have reduced. I do not accept a high workload or high file load excuses all of your conduct. It does not excuse your conduct in accessing the confidential document containing information about discipline processes undertaken by Crown Law on behalf of the Department. It also does not excuse your conduct in being misleading or dishonest in your communications.
- I consider it is open to me to terminate your employment for your conduct. Any conduct involving dishonesty or accessing confidential information improperly is a serious breach of trust and confidence inherent to the employment relationship. Employers must be able to trust their employees to act properly, particularly when they cannot be constantly supervised. A solicitor of your experience and length of service within Crown Law should not have required supervision in relation to your day to day conduct of files and communications with claimant solicitors, QGIF and judges' associates.
- I acknowledge you have not previously been the subject of disciplinary action. However, I do not consider this outweighs the seriousness of your conduct. I consider significant disciplinary action is required to reflect the seriousness of your conduct.
- I have decided on this occasion, not to terminate your employment, but to reduce your classification from a PO6 Principal Lawyer to a PO5 Senior Lawyer. While I hold concerns about your honesty, competence and diligence as a solicitor, I am prepared to give you an opportunity to demonstrate you are able to conduct litigation files in accordance with legislative requirements and your professional obligations.
- A Senior Lawyer does not have the same responsibilities as a Principal Lawyer for supervision and development of more junior lawyers within the team. A Principal Lawyer also conducts files with a greater degree of independence and autonomy. Based on the concerns identified in relation to your conduct, I do not consider it is appropriate that you work without a greater degree of supervision than ordinarily required of a Principal Lawyer. I consider you continuing to be employed as a Principal Lawyer would pose too great a risk to the state.
- I acknowledge my decision to reduce your classification from PO6 to PO5 will have a financial impact on you, however, the financial impact is less than if had decided to proceed with the termination of your employment. Further, you will have the opportunity to progress to PO6 in the future through usual recruitment processes, providing your performance as a PO5 is satisfactory and you demonstrate an ability to engage in appropriate communications. I do not expect you to access any confidential documents belonging to other teams in the future.
- On your return to work, you will be allocated files commensurate with a PO5 level position. You will also be allocated a supervisor, who will monitor your work to ensure you meet QGIF's SLAs as well as your obligations under PIPA. I expect that you will work professionally and respectfully with your supervisors and Assistant Crown Solicitor and ensure you conduct yourself politely, respectfully and courteously in all your dealings with claimant solicitors. Engaging in similar conduct in the future could lead to a further disciplinary process, which may result in the termination of your employment.
Accordingly, I have determined to impose the following disciplinary action under section 92(1) of the Act:
- A reduction in classification level from PO6 to PO5, and a consequential change in duties from a Principal Lawyer to a Senior Lawyer.
As a Senior Lawyer you will be supervised by a Senior Principal Lawyer or your Assistance Crown Solicitor on your return to work.
I have decided you should be placed at the PO5.1 pay point. Your progression through increments will be in accordance with the Queensland Public Service Officers and Other Employees Award – State 2015 including the requirement that conduct, diligence and efficiency of the employee has been certified by the chief executive to have been and to be satisfactory.
…
Ms Vickers' grounds of appeal
- [77]While Ms Vickers' appeal notice sets out several grounds of appeal, the only grounds of appeal relevant when considering the merits of the substantive appeal are those relating to the disciplinary action decision. In the Schedule to her Form 89 Appeal Notice, Ms Vickers addresses the disciplinary action decision in her fourth ground of appeal: The penalty imposed because of the disciplinary finding is unreasonably harsh, unfair and disproportionate to the alleged conduct even if it were substantiated.
- [78]Ms Vickers provides submissions regarding this fourth ground of appeal on pages 3 and 4 of the Schedule. First, she addresses the finding of misconduct. Ms Vickers then turns to the workload of the team and what she describes as the 'extreme pressure' under which the team was working. Ms Vickers notes that changes have since been made to address these matters and that external law firms are now being briefed. Ms Vickers points to her long career as a public servant and says that throughout her career, she has performed her duties with diligence, integrity and honesty. Ms Vickers also states that she has been extremely constrained from socialising with friends and work colleagues over 16 months and that she has not had opportunities for career advancement, noting that she was offered a contract externally but declined it as 'her intention is to acquit herself honourably from the public service'.[35]
The Respondent's submissions addressing the disciplinary action decision
- [79]From paragraphs [24]–[28] of the Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 3 February 2025, the Respondent describes the disciplinary process and submits that it was procedurally fair. The Respondent submits that the decision maker had regard to all relevant material in relation to the matter and says that this included Ms Vickers' five previous responses to the Crown Solicitor and Acting Crown Solicitor from 8 September 2023 to 27 November 2023.
