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Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd[2024] QIRC 109

Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd[2024] QIRC 109

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd [2024] QIRC 109

PARTIES:

CRAIG GEOFFREY FOX

(applicant)

v

INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LTD

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

B/2023/15

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

10 May 2024

HEARING DATE:

26 February 2024, 9 May 2024

MEMBERS:

Davis J, President, O'Connor, Vice-President, Hartigan, Deputy President

ORDERS:

  1. Narendra Gade performed ten years continuous service with the respondent partly in and partly outside the State of Queensland and is entitled to long service leave.
  2. Any dispute as to the calculation of the entitlement is remitted to Deputy President Hartigan for determination consistently with the Full Bench’s reasons.
  3. The parties shall exchange written submissions on the question of costs by 4pm on 17 May 2024.
  4. Each party may file and serve by 4pm on 24 May 2024 an application for leave to make oral submissions on costs.
  5. In the absence of any application being filed by 4pm on 24 May 2024 the question of costs shall be determined on any written submissions received and without further oral hearing.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – GENERAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS – LONG SERVICE LEAVE – ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE – CONTINUITY OF SERVICE – where the employee was employed by the respondent in India – where a condition of the terms of employment was that the employee could be deployed to locations outside India – where the employee was deployed to Victoria – where, after ten years of continuous service with the respondent, the employee was deployed to work in Queensland – where the employee worked in Queensland for 18 days – where the employee made claim for long service leave pursuant to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – whether long service leave entitlements only arise if the service of the employee has a “substantial connection” to the State – whether the entitlement to long service leave arises if the employee has performed ten years continuous service with the respondent before working in Queensland – whether entitlements of the employee under laws of the sovereign state of India disentitle the employee to long service leave under the provisions of Industrial Relations Act 2016.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – STATE CONSTITUTION – EXTRA-TERRITORIAL OPERATION OF LEGISLATION – GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION ON STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER – where an employee claimed an entitlement to long service leave – where the employee’s “continuous service” included service under employment beyond Queensland – where the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provided that service “wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State” counted towards long service leave – whether the provision concerning service beyond the State was beyond the power of the Queensland parliament – whether the provision concerning service beyond  the State needed to be read down so as to be within the power of the Queensland parliament

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 35(1)(b)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9, s 57A

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 (Ind)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 13

Gratuity Act 1972 (Ind)

Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964

Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 7, s 8, s 93, s 95, s 107, s 130, s 131, s 132, s 133, s 134, s 486

Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 35

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld)

Australia Act 1986 (Cth) s 2

CASES:

Anantapadma v Infosys Limited [2020] QIRC 190, not followed

Application for Interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964 (Federal Hotels case) (1965) 58 Q Gov Indus Gaz 530, cited

Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246, cited

New South Wales v The Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 52, cited

Broken Hill South Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337; [1937] HCA 4, cited

Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410; [1995] HCA 24, cited

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Anor v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (2022) 275 CLR 165; [2022] HCA 1, cited

Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421; [2020] FCAFC 204, cited

Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472; [1930] HCA 12, cited

Farrah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22, cited

Infosys Technologies Ltd v Victoria (2021) 64 VR 61; [2021] VSCA 219, cited

International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving [1981] 2 NSWLR 64, cited

Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd (2022) 320 IR 168; [2022] QIRC 348, cited

Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214; [1990] HCA 6, cited

Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1; [2002] HCA 27, cited

Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507; [1976] HCA 26, cited

Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340; [1989] HCA 49, cited

Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah & District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 Q Gov Indus Gaz 169; [2008] ICQ 18, cited

R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, followed

Raman v Infosys Limited [2021] QIRC 275, not followed

Simmons v Health Laundry Co [1910] 1 KB 543, cited

State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1996) 189 CLR 253; [1996] HCA 32, cited

Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1; [1988] HCA 55, cited

University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, cited

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456; [2021] HCA 23, followed

APPEARANCES:

On 26 February 2024 and 9 May 2024, the applicant appearing in person for the Office of Industrial Relations

On 26 February 2024 T O'Brien for the respondent instructed by K&L Gates and on 9 May 2024 MT Hickey instructed by K&L Gates

  1. [1]
    The applicant, Craig Fox, is an industrial inspector who brings a claim on behalf of Mr Narendra Gade against the respondent Infosys Technologies Ltd (Infosys) for unpaid wages representing alleged long service leave entitlements.
  2. [2]
    The matter was referred to the Full Bench pursuant to s 486 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act).
  3. [3]
    Most of Mr Gade’s service to Infosys was performed outside Queensland and that raises for consideration questions of construction of provisions of the IR Act as to the calculation of “continuous service” for the purposes of long service leave.  Similar issues arose for consideration of a Full Bench of the Commission in Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd,[1] but certain questions as to the construction of the relevant provisions were unnecessary to decide and were therefore left open.  It is necessary to address some of those unresolved issues here.

