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CITE

Unreported Judgment

Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd[2022] QIRC 348Davis J and President and Dwyer IC and McLennan IC
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Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd[2022] QIRC 348

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd [2022] QIRC 348
PARTIES:	NICHOLAS MEARS (applicant) v VECTOR AEROSPACE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (respondent)
FILE NO/S:	B/2021/81
PROCEEDING:	Dispute
DELIVERED ON:	8 September 2022
HEARING DATE:	30 August 2022
MEMBER:	Davis J, President, Dwyer IC, McLennan IC
ORDER/S:	The applicant’s service with Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic (previously known as Atlantic Turbines International) in Canada and with Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) in England is part of the applicant’s continuous service to the respondent for the purposes of s 95 of the *Industrial Relations Act* 2016.
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – GENERAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS – LONG SERVICE LEAVE – ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE – CONTINUITY OF SERVICE – where the employee worked for companies associated to the employer in Canada and the United Kingdom – where the employee was employed by the employer in Queensland – where the employer denied that service in Canada and the United Kingdom counted upon the calculation of long service leave – whether substantial connection between overseas service in Queensland is necessary for the service to count – whether all service is “wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State” CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – STATE CONSTITUTION – EXTRATERRITORIAL OPERATION OF LEGISLATION – GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION ON STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER – where an employee claimed an entitlement to long service leave against his employer – where the employee’s “continuous service” included service under employment beyond Queensland – where the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provided that service “wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State” counted towards long service leave – whether the provision concerning service beyond the State was beyond the power of the Queensland Parliament Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 35 Australia Act 1986 (Cth), s 2 Constitution Act 1867 (Qld), s 2 Constitution of Queensland 2001, s 8 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 13 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts (Qld) 1961-1964 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 7, s 8, s 93, s 95, s 107, s 134 Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW) Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic)
CASES:	Anantapadma v Infosys Limited [2020] QIRC 190 - cited APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, cited Application for interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964 (1965) 58 QGIG 530, considered Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246, cited Broken Hill South Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337, followed Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421, cited Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria (2021) 64 VR 61, considered International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving [1981] 2 NSWLR 64, considered Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1, cited SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362, followed The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507, followed Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, cited
APPEARANCES:	Nicholas Mears, the applicant, appearing for himself C Fox for the Office of Industrial Relations M Swan for the respondent

[1]
Nicholas Mears, the applicant, is an employee of the respondent, Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd (Vector Australia). He claims an entitlement to long service leave and says that he has 10 years continuous service^[1] with Vector Australia or associated companies. Vector Australia submits that time served by Mr Mears when employed by companies associated with it in Canada and the United Kingdom ought not be taken into account in calculation of his long service leave entitlements.

Background

[2]
The case proceeded on a statement of agreed facts which is in these terms:

“

1.On 14 January 2008, the Applicant commenced employment with Atlantic Turbines International based in Prince Edward Island, Canada. During his employment the company name was changed to Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic.

2.Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic was a subsidiary of Vector Aerospace Holdings. The Applicant’s role was as an Engine Shop Technician working on the Engine Assembly Line.

3.The Applicant’s total length of employment at Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic was 1 year.

4.On 5 January 2009 the Applicant transferred to Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) based in Gosport, England. Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) was a subsidiary of Vector Aerospace Holdings. The Applicant’s role with that employer was as an Engine Shop Technician working on the Engine Assembly Line and Field Support Engineer/MRT (Mobile Repair Team).

5.The Applicant’s total length of employment at Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) was 4 years.

6.Around October 2012, the Applicant was offered a position at Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd (the Respondent) based in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, which he provisionally accepted.

7.On 26 November 2012 the Applicant signed the new employment contract with the Respondent.

8.The Respondent was, at all relevant times, was a subsidiary of Vector Aerospace Holdings.

9.The agreed start date for the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent was 24 January 2013 and it was on that date that his employment commenced with the Respondent.

10.The Applicant’s role with the Respondent was to work in the MRT Department (Mobile Repair Team) as a MRT Technician.