- [80]The Respondent submits that the decision was procedurally fair and says that Ms Vickers was placed on notice with respect to the allegations, including the particulars relied upon in support of the allegations. Further, the Respondent says that Ms Vickers was provided with an opportunity to respond to the allegations and make submissions in respect of the proposed penalty. The Respondent says that there was no unreasonable delay in dealing with the process and that Ms Vickers has not been disadvantaged in that regard.
- [81]The Respondent says that on the basis of the misconduct findings, termination of employment was proposed, however this did not occur and the decision to reduce Ms Vickers' classification level was fair and reasonable.
- [82]The Respondent says that to the extent that Ms Vickers states that the Respondent did not comply with the Positive Performance Management Principles and Positive Performance Management Directive (Directive 02/24), the positive performance management principles are not designed to address a serious departure from the expected behavioural standards, professional and legislative obligations of an employee.
- [83]The Respondent reiterates the conduct Ms Vickers was found to have engaged in and submits that this is 'not conduct which an employee, particularly an experienced solicitor, needs to be told is unacceptable, unsatisfactory and given guidance or instruction to ensure they do not engage in such conduct'.[36]
- [84]The Respondent submits that the decision-maker 'specifically considered Ms Vickers' submissions about her workload and file load' but says that the decision-maker concluded that the high file load did not excuse the conduct.
- [85]The Respondent notes that the decision-maker found that Ms Vickers had been dishonest in her response to Allegation 2 and says that any finding of dishonesty, particularly from a solicitor would justify termination of employment.
- [86]The Respondent submits that Ms Vickers has demonstrated that she is not able to meet the expectations of a Principal Lawyer. The Respondent says that given the serious nature of the misconduct, a reduction in classification level and a consequential change of duties rather than termination was generous.
- [87]It is submitted that the decision-maker had regard to Ms Vickers' submissions about her personal circumstances and that these were taken into account is reflected in the fact that her employment was not terminated. The Respondent accepts that the reduction in classification will have a financial impact on Ms Vickers but says that it was fair and reasonable for the decision maker to consider that it was not in the public interest for Ms Vickers to continue in her role as a Principal Lawyer. The Respondent also notes that if she demonstrates satisfactory conduct and performance as a Senior Lawyer, Ms Vickers will have the opportunity to progress to Principal Lawyer through usual recruitment processes.
- [88]The Respondent submits that Ms Vickers' human rights were considered and that the decision was justified on the basis that it was in the public interest to ensure employees of the Department perform to a high professional standard and this outweighed any potential impact on Ms Vickers' human rights.
Ms Vickers' submissions regarding the disciplinary action decision
- [89]Ms Vickers contends that she should be employed at a PO6.2 level, not PO6.1 as stated in the disciplinary action decision. Ms Vickers says that this means the financial impact of the reduction in her classification is greater than that suggested by the Respondent. Ms Vickers says that the drop in the amount of remuneration she will receive is significant and will 'carry a substantial impact on the Appellant's ability to meet her financial obligations with rising living costs'.[37] Ms Vickers submits that she had no confidence that she will receive incremental increases as she was 'unfairly and unreasonably denied an increment increase from PO6.1 to PO6.2 in May 2023.
- [90]Ms Vickers then addresses the impact on her public service career and says that she is unlikely to progress to PO6 level unless there is a genuine vacancy and she is successful in competing for the position. Ms Vickers says that an adverse record of misconduct and a corresponding demotion make promotion unlikely.
- [91]With regard to the requirement to disclose any history of serious disciplinary action taken against her as an employee of the Queensland public service, Ms Vickers says she 'does not wish to be re-traumatised in providing a written disclosure each time the matter arises and then subject herself to fresh judgment and censure'.[38] Ms Vickers also says that the requirement to disclose the serious disciplinary finding will make her opportunities for employment elsewhere in the public service or outside of the public sector very limited.
- [92]Ms Vickers submits that the findings of misconduct 'bear a permanent stain' upon her career and significantly limit her future employment prospects and ability to secure employment.