Background

  1. [4]
    The parties have agreed upon a statement of facts which, with some attachments, constitutes the evidence in the claim.
  2. [5]
    Infosys is a company incorporated pursuant to the laws of India.  It is registered in Australia as a foreign company pursuant to the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Its business is the provision of information technology solutions.
  3. [6]
    While Infosys is primarily based in India, it operates from 247 locations across 54 countries.
  4. [7]
    Infosys has a large workforce.  A significant proportion of the workforce is employed in India.  However, employees are resident in other countries including Australia.
  5. [8]
    In order to meet local demand from time to time, employees are often deployed to overseas destinations including Australia.  Within Infosys, these deployments are known as “deputations”.  Therefore, many employees of Infosys will spend varying lengths of time away from India working temporarily in other countries.
  6. [9]
    Mr Gade is an Indian national who, in late 2011, was resident in the city of Vijayawada in India.  On 10 December 2011, Mr Gade was offered employment with Infosys.  The letter of offer was formally accepted on 5 March 2012 when he started work.  Upon acceptance by Mr Gade, the terms of the letter became terms of his employment.
  7. [10]
    The following term was included in the letter:

“Your services can be transferred to any of our Units / Departments situated anywhere in India or abroad. At such time, the compensation applicable to a specific location will be payable to you.”

  1. [11]
    From 5 March 2012 to 14 June 2018, Mr Gade worked for Infosys in Mysore[2], India.
  2. [12]
    By letter of 13 June 2018, Mr Gade was informed of his deputation to Melbourne.  The terms and conditions of the deputation included:

“Your deputation will be for a period of about 13 months commencing from 14-Jun-2018.  The exact duration, however will depend on specific requirements of the project.  This deputation is temporary in nature and you shall return to your home country post completion of your deputation.  Your base location continues to be in India.”

And:

“You are required to return to your home country immediately following the completion of your deputation in Australia.”

  1. [13]
    Mr Gade’s deputation continued into 2020. By letters of 27 July 2020 and 15 December 2020, Mr Gade was assigned to work with Telstra in Melbourne.
  2. [14]
    By letter from Infosys to Mr Gade dated 9 March 2022, Mr Gade was assigned to work with Telstra in Brisbane.  This assignment was at Mr Gade’s request.  Mr Gade had been attempting to obtain permanent residency status in Australia and working in Brisbane was thought to assist that application.
  3. [15]
    The letter of 9 March 2022 contained the following:

“1. Duration

Your Assignment will be for a period of about 4 months commencing from 14-Mar-2022.  Your revised Assignment end date is 30-Jun-2022.  The exact duration, however, will depend on the specific requirements of the project and/or on the discretion of the Company.

Please note that, your on-site tenure including this Assignment cannot exceed the duration specified in your immigration document or 18 months whichever is lower.

Infosys Limited reserves the right to call for your return to your base location at any point during your Assignment.”

  1. [16]
    Mr Gade’s employment in Queensland was to be from 14 March 2022 to 30 June 2022.  However, due to illness, Mr Gade did not commence employment in Queensland until 28 March 2022.  He had, from 14 March to 27 March 2022, continued to work for Infosys in Melbourne.
  2. [17]
    While Mr Gade was still in Melbourne, he resigned from Infosys.  His notice of resignation was to expire while he was working in Brisbane.  He worked in Brisbane from 28 March 2022 to 14 April 2022, a period of 18 days.
  3. [18]
    The laws of India include the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 (Ind) (the Gratuity Act) and the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 (Ind) (the EPF Act). 
  4. [19]
    The Gratuity Act sets up a form of long-service entitlement.  Where an employee has worked continuously with an employer for a period of five or more years, a payment is made calculated at the rate of 15 days wages for every completed year of continuous service.  The sum is payable upon retirement, termination, death or disablement of the employee.
  5. [20]
    The EPF Act sets up a form of employer funded superannuation.  During an employee’s employment, the employer must make contributions to prescribed provident funds which are then available to the employee upon retirement.
  6. [21]
    Upon Mr Gade’s resignation from his employment with Infosys, he was paid an amount due under the provisions of the Gratuity Act.  During Mr Gade’s employment, Infosys made all contributions required under the EPF Act.
  7. [22]
    Mr Fox alleges that as Mr Gade was employed continuously by Infosys for a period exceeding ten years and some of that service was performed in Queensland, Mr Gade is entitled to long service leave which he calculates to $11,065.31.
  8. [23]
    That sum was calculated by assessing the long service leave entitlement under the IR Act and deducting the amount paid to Mr Gade by Infosys pursuant to its obligations under the Gratuity Act.
  9. [24]
    Infosys challenges Mr Gade’s entitlement to long service leave but does not challenge the calculations.  There is though some dispute as to the significance of the payment of the sum paid pursuant to the Gratuity Act.