11.In order to relocate to Brisbane, Queensland, and commence his new employment with the Respondent, the Applicant was advised that he was required to resign his position at Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK). The Applicant resigned his position with that company on 11 January 2013.

12.The Applicant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 24 January 2013.

13.In 2018, the Respondent commenced using the business name ‘StandardAero’ after the Respondent’s parent company was taken over by a corporation of that name.

14.The Applicant is currently still permanently employed by the Respondent in the role of MRT Technician and has been living in Brisbane, Queensland for a period of 9 years.

15.Set out below is a summary of length of the Applicant’s employment at each subsidiary within the Vector Aerospace/Standard Aero corporate group and the length of his employment within that corporate group:

Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic	14 January 2008 to 5 January 2009	1 year
Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK)	5 January 2009 to 11 January 2013	4 years
Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd t/as StandardAero	24 January 2013 to present	9 years
Total length of employment:		14 years”

Statutory provisions

[3]
Chapter 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) concerns “modern employment conditions”. Part 3 concerns “Queensland Employment Standards” and Division 9 of Part 3 concerns “long service leave”.
[4]
Section 95 of the IR Act provides for an entitlement of employees to long service leave. An employee is entitled to long service leave once they have “completed 10 years continuous service”.^[2] Mr Mears is “a national system employee” within the meaning of s 13 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the respondent is “a national system employer”. The long service leave provisions of the IR Act apply to Mr Mears’ employment with the respondent.^[3]
[5]
“Continuous service” is defined by s 93 of the IR Act, relevantly:

“continuous service, of an employee, means—

(a)
in section 107– the period of continuous service the employee is taken to have had with an employer under section 107(2)(b); or

(b)
elsewhere—the employee’s continuous service with the same employer, whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State. …” (emphasis added)

[6]
Section 107(2)(b) concerns seasonal workers and is not relevant. Section 107, relevantly here, provides:

“(1) The employee is entitled to long service leave on full pay of at least the number of weeks worked out using the following formula—

actual service

entitlement x –––––––––––––

where—

entitlement means the entitlement to long service leave of an employee under section 95.

service means actual service expressed as a part of a year.

Example—

An employee who worked half of each year, over a 10-year period, is entitled to half the entitlement, that is, half of 8.6667 weeks leave (8.6667 x 5/10 = 4.3334).

(2)
In working out the length of the employee’s continuous service—

…

(5)
In this section—

actual service means the total ordinary time in years actually worked by the employee during the employee’s period of continuous service.”

[7]
Sections 134(8) and (10) provide, relevantly:

“(8) Service with a corporation and any of the corporation’s subsidiaries is taken to be continuous service with the same employer. …

(10)
In this section—

subsidiary has the meaning given by the Corporations Act. …”

[8]
There is no need to consider the definition of “corporation” in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).^[4] It is accepted by Vector Australia that Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic, Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) and it are related so that service with any of them counts towards “continuous service”, subject of course to the arguments about the appropriateness of calculating overseas service.

The issues in dispute

[9]
The Office of Industrial Relations appeared on the application through Mr Fox. Mr Fox, in his submissions, supported Mr Mears’ claim. There is no need to distinguish between the submissions made by Mr Mears himself, and the submissions made by Mr Fox. Reference to submissions by Mr Mears includes those made in support of him by Mr Fox.
[10]
Mr Mears’ submitted that:
1. (a)
  he has over 10 years of “continuous service” with the companies within the Vector Aerospace group;
2. (b)
  some of that service has been within Queensland. That service is nine years and is all with Vector Australia;^[5]
3. (c)
  some of the service has been outside Queensland. That service is five years, being one year in Canada and four years in the United Kingdom;
4. (d)
  therefore, applying s 93(b) there has been continuous service for over 10 years and an entitlement to long service leave has arisen.
[11]
Vector Australia submits:
1. (a)
  that on a proper construction of s 93(b) of the IR Act, service overseas, before employment in Queensland, is not service for the purposes of the calculation under s 95 of the IR Act. There is some reliance upon s 35(1)(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954;
2. (b)
  if s 93(b) operates as Mr Mears submits, then:
  1. it is beyond the plenary power of the Parliament of Queensland and, therefore;
  2. the section ought to be read down to preserve its constitutional validity.^[6]