- [93]Ms Vickers also notes that she is corresponding with the Legal Services Commission and the Queensland Law Society.
Respondent's further submissions dated 28 February 2025
- [94]The Respondent says that Ms Vickers was eligible for consideration of an increment from PO6.1 to PO6.2 on 23 May 2023. The Respondent says that eligibility for movement within classification levels from one increment to the next higher increment is based on the employee having received salary at the lower increment point for a period of 12 calendar months; and performance objectives having been achieved as certified by the chief executive.[39]
- [95]The Respondent notes that Ms Vickers was suspended from duty on 2 June 2023 under s 101(1)(b) of the PS Act. The Respondent notes that the correspondence provided to Ms Vickers informed her that concerns had been raised regarding her workplace conduct. The Respondent says that on 30 April 2023, the person acting in the role of Ms Vickers' substantive Assistant Crown Solicitor approved progression from PO6.1 to PO6.2, however, due to matters relating to confidentiality, he was not aware of the concerns which had been identified in relation to Ms Vickers' conduct.
- [96]The Respondent notes that the increment was to be progressed on 23 May 2023 and on 12 May 2023, Ms Benjamin, People and Culture Officer for Crown Law requested the Department's payroll hold off on processing the increment review form until further notice.[40] The Respondent submits that this request was made before any decision about increment progression was to take effect. The Respondent submits that due to an administrative error, the increment was processed for a pay period. Once this was identified, Ms Vickers' pay was corrected to PO6.1 and no overpayment was recovered.
- [97]In any case, the Respondent notes that the decision to stop the processing of Ms Vickers' increment is not the subject of this appeal.
- [98]The Respondent says that processes or inquiries commenced by the Legal Services Commission and the Queensland Law Society are separate from the disciplinary process and that Crown Law was not a complainant about Ms Vickers' conduct to either of these bodies.
Consideration regarding merits of the substantive appeal
- [99]As stated above, I have determined that the substantive appeal relates only to the disciplinary action decision.
- [100]I am satisfied that the Respondent has provided Ms Vickers with procedural fairness. Ms Vickers was afforded an opportunity to respond to the proposed disciplinary action of termination and was informed of her appeal rights regarding the disciplinary findings.
- [101]For completeness, I note that the show cause process for proposed disciplinary action complied with cl 9.5 of the Discipline Directive (05/23). I am also satisfied that the decision on disciplinary action complied with cl 9.6 of the Discipline Directive. Further, the disciplinary action of a reduction of classification level and a consequential change of duties is envisaged in s 92 of the PS Act.
- [102]The decision-maker has provided extensive reasons in support of the decision. That Ms Vickers' response was taken into account is demonstrated in the decision not to terminate her employment and to instead apply a reduction of classification and a consequential change of duties. Ms Vickers' submissions in this appeal address the impact the decision will have on her, but otherwise do not raise any new matters that were not considered by the decision-maker when determining the disciplinary action to be taken against Ms Vickers.
- [103]In circumstances where following a serious finding of misconduct it was initially proposed that Ms Vickers' employment be terminated but where a consideration of her submissions has led to a substantially less serious outcome, I am satisfied that Ms Vickers' appeal has low prospects of success.
Prejudice to the Respondent if the extension is granted
- [104]The Respondent does not make specific submissions regarding this matter and appears to be content that Ms Vickers has not discharged the onus to persuade the Commission to exercise the discretion to extend time. An absence of prejudice to the employer does not, on its own, mean that an extension of time should be granted.
Prejudice to the Appellant if the extension is not granted
- [105]The prejudice to Ms Vickers if the extension of time is not granted is she will not be able to appeal the disciplinary action decision. Given I have determined that the disciplinary findings decision is not appealable, it is only the decision to impose a reduction in classification and a consequential change of duties which would be subject of the appeal. For the reasons given above, I find that the substantive application has limited merit and therefore I do not consider the prejudice to Ms Vickers to be of significant weight.
Conclusion
- [106]For the reasons given above from paragraphs [42]–[61], Ms Vickers has not persuaded me that she has an acceptable explanation for the seven-day delay in filing her appeal. I am also not persuaded that Ms Vickers took any actions to progress her appeal following receipt of the decision on 10 December 2024 up until the filing of the appeal seven-days out of time on 10 January 2025 which demonstrate that time should be extended.