Statutory provisions

  1. [25]
    Since the WorkChoices case[3] and the enactment of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), employees in private enterprise are “national system employees” and the IR Act does not generally apply to national system employees.  However, long service leave is a state entitlement, and the IR Act applies.
  2. [26]
    Chapter 2 of the IR Act concerns “Modern employment conditions”.  Part 3 concerns “Queensland Employment Standards” and Division 9 of Part 3 concerns “Long service leave”.
  3. [27]
    As Mr Gade is a “national system employee”[4] and Infosys is a “national system employer”, the long service leave provisions of the IR Act apply to Mr Gade’s employment with Infosys.[5]
  4. [28]
    The entitlement to long service leave arises under s 95 of the IR Act.  The entitlement inures to employees once they have “completed 10 years continuous service”.[6]
  5. [29]
    “Continuous service” is defined by s 93 of the IR Act, relevantly:

“93  Definitions for division

…

continuous service, of an employee, means—

  1. in section 107– the period of continuous service the employee is taken to have had with an employer under section 107(2)(b); or
  1. elsewhere—the employee’s continuous service with the same employer, whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State.

…” (emphasis added)

  1. [30]
    Sections 134(8) and (10) provide, relevantly:

“134 Continuity of service—generally

…

  1. Service with a corporation and any of the corporation’s subsidiaries is taken to be continuous service with the same employer.

…

  1. In this section—

subsidiary has the meaning given by the Corporations Act.

…”

  1. [31]
    There is no need to consider the definition of “corporation” in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).[7] 
  2. [32]
    It is accepted by Infosys that, subject to arguments about calculating overseas service, Mr Gade has had ten years of continual service.

The questions in dispute

  1. [33]
    Mr Gade was employed by Infosys from 5 March 2012 to 14 April 2022.  He attained ten years of continuous service with Infosys on 5 March 2022, some 23 days before he began work in Queensland.
  2. [34]
    Long service leave crystallises on a particular date, but it does not accrue from day to day.[8] In other words, except in limited circumstances, an employee who resigns before the tenth anniversary of continuous employment gets nothing.[9] 
  3. [35]
    By s 93 of the IR Act, service “partly in” or “partly outside the State” may occur at any time during the qualifying period of ten years.  It follows then that service later in the qualifying period has a somewhat retrospective operation.  Until there is some service within Queensland, there is no service being counted towards the entitlement. Once there is service in Queensland, the “continuous service” will be calculated as including past service performed outside the State.
  4. [36]
    Mr Gade has greater than ten years continuous service relevantly from 5 March 2012 to 14 April 2022.  Subject to the arguments considered below, some of his service with Infosys occurred “partly in” Queensland. That is the 18-day period from 28 March 2022 to 14 April 2022.  Taken literally, he therefore completed ten years of continuous service “partly in and partly outside the State”.
  5. [37]
    Four issues have emerged. 
  6. [38]
    The first is that Infosys submits that the relevant provisions ought to be read so as to require a “substantial connection” between Mr Gade’s service and the State of Queensland.  It submits that Mr Gade was employed in India, obtained the benefit of industrial legislation enacted in India, his employment in Queensland was fleeting, and was just an incident of his employment in India (the first issue).
  7. [39]
    The second issue is that Infosys submits that, as the law of India provides for the payment to Mr Gade of benefits of the nature of long service leave, s 131(2) of the IR Act excludes Mr Gade’s entitlement to long service leave under the provisions of the IR Act (the second issue).
  8. [40]
    The third issue is that the Mr Gade served ten years employment with Infosys before he performed any service in Queensland.  It is submitted then that the 18 days service in Queensland cannot be merged into and counted with the earlier service (the third issue).
  9. [41]
    The fourth issue is that Infosys submits that if s 93(b) of the IR Act is construed as submitted by Mr Fox, the law is beyond the power of the Queensland legislature to have enacted and the provision must therefore be read down (the fourth issue).

The hearing

  1. [42]
    The application came before the Full Bench on 26 February 2024.
  2. [43]
    During argument, the second and third issues emerged.  They had not featured in any of the written submissions.  They arose as a result of questions asked of the parties by members of the Full Bench.  The fourth issue emerged in written submissions filed pursuant to orders made by the Full Bench on 26 February 2024 and amended on 4 March 2024
  3. [44]
    It became evident that the interests of justice required that the parties be given the opportunity to make detailed submissions on the second and third issues and also on another matter that had arisen during argument, namely the state of the law before Mears was decided. 
  4. [45]
    On 26 February 2024, orders were made which were subsequently amended. As amended, the orders were:

“ …

  1. The Respondent have leave to file in the Industrial Registry and serve on the Applicant by 4pm on 6 March 2024, written further submissions on the issues of:
    1. the state of the law concerning the requirement of ‘substantial connection to Queensland’ prior to the decision in Nicholas Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd [2022] QIRC 348; and
    2. the effect of the fact that Mr Gade served 10 years continuous service with Infosys Technologies Ltd before he worked in Queensland.
  1. The Applicant have leave to file in the Industrial Registry and serve on the Respondent by 4pm on 4 March 2024, written further submissions on the significance of section 131 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).
  2. The Applicant file in the Industrial Registry and serve on the Respondent by 4pm on 13 March 2024, written submissions in reply to the Respondent’s submissions.
  3. The Respondent file in the Industrial Registry and serve on the Applicant by 4pm on 11 March 2024, written submissions in reply to the Applicant’s submissions.
  4. The application be determined without further oral submissions unless a party applies by 4pm on 13 March 2024 to have leave to make further oral submissions.”
  1. [46]
    Further submissions were filed and served by both parties.  The applicant objects to certain further written submissions made by the respondent, arguing that the submissions went beyond the leave given.  This included the fourth issue.  The parties applied for leave to make further oral submissions.  That was granted and the further oral hearing was set for 9 May 2024.
  2. [47]
    On 17 April 2024, the matter was mentioned before Vice-President O'Connor but no orders were thought necessary and none were made.
  3. [48]
    Further oral submissions were heard on 9 May 2024.
  4. [49]
    New counsel appeared for Infosys when the hearing resumed.  Mr Hickey’s approach to the substantial connection point differed from Mr O'Brien’s.  The Full Bench gave the parties leave to argue the case afresh, unconstrained by anything that had occurred on 26 February 2024.  To their credit, both parties avoided unnecessary repetition.
  5. [50]
    Before turning to the four issues, it is necessary to consider what was decided in Mears.[10]

Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd

  1. [51]
    Mr Mears was an aero engine mechanic.  For about 14 years he worked for various subsidiaries of Vector Aerospace Holdings.  Initially, his employment was in Canada and then in the United Kingdom.  He was then employed by Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of Vector Aerospace Holdings.  For about nine years he resided and worked in Queensland.
  2. [52]
    When Mr Mears claimed long service leave, Vector Aerospace Australia took two points in opposition to the claim.  It argued:
    1. section 93(b) of the IR Act had to be read down as in the absence of some nexus to Queensland the law would be beyond the plenary power of the Queensland Parliament (the constitutional point); and
    2. the relevant provisions of the IR Act should be read so as to incorporate a requirement that there was some substantial connection between Mr Mears’ employment and Queensland (the substantial connection point).
  3. [53]
    As to the substantial connection point, the Full Bench observed:

“[13] Sections 93 and 95, read together and taken literally, fix a liability upon an employer and confer a right upon a Queensland employee once the employee has 10 years continuous service part of which is within the State of Queensland.  Here, Mr Mears has worked for the Vector Aerospace group for over 10 years. Part of that service is in Queensland.  On the plain and literal meaning of the text, he is entitled to long service leave.”[11]

  1. [54]
    The Full Bench considered various authorities on the question of substantial connection.  However, those cases observed that in the legislation that was being considered, the relevant sections did not expressly deal with whether service outside the State counted in the calculation of service for the purposes of long service leave.  The Full Bench in Mears observed:

“[28]  None of the authorities looking at interstate legislation are relevant to the construction of s 93(b) of the Industrial Relations Act.  In the other States, the relevant provisions are silent as to whether service outside the State counts in the calculation.  That necessarily leads to the consideration of provisions like s 35(1)(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and consideration of the intention of the legislature as to the effect of acts and events occurring outside the State.

[29]  That problem of construction does not exist in s 93(b).  It expressly provides that both service within the State and outside the State counts in the calculation.  All that is necessary is that there is continuity of employment by the employer of the employee.

[30] There are, in our view, doubts as to whether any substantial connection test is imported into s 93(b).  The only direct authority in support of that position is the Industrial Commissioner’s decision in Federal Hotels.  That was not supported, at least expressly, on appeal to the Industrial Court.”[12] (footnotes omitted)

  1. [55]
    A general observation was made:

“[31]  However, if there is no such requirement, odd results may follow.  An employee may work virtually all their service outside Queensland and liability for long service leave may be visited upon an employer under the IR Act for a very short period of service in Queensland.  It may be, though, that is just a consequence of the continuance of the relationship between the employer and employee.”[13]

  1. [56]
    The question was left open as the Full Bench determined that there was a substantial connection between Mr Mears’ employment and the State of Queensland so, if proof of such a thing was necessary, then it had been proved.[14]  As Mr Gade only worked for 18 days of his ten years qualifying service in Queensland, the point left open in Mears is raised for consideration.

Consideration of the four issues

The first issue: is a substantial connection required?

  1. [57]
    In R v A2[15], the High Court authoritatively summarised the principles to be applied by Australian Courts when construing a statute.[16]  What has to be ascertained is the meaning of the actual text of the provision.  In so doing, a literal approach may give way to a meaning discerned by consideration of the statute as a whole in the context of purpose, statutory history and any relevant extrinsic materials.
  2. [58]
    The purpose behind s 93 is obvious.  The employee is not to lose the benefit of continuous ten-year service with one employer because part of the service is not performed in Queensland.  Before Mears, several cases considered whether the entitlement to long service leave was dependent upon a substantial connection between the employee’s service and the State.
  3. [59]
    In Application for Interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964 (the Federal Hotels Case),[17] the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission commented on the issue.  This was stated by the Commission:

“In the Queensland statute the legislature has attached rights and duties within the State to acts committed outside the State (section 17 (2)) and it was not suggested that there is anything invalid or outside the power of Parliament to do this.

If it is held that the long service leave provisions of the Queensland Act apply to Mr. C. it seems then that the period of continuous service in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland can be taken into consideration in deciding the value of leave payable.