The proper construction of s 93(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016

[12]
In construing the relevant provisions of a statute, the aim is to find the meaning of the actual words used in the context of the legislation as a whole and other relevant context and having regard to the purpose of the provisions.^[7]
[13]
Sections 93 and 95, read together and taken literally, fix a liability upon an employer and confer a right upon a Queensland employee once the employee has 10 years continuous service part of which is within the State of Queensland. Here, Mr Mears has worked for the Vector Aerospace group for over 10 years. Part of that service is in Queensland. On the plain and literal meaning of the text, he is entitled to long service leave.
[14]
However, jurisprudence has developed such that it is now assumed that the entitlement to long service leave does not arise unless the employee’s service has a substantial connection to Queensland. This emerged for the first time in the Federal Hotels case decided by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1965.^[8]
[15]
The Federal Hotels case concerned the long service leave provisions in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts 1961-1964. Long service leave provisions were introduced in 1952 and were subsequently amended. By the time of the Federal Hotels case, the provisions were in relevantly the same form as s 93(b) of the IR Act.
[16]
In Federal Hotels, an employee had worked in Queensland but had previously worked for related companies in New South Wales and Victoria. Questions arose as to the calculation of interstate service on long service entitlements. In the Commission, this was held:

“In the Queensland statute the legislature has attached rights and duties within the State to acts committed outside the State (section 17 (2)) and it was not suggested that there is anything invalid or outside the power of Parliament to do this.

If it is held that the long service leave provisions of the Queensland Act apply to Mr C^[9] it seems then that the period of continuous service in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland can be taken into consideration in deciding the value of the leave payable.

There are two extreme cases which could arise under the legislation. The first, at one extreme, where an employee works for a Queensland employer in Queensland for the whole of his service performing work which would bring him within the Act provision. Then, at the other extreme, there could be the case of an employee from another State employed for a very short period in Queensland and then returning to his home State. It seems obvious that such an employee would be subject to the long service leave provisions of the Act in his home State.

But the present case falls somewhere between these two. Mr C had the final four years of his service with the Company in Queensland.

Had Mr C been appointed in the first place to Queensland by Federal Hotels Limited and had he the same length of continuous service in Queensland that he has had in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, I think it might well be, even conceding Victorian employment, that he would have become entitled to the benefit of the Queensland Act at the termination of his employment.” (emphasis added)

[17]
The reasoning of the Industrial Commissioner was that to avoid multiple claims in different States, there should be a real connection to one State, thus identifying the relevant jurisdiction in which the claim could be made. In that way, it has been assumed the provisions incorporate a “substantial connection with Queensland” test.^[10]
[18]
An appeal to the Industrial Court by Federal Hotels was unsuccessful. In a short judgment, Hanger J (as his Honour then was), as President of the Industrial Court, held that some of the employee’s service was inside the State, some outside the State and as together that service amounted to 10 years, the employee fell literally within the terms of the provisions. There is nothing in the Industrial Court’s decision to suggest any requirement for substantial connection of the service taken as a whole to Queensland, or the necessity that the service undertaken outside Queensland has some “substantial connection” to Queensland.
[19]
A “substantial connection” test has been adopted in various other jurisdictions.^[11]
[20]
In International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving,^[12] the Industrial Commission of New South Wales in Court Session, considered provisions of the Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW). The relevant sections contained no equivalent to the term, “whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State”, as appears in s 93(b) of the IR Act. In that case, the employee had spent some of his service outside New South Wales. As the legislation was silent on the issue of interstate service, the Industrial Commission of New South Wales observed:

“It was conceded that if the service with the various companies had taken place in New South Wales the worker would have been entitled to the long service leave awarded by the Chief Industrial Magistrate and that his conclusion was justified were it not for the fact that the service prior to December 1975 had, apart from the period in 1966, been outside New South Wales.