- [107]For the reasons given above from paragraphs [62]–[103] of these reasons for decision, I find that Ms Vickers' substantive appeal has limited merits. In considering this factor, I have had the advantage of all filed submissions and materials relevant to the substantive appeal.
- [108]As I have canvassed at paragraph [104] of these reasons, an extension of time would prejudice the Respondent in that they would be required to defend the proceedings. However, in circumstances where submissions have already been made addressing the substantive appeal, any prejudice to the Respondent would be minimal. This is not a factor which has weighed heavily in my decision.
- [109]Likewise, as discussed at paragraph [105], there is a prejudice to Ms Vickers if I do not extend time, as her appeal will not be heard. However, given my assessment of the merits of the appeal, I do not find any prejudice to Ms Vickers is such that it persuades me to extend time.
- [110]Ms Vickers did not make any submissions as to the fairness between the Appellant and other persons in a like position. However, there have been occasions where applications to extend time based on a misunderstanding of the statutory appeal period have been dismissed.
- [111]The Commission has repeatedly held that that it is the responsibility of the Appellant to ensure that material is filed within the statutory time periods.[41] As I noted above, regardless of whether Ms Vickers received incorrect information on 9 January 2025 about the impact of the Christmas Closure on her appeal rights, this information was provided well beyond the expiry of the 21-day appeal period.
- [112]I am unable to identify any relevant conduct of the Respondent which has contributed to Ms Vickers' late filing of her appeal. The Respondent has complied with the requirement to inform Ms Vickers of her appeal rights with respect to the disciplinary action decision.
- [113]As stated by McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor,[42] 'A limitation provision is the general rule; an extension provision is the exception to it'.[43] Having taken into account all of the available information regarding the relevant considerations, I am not persuaded that Ms Vickers should be granted an exception from the established limitation period for public sector appeals. I decline to exercise discretion to extend time for filing the appeal. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Orders
- [114]I make the following orders:
- The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Footnotes
[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(4)(a).
[2] Ibid, s 562B(4)(b).
[3] Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 3 February 2025, [8]–[11].
[4] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) CLR 541; Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20.
[5] Maina v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 100 at [25];.
[6] Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20.
[7] As per the decision of McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 180 CLR 541 at [554]; Kazuva v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 147 at [19]; Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 151 at [36].
[8] Having been admitted in January 2006.
[9] Kazuva v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 147 at [25]; Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 151 at [40].
[10] Stacey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 220, [18].
[11] Ms Vickers' submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 24 February 2025, [11] citing Gibson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 090, [6].
[12] Ibid [14]-[16].
[13] Ibid [17].
[14] Ibid [18]–[20].
[15] Ms Vickers cites Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 2) [2016] QIRC 08.
[16] Ms Vickers refers to a family member recently undergoing a medical procedure on 18 February, returning home on 20 February 2025.
[17] Ibid [21].
[18] Ibid [22].
[19] Ibid [23].
[20] Ibid [26]-[28].
[21] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564(2).
[22] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344, 348 (Wilcox J); Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298, 299-300 (Marshall J).
[23] (1995) 149 QGIG 777.
[24] (1996) 186 CLR 541 ('Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor').
[25] Ibid 553.
[26] Ibid 554; Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258, [35].
[27] Stacey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 220.
[28] Jelacic v State of Queensland (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) [2021] QIRC 384; Newman v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 159; AW v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2021] QIRC 036; Nash v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2021] QIRC 345; Magor v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2022] QIRC 035; O'Hearn v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 283.
[29] Respondent's submissions filed 3 February 2025, Letter from Ms Scott dated 28 October 2024, 17.
[30] Queensland Government Insurance Fund.
[31] Respondent's submissions filed in the Registry on 3 February 2025, Ms Vickers' letter to Ms Scott dated 12 November 2024.
[32] Appeal Notice, Decision letter on disciplinary action, 3.
[33] Ibid, pages 3 and 4 of the disciplinary action decision.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid, schedule [7].
[36] Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 3 February 2025, [31].
[37] Ms Vickers' submissions in reply (n 11), [47].
[38] Ms Vickers' submissions in reply (n 11) [52].
[39] Queensland Public Service Officers and Other Employees Award – State 2015 cl 12.9.
[40] Attachment 5 to submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 28 February 2025.
[41] Redman v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 20; Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 428; Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 293.
[42] (1996) 186 CLR 541.
[43] Ibid 553.