There are two extreme cases which could arise under the legislation. The first, at one extreme, where an employee works for a Queensland employer in Queensland for the whole of his service performing work which would bring him within the Act provision. Then, at the other extreme, there could be the case of an employee from another State employed for a very short period in Queensland and then returning to his home State. It seems obvious that such an employee would be subject to the long service leave provisions of the Act in his home State.

But the present case falls somewhere between these two. Mr. C. had the final four years of his service with the Company in Queensland.

Had Mr. C. been appointed in the first place to Queensland by Federal Hotels Limited and had he the same length of continuous service in Queensland that he has had in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, I think it might well be, even conceding Victorian employment, that he would have become entitled to the benefit of the Queensland Act at the termination of his employment.” (emphasis added)

  1. [60]
    In a federation of States such as Australia, it makes sense that there should be some way that a particular jurisdiction is nominated to govern an entitlement.  However, the scheme is not a national one.[18]  The Commission’s decision in Federal Hotels was subject to an unsuccessful appeal to the Industrial Court.  The judgment on appeal is short, with the President (Hanger J as his Honour then was) finding compliance with the Act by the employee as he had served ten years employment with the one employer, with some service inside the state and some outside.  The Court found the employee fell within the literal corners of the relevant section and there is nothing in the judgment to suggest a necessity that the service undertaken outside Queensland has some substantial connection to Queensland before it could be counted in the calculation.
  2. [61]
    There has been long service leave legislation in New South Wales and Victoria for decades.  That legislation gives an entitlement to long service leave after a period of continuous service.  However, none of those sections contain an equivalent to the term “whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State” as appears in s 93(b) of the IR Act.  That has led to an adoption of a substantial connection requirement in these states.
  3. [62]
    International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving[19] was a decision of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales.  There, some of the service of the employee occurred outside New South Wales.  The Industrial Commission observed:

“It was conceded that if the service with the various companies had taken place in New South Wales the worker would have been entitled to the long service leave awarded by the Chief Industrial Magistrate and that his conclusion was justified were it not for the fact that the service prior to December 1975 had, apart from the period in 1966, been outside New South Wales.

It is trite that it would be unreasonable to read the section as applying to workers under all contracts of employment anywhere in the world and that some territorial limitation must be introduced in the construction of the relevant section: cf Mynott v Barnard (1939) 62 CLR 68, at p 73.”[20]  (emphasis added)

And later:

“We are, therefore, in agreement with the appellant’s approach to the problem to the extent that it contends that the service involved must be connected with New South Wales. We think, however, that its submissions go too far when they involve the proposition that the service (subject to temporary absences) which is to be rewarded must be performed entirely in New South Wales. We think that the benefits provided for in the Act accrue if at the time the relevant event occurs (that is, completion, termination or cessation) the service which was being performed up to that time has a substantial connection with this State. This interpretation seems to us to accord with the purpose and policy of the Act without being in any way inconsistent with its language. It is to be assumed that the legislature intended the statute to bear a meaning which would have regard to the practical situation in industry and would leave as few anomalies as possible. We believe that the interpretation we favour achieves this result. This view does not make it necessary, as in the case of workers’ compensation legislation, that the relevant event must occur within the State but it is essential that, at the time of its occurrence, the service, looked at as a whole, may fairly be said to be to a substantial extent New South Wales service.”[21]  (emphasis added)

  1. [63]
    The Victorian legislation also lacks an equivalent to the term used in s 93(b) “whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State”.  Both the full Federal Court in Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan[22] and the Court of Appeal of Victoria in Infosys Technologies Ltd v Victoria[23] have imported a substantial connection test. Although the result of Infosys Technologies Ltd v Victoria was the same as that in Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan, two of the judges of the Victorian Court of Appeal[24] did not follow the reasoning in Keenan and the third judge, Niall JA distinguished Keenan. Reliance was made instead on s 48 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic).  That has an equivalent in s 35(1)(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and is in these terms:

“35References to Queensland to be implied

…

  1. a reference to a locality, jurisdiction or other thing is a reference to such a locality, jurisdiction or other thing in and of Queensland.”
  1. [64]
    As to the operation of s 48(b) of the ILA[25], it was observed by the Court of Appeal of Victoria:

“When s 6 of the LSL Act[26] is construed in light of s 48(b) of the ILA, ‘continuous employment’ means employment ‘in and of’ Victoria.”[27]

And:

“Continuous employment in and of Victoria with one employer requires a close identification between the continuous employment and Victoria. It is unnecessary to exhaustively define the circumstances as to when such close identification will arise.”[28]

  1. [65]
    It was held that all of the “continuous service” had to have some substantial connection with Victoria.  The Court of Appeal of Victoria therefore departed from the reasoning in both Weaving and Keenan where it was held that the question was answered by looking at the service globally.
  2. [66]
    In Anantapidma v Infosys Limited[29], Merrell DP dealt with an application for a proportionate payment of long service leave.  In order to make that claim, the employee had to have completed at least seven years continuous service.
  3. [67]
    Faced with a series of superior court decisions[30] which all one way or another imported a requirement of substantial connection to the State, and faced with dicta in Federal Hotels, Merrell DP held:

“[38]  It seems to me that in the Federal Hotels case, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission of Queensland, having regard to the provisions of s 17(2) of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961 to 1964, applied reasoning similar to that as applied by the NSW Commission 16 years later in Weaving.  That is, despite an employee’s service in other States, at the time of the termination of the worker’s employment, the employee’s service had to have substantial connection with Queensland for all of the employee’s service to be continuous service for the purposes of accruing long service leave.”[31]

  1. [68]
    Hartigan IC, as the Deputy President then was, in Raman v Infosys Limited[32] followed, as she was practically obliged to do,[33] Anantapadma v Infosys Limited[34].
  2. [69]
    In the submission made on 26 February 2024, counsel for Infosys sought to import into s 93(b) a general requirement of substantial connection between the employment and the State of Queensland.  To imply such a connection might be necessary where, as in New South Wales and Victoria, the provisions are silent as to the relationship between the relevant State jurisdiction and the employee.
  3. [70]
    As was observed by the Full Bench in Mears, none of the authorities considering interstate legislation are directly relevant to the construction of s 93(b) of the IR Act.  The subsection expressly provides that both service within the State and outside of the State counts in the calculation.  All that is necessary is that there is continuity of employment by the employer of the employee.[35]  There is no basis upon which a “substantial connection” test is imported as a broad requirement into s 93(a) of the IR Act.  The trigger is “service … partly in the State”. 
  4. [71]
    Mr Hickey’s submission was more subtle.  He submitted that it could not be the legislative intention that the mere presence of the employee in the State at some time during the relevant period of employment could trigger an entitlement to long service leave.  Similarly, he submitted that an isolated action taken by an employee for the employer while the employee was fleetingly in Queensland could not suffice.
  5. [72]
    Mr Hickey submitted that the “service” of the employee, to be “service” which is “partly in the State” must be substantial so that it can be said to be “service … partly in the State”.  This submission adopts the statutorily prescribed geographical test (“service … partly in the State”) and does not require the implication of some other broad geographical requirement.
  6. [73]
    The notion of an employee’s “service” is a different concept to the employee providing a “service”.  This is made clear from the independent contractor cases.  There is a difference between a “contract for services” and a “contract of service”.  An independent contractor is the subject of the former, and a servant is the subject of the latter; “a contract of service involves the existence of a servant, and imports that there exists in the person serving an obligation to obey the orders of the person served.  A servant is a person who is subject to the commands of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work”.[36]
  7. [74]
    It might be that in some cases an employee’s presence in Queensland is so fleeting that it might not be able to be said that there was any “service in the State”.  It is a matter of fact to be determined whether in any particular case, the presence of the employee in the performance of any work by the employee constitutes “service … partly within the State”.
  8. [75]
    In order to determine whether there has been “service … partly in the State” it is necessary to look at all the circumstances including the contract of service.  The terms of employment of an employee are not exclusively defined by the contract of service in that terms and conditions may be incorporated by statute or industrial instruments.[37]  However, subject to those exceptions, the contract of employment will define the relationship.[38]
  9. [76]
    While Mr Gade’s employment contract was entered into in India, the terms of employment expressly provided that he may be required to serve the respondent in other jurisdictions.  He was required to serve the respondent both in Victoria and in Queensland.  The fact that he may have requested deployment to Queensland is beside the point.  The respondent chose to send him to Queensland for the purpose of his employment.  He worked in Queensland for some 18 days as part of his “service” which was “partly in the State”.
  10. [77]
    Subject to the argument about s 131, Mr Gade is entitled to long service leave.

The second issue: the effect of s 131(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016

  1. [78]
    Section 131 of the IR Act provides:

“131How part applies

  1. This part applies for working out an employee’s rights and entitlements under this chapter, an applicable industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument by prescribing when the employee’s continuity of service is not broken.
  1. An employee is not entitled to claim the benefit of a right or entitlement more than once for the same period of service.
  1. However, when working out the minimum period of notice required to be given under section 123 to a transferred employee, a period of notice previously given in relation to the transfer of the calling, whether given before or after the commencement of this subsection, is to be disregarded.”
  1. [79]
    In the course of argument on 26 February 2024, it was suggested that if s 131 allowed the set off of benefits bestowed by the laws of other jurisdictions from continuous service, that may strengthen the construction of s 93(b) proposed by the applicant.  However, the respondent now submits that s 131(2) excludes Mr Gade’s claim for long service leave.
  2. [80]
    Infosys submits that s 131(2) does not permit a set off of one entitlement against another.  It submits that s 131 shuts out an entitlement to claim the benefit bestowed in s 95.  It submits that the entitlement under the Gratuity Act is a “right or entitlement” of a nature of long service leave which accrues over the same period of service that Mr Gade now relies upon to claim an entitlement under s 95.  Therefore, it is submitted by Infosys that, given that there is a “right or entitlement” under the Gratuity Act for the “same period of service” as is the subject of the current claim, Mr Gade is “not entitled to claim the benefit [bestowed by s 95]”[39].
  3. [81]
    The submission by Infosys should be rejected as it misunderstands Part 4 of Chapter 2 which is the part in which s 131 appears.
  4. [82]
    Part 4 is entitled “Continuity of service and employment”.  Section 130, the first section in Part 4, contains some definitions.  Section 131 then appears and it is followed by ss 132, 133 and 134 which are the remaining sections in the Part.  They are headed:
    1. section 132: Continuity of service – transfer of calling;
    2. section 133: Continuity of service – apprentices or trainees; and
    3. section 134: Continuity of service – generally.
  5. [83]
    Those sections prescribe specific circumstances where, for the purposes of the IR Act, service is taken to be “continuous”.
  6. [84]
    Section 131(1) states that Part 4 applies “for working out an employee’s rights and entitlements” under:
    1. Chapter 2;
    2. an industrial instrument; or
    3. a federal industrial instrument.
  7. [85]
    Section 131(1) provides that the part achieves that aim “by prescribing when the employee’s continuity of service is not broken”.
  8. [86]
    Section 131(2) refers to an employee’s entitlement “to claim the benefit of a right or entitlement”.  Given that Part 4 is limited in its operation to “prescribing when the employee’s continuity of service is not broken”, it is obvious that s 131(2) is not intended to create or exclude a right or entitlement.  Further, s 131(2) when it refers to the “right or entitlement” must be referring to the same “rights and entitlements” referred to under s 131(1).  That is because by force of s 131(1), Part 4 applies for the working out of specific rights and entitlements, namely ones under either Chapter 2, an applicable industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument.
  9. [87]
    It follows then that s 131(2) only affects an entitlement to claim “the benefit of a right or entitlement given under the Chapter, an applicable industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument”.  The restriction is that the employee must not claim such a right twice for the same period of service.  Any right which Mr Gade has under the Gratuity Act is not a “right or entitlement” arising under either Chapter 2 of the IR Act, an industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument.
  10. [88]
    It follows that s 131(2) is irrelevant to the present claim and the sum paid under the Gratuity Act should not have been deducted from Mr Gade’s claim.

The third issue: the significance, if any, of the fact that Mr Gade served ten years with Infosys before working in Queensland

  1. [89]
    Infosys submitted that Mr Gade’s tenth anniversary of continuous service with Infosys arrived when he was working in Victoria.  That is correct as a matter of fact.  Infosys then submits that a literal interpretation of the provisions would mean that an employee could effectively activate an entitlement to long service leave by a very short service in Queensland when in fact the employee was a long-term employee prior to even arriving in Queensland.  That, it was submitted, would be an absurd result and should be avoided.  Reliance was sought in the High Court’s judgment in Mills v Meeking.[40]
  2. [90]
    Section 93(a) of the IR Act:
    1. provides that “continuous service” may be “wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State”; and
    2. does not provide that the calculation of continuous service commences upon service in the State.
  3. [91]
    Therefore, it follows, as already observed, that the section has a retrospective effect.  The fact which triggers the calculation is service by the employee in Queensland.  Once that occurs, then what is taken into account in the calculation includes service “partly outside the State” which may be service which predates the service in Queensland.
  4. [92]
    Until there is service in Queensland, no service by the employee in some other place counts to calculation of long service leave under the IR Act.  No matter what the length of “continuous service” of an employee with an employer outside the State, no entitlement arises.  It follows then, that the tenth anniversary of continuous service outside the State has no legal significance.
  5. [93]
    However, once there is service “partly in the State”, the next question is whether there is ten years service “partly outside the State”.  Here there is.  It is the period from 14 April 2012 to 14 April 2022.

The fourth issue: whether the law is valid if construed as submitted by the applicant

  1. [94]
    Section 2 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) recognises the powers of the parliament of each State to make laws for the “peace, order and good government of the State that have extra-territorial operation”.[41]
  2. [95]
    Various decisions of the High Court have established that there must be a real connection between the State and the subject matter of the law.[42]  It is now settled that “even a remote or general connection” will suffice.[43]  In Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v State of Victoria[44] Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ left this open: 

“That is not to say, however, that there may not remain some questions first, about what is meant in a particular case by “real connection” and, secondly, about the resolution of conflict if two States make inconsistent laws”.[45] (footnotes omitted)

  1. [96]
    No submission here is raised that Queensland has made inconsistent laws with another state.  The question is whether there is a “real connection” which, as we have already observed, might be “even a remote or general connection”.
  2. [97]
    Section 93(b) operates with s 95 so as to bestow benefits upon workers who perform work within the geographical boundaries of Queensland.  The fact that the entitlement may also depend upon things which have occurred outside Queensland does not render the law one that does not have a “real connection” with Queensland.  As was concluded in Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd[46], s 93(a) is within the power of the Queensland parliament to make.  There is no need to read it down.

Conclusions

  1. [98]
    As earlier observed, the amount claimed by the applicant on Mr Gade’s behalf is $11,065.31.  That took into account, by way of offset, sums which Infosys paid pursuant to the Gratuity Act.  We have held that those payments ought not to have been set off.  It follows that Mr Gade’s entitlement is more than $11,065.31.
  2. [99]
    It is therefore appropriate to declare that Mr Gade has an entitlement to long service leave because he has served ten years continuous service partly in and partly outside the State.  In case there is then dispute about the calculation of the entitlement, the parties should have leave to list that issue for determination by Deputy President Hartigan.
  3. [100]
    There may be costs questions arising from the present application and the hearing before the Full Bench.  However, if possible, those issues ought to be determined by written submissions without further oral hearing.
  4. [101]
    The orders of the Full Bench are:
  1. Narendra Gade performed ten years continuous service with the respondent partly inside and partly outside the State of Queensland and is entitled to long service leave.
  2. Any dispute as to the calculation of the entitlement is remitted to Deputy President Hartigan for determination consistently with the Full Bench’s reasons.
  3. The parties shall exchange written submissions on the question of costs by 4pm on 17 May 2024.
  4. Each party may file and serve by 4pm on 24 May 2024 an application for leave to make oral submissions on costs.
  5. In the absence of any application being filed by 4pm on 24 May 2024 the question of costs shall be determined on any written submissions received and without further oral hearing.

Footnotes

[1][2022] QIRC 348.

[2]Also known as Mysuru.

[3]New South Wales v The Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1.

[4]Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 13.

[5]Industrial Relations Act 2016, ss 7(2)(a), 8(2)(a).

[6]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 95(2)(a).

[7]Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 9, 57A.

[8]Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah & District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 Q Gov Indus Gaz 169 at 170.

[9]Subject to the terms of s 95(3) and (4) Industrial Relations Act 2016.

[10][2022] QIRC 348.

[11]At [13].

[12]At [28]-[30].

[13]At [31].

[14]At [33].

[15](2019) 269 CLR 507.

[16]At [32]-[37].

[17](1965) 58 Q Gov Indus Gaz 530 at 530.

[18]An example of a national scheme is the national work health and safety scheme instigated pursuant to the Intergovernmental Agreement for Regulatory and Operation Reform in Occupational Health and Safety made in July 2008 through the Council of Australian Government; see Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld).

[19][1981] 2 NSWLR 64.

[20]At 67; following Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [1971] AR (NSW) 246 at 253.

[21]At 70; Weaving was followed in Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1071 at [172].

[22](2020) 281 FCR 421.

[23](2021) 64 VR 61.

[24]Kennedy JA and McDonald AJA.

[25]A reference to the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic).

[26]A reference to the Long Service Leave Act 2018 (Vic).

[27]Infosys Technologies Ltd v Victoria (2021) 64 VR 61 at [45].

[28]At [92].

[29][2020] QIRC 190.

[30]Those considered above.

[31]At [38].

[32][2021] QIRC 275.

[33]Farrah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89.

[34][2020] QIRC 190.

[35]Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd [2022] QIRC 348.

[36]University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601 at 610-611, following Simmons v Health Laundry Co [1910] 1 KB 543.

[37]Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 419-421; and Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472 at 479.

[38]Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (2022) 275 CLR 165 at [43], following WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456 at [56]-[57], [63].

[39]A reference to s 131(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.

[40](1990) 169 CLR 214.

[41]Australia Act 1986 (Cth), s 2(1).

[42]Broken Hill South Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 337 at 375; Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1 at 14; Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507 at 518; and Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340 at 372.

[43]Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1 at [48], following Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1 at 14; and Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340 at 372.

[44](2002) 211 CLR 1.

[45]At [48], citing Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen’s Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340 at 374; and State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1996) 189 CLR 253 at 285-286.

[46][2022] QIRC 348.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Fox v Infosys Technologies Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 109

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Davis J, O'Connor VP, Hartigan DP

  • Date:

    10 May 2024

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2024] QIRC 10910 May 2024Referral of matter to full bench; claim for unpaid wages representing alleged long service leave entitlements; employee performed 10 years' continuous service partly in and partly outside Queensland and is entitled to long service leave: Davis J, O'Connor VP and Hartigan DP.
Notice of Appeal FiledFile Number: CA 6984/2431 May 2024Notice of appeal filed.
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2025] QCA 4501 Apr 2025Appeal dismissed: Bond JA (Brown JA and Crow J agreeing).
Application for Special Leave (HCA)File Number: B16/202529 Apr 2025Application for special leave to appeal filed.
Special Leave Refused (HCA)[2025] HCADisp 15307 Aug 2025Special leave refused: Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ.

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined - Special Leave Refused (HCA)

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Anantapadma v Infosys Limited [2020] QIRC 190
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 190
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 190
Cite 3 - [2020] QIRC 190
Application for interpretation of s 17 and 19 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1961-1964 (1965) 58 QGIG 530
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1965) 58 QGIG 530
Cite 2 - (1965) 58 QGIG 530
Australian Timken Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) (1971) AR (NSW) 246
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1971) AR (NSW) 246
Cite 2 - (1971) AR (NSW) 246
Broken Hill South Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) [1937] HCA 4
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1937] HCA 4
Broken Hill South Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of TaxationNA (1937) 56 CLR 337
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1937) 56 CLR 337
Cite 2 - (1937) 56 CLR 337
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 185 CLR 410
Cite 2 - (1995) 185 CLR