It is trite that it would be unreasonable to read the section as applying to workers under all contracts of employment anywhere in the world and that some territorial limitation must be introduced in the construction of the relevant section: cf Mynott v Barnard (1939) 62 CLR 68, at p 73.”^[13] (emphasis added)

[21]
The Industrial Commission of New South Wales went on to hold that it was not necessary that all service be “substantially connected” to New South Wales, but that the test was applied looking at the service as a whole:

“We are, therefore, in agreement with the appellant’s approach to the problem to the extent that it contends that the service involved must be connected with New South Wales. We think, however, that its submissions go too far when they involve the proposition that the service (subject to temporary absences) which is to be rewarded must be performed entirely in New South Wales. We think that the benefits provided for in the Act accrue if at the time the relevant event occurs (that is, completion, termination or cessation) the service which was being performed up to that time has a substantial connection with this State. This interpretation seems to us to accord with the purpose and policy of the Act without being in any way inconsistent with its language. It is to be assumed that the legislature intended the statute to bear a meaning which would have regard to the practical situation in industry and would leave as few anomalies as possible. We believe that the interpretation we favour achieves this result. This view does not make it necessary, as in the case of workers’ compensation legislation, that the relevant event must occur within the State but it is essential that, at the time of its occurrence, the service, looked at as a whole, may fairly be said to be to a substantial extent New South Wales service.”^[14] (emphasis added)

[22]
That approach was followed by the Full Federal Court considering the Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) in Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan.^[15]
[23]
Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria^[16] is heavily relied upon by Vector Australia. There, the Court of Appeal of Victoria considered the provisions of the Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic). Two employees had worked for Infosys in India for some seven years before they were then employed in Victoria.
[24]
It is unnecessary to set out the Victorian provisions. As observed by Kennedy JA and McDonald AJA:

“The LSL Act makes no provision as to its territorial reach and operation. Both Infosys and the State seek to fill this lacuna by resort to s 48(b) of the ILA, which provides:

In an Act or subordinate instrument, unless the contrary intention appears –

(b)
a reference to a locality, jurisdiction or other matter or thing shall be construed as a reference to such locality, jurisdiction or other matter or thing in and of Victoria.”^[17]

[25]
The reference to the “ILA” is a reference to the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic). Section 35(1)(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 is an equivalent to s 48(b) of the ILA.
[26]
As to the operation of s 48(b) of the ILA, it was observed by the Court of Appeal of Victoria:

“When s 6 of the LSL Act is construed in light of s 48(b) of the ILA, ‘continuous employment’ means employment ‘in and of’ Victoria.”^[18]

And:

“Continuous employment in and of Victoria with one employer requires a close identification between the continuous employment and Victoria. It is unnecessary to exhaustively define the circumstances as to when such close identification will arise.”^[19]

[27]
It was held that all of the “continuous service” had to have some substantial connection with Victoria. The Court of Appeal of Victoria therefore departed from the reasoning in both Weaving and Keenan where it was held that the question was answered by looking at the service globally.
[28]
None of the authorities looking at interstate legislation are relevant to the construction of s 93(b) of the Industrial Relations Act. In the other States, the relevant provisions are silent as to whether service outside the State counts in the calculation.^[20] That necessarily leads to the consideration of provisions like s 35(1)(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and consideration of the intention of the legislature as to the effect of acts and events occurring outside the State.^[21]
[29]
That problem of construction does not exist in s 93(b). It expressly provides that both service within the State and outside the State counts in the calculation. All that is necessary is that there is continuity of employment by the employer of the employee.
[30]
There are, in our view, doubts as to whether any substantial connection test is imported into s 93(b). The only direct authority in support of that position is the Industrial Commissioner’s decision in Federal Hotels. That was not supported, at least expressly, on appeal to the Industrial Court.
[31]
However, if there is no such requirement, odd results may follow. An employee may work virtually all their service outside Queensland and liability for long service leave may be visited upon an employer under the IR Act for a very short period of service in Queensland. It may be, though, that is just a consequence of the continuance of the relationship between the employer and employee.
[32]
It is not necessary to finally decide that issue and another case will no doubt arise which will be a better vehicle to determine the matter.
[33]
The liability under s 93(b) of the IR Act crystalises upon the employer who employs the employee in Queensland on the day of the tenth anniversary of employment by it or an associated company. Section 93(b) specifically refers to service outside Queensland and there is simply no basis to construe s 93(b) as incorporating a requirement that all service must have a substantial connection to Queensland. In the present case, Mr Mears was employed in Queensland for almost half of the relevant 10-year period. If some “substantial connection” test applies, it is clearly satisfied.
[34]
Subject to the constitutional question, Mr Mears has made out his claim.

The constitutional question: must s 93(b) be read down?

[35]
Vector Australia submitted that if service overseas, prior to an employee working in Australia, was counted towards long service liability crystallising in Queensland, the effect of s 93(b) was to fix the working terms and conditions of employees beyond the State. In the absence of some nexus to Queensland, the law would be beyond the plenary power of the Queensland Parliament.
[36]
Cases such as Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone,^[22] International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving^[23] and Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria^[24] did not doubt the power of the relevant State Parliament to enact laws as to long service leave with extra-territorial operation.
[37]
Vector Australia’s submission cannot succeed. Section 93(b) does not purport to impose terms and conditions of employment beyond Queensland borders. What it does is identify a fact, which may occur interstate or overseas, which then visits liability upon an employer who, at the relevant time, is employing an employee in Queensland.
[38]
The powers of State Parliament are defined by s 2 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth). That provides:

“2 Legislative powers of Parliaments of States

(1)
It is hereby declared and enacted that the legislative powers of the Parliament of each State include full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of that State that have extra‑territorial operation.

(2)
It is hereby further declared and enacted that the legislative powers of the Parliament of each State include all legislative powers that the Parliament of the United Kingdom might have exercised before the commencement of this Act for the peace, order and good government of that State but nothing in this subsection confers on a State any capacity that the State did not have immediately before the commencement of this Act to engage in relations with countries outside Australia.”

[39]
Although the wording is slightly different, s 2 of the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) is to the same effect. It provides:

“2 Legislative Assembly constituted

Within the said Colony of Queensland Her Majesty shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the said Assembly to make laws for the peace welfare and good government of the colony in all cases whatsoever.”

[40]
Section 8 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001 preserves the position under s 2 of the Constitution Act 1867.
[41]
In Broken Hill South Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW),^[25] Dixon J (as his Honour then was) in a passage which has been consistently followed by the High Court^[26] observed:

“The power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of a State does not enable the State Parliament to impose by reference to some act, matter or thing occurring outside the State a liability upon a person unconnected with the State whether by domicil, residence or otherwise. But it is within the competence of the State legislature to make any fact, circumstance, occurrence or thing in or connected with the territory the occasion of the imposition upon any person concerned therein of a liability to taxation or of any other liability. It is also within the competence of the legislature to base the imposition of liability on no more than the relation of the person to the territory. The relation may consist in presence within the territory, residence, domicil, carrying on business there, or even remoter connections. If a connection exists, it is for the legislature to decide how far it should go in the exercise of its powers. As in other matters of jurisdiction or authority courts must be exact in distinguishing between ascertaining that the circumstances over which the power extends exist and examining the mode in which the power has been exercised. No doubt there must be some relevance to the circumstances in the exercise of the power. But it is of no importance upon the question of validity that the liability imposed is, or may be, altogether disproportionate to the territorial connection or that it includes many cases that cannot have been foreseen.”^[27]

[42]
Here:
1. (a)
  Section 93(b) operates in relation to employers carrying on business in Queensland; and
2. (b)
  Section 93(b) operates with relation to employees employed in Queensland; and
3. (c)
  the long service leave provisions impose a liability upon an employer in relation to its employment of an employee employed in Queensland.
[43]
The provisions are clearly within the power of the Queensland Parliament to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Queensland and the contrary is not established merely because some of the acts giving rise to that liability may have occurred overseas.

Conclusions

[44]
Mr Mears has established 10 years of continuous service with the respondent or related companies and is entitled to long service leave, pursuant to s 95 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.
[45]
The appropriate order is to find that the applicant’s service with Vector Aerospace Engine Services Atlantic (previously known as Atlantic Turbines International) in Canada and with Vector Aerospace Engine Services (UK) in England is part of the applicant’s continuous service to the respondent for the purpose of s 95 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.
[46]
No party applied for costs.

Footnotes

[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 93 and 95.

[2] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 95(2)(a).

[3] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a).

[4] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9 and 57A.

[5] Statement of agreed facts, paragraph 16.

[6] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 9.

[7] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 and The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507.

[8] Application for interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964 (1965) 58 QGIG 530, and on appeal to the Industrial Court of Queensland (1965) QGIG 531.

[9] The relevant employee.

[10] Anantapadma v Infosys Limited [2020] QIRC 190 at [38].

[11] New South Wales; International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving [1981] 2 NSWLR 64, Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246 and in Victoria; Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria (2021) 64 VR 61 and Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421.

[12] [1981] 2 NSWLR 64.

[13] At 67.

[14] At 70.

[15] (2020) 281 FCR 421 at [191].

[16] (2021) 64 VR 61.

[17] At [62].

[18] At [45].

[19] At [92].

[20] With the exception of South Australia where the Parliament has enacted a unique provision prescribing limits to the territorial application of their long service leave provisions. See s 4, Long Service Leave Act 1987 (South Australia).

[21] See generally Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421 at [183]–[194].

[22] [1971] AR (NSW) 246.

[23] [1981] 2 NSWLR 64.

[24] (2021) 64 VR 61 at [61].

[25] (1937) 56 CLR 337.

[26] APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1 and Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1.

[27] At 375.

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd
Shortened Case Name:
Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd
MNC:
[2022] QIRC 348
Court:
QIRC
Judge(s):
Davis J, President, Dwyer IC, McLennan IC
Date:
08 Sep 2022

Appeal Status

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Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Anantapadma v Infosys Limited	[2020] QIRC 190	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 190 Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 190
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW)	View on:JADE(2005) 224 CLR 322	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2005) 224 CLR 322 Cite 2 - (2005) 224 CLR 322 Cite 3 - (2005) 224 CLR 322
Application for interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964	(1965) 58 QGIG 530	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1965) 58 QGIG 530 Cite 2 - (1965) 58 QGIG 530
Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2)	(1971) AR (NSW) 246	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1971) AR (NSW) 246 Cite 2 - (1971) AR (NSW) 246 Cite 3 - (1971) AR (NSW) 246
Broken Hill South Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of TaxationNA	View on:JADE(1937) 56 CLR 337	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1937) 56 CLR 337 Cite 2 - (1937) 56 CLR 337
Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan	(2020) 281 FCR 421	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2020) 281 FCR 421 Cite 2 - (2020) 281 FCR 421 Cite 3 - (2020) 281 FCR 421 Cite 4 - (2020) 281 FCR 421
Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria	View on:VR(2021) 64 VR 61	6 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2021) 64 VR 61 Cite 2 - (2021) 64 VR 61 Cite 3 - (2021) 64 VR 61 Cite 4 - (2021) 64 VR 61 Cite 5 - (2021) 64 VR 61 Cite 6 - (2021) 64 VR 61
International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving	View on:NSWLR[1981] 2 NSWLR 64	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64 Cite 2 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64 Cite 3 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64 Cite 4 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v State of Victoria	View on:JADE(2002) 211 CLR 1	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2002) 211 CLR 1 Cite 2 - (2002) 211 CLR 1
Mynott v Barnard	View on:JADE(1939) 62 CLR 68	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1939) 62 CLR 68
R v A2	View on:JADE(2019) 269 CLR 507	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507 Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection	View on:JADE(2017) 262 CLR 362	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2017) 262 CLR 362 Cite 2 - (2017) 262 CLR 362
The Queen v Vaziri	(1965) QGIG 531	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - (1965) QGIG 531
Union Steamship Co. of Australia Pty Ltd v King	View on:JADE(1988) 166 CLR 1	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1988) 166 CLR 1 Cite 2 - (1988) 166 CLR 1

Cases Citing List of cases on Queensland Judgments citing this Judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd	[2024] QIRC 109	6 citations

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Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd[2022] QIRC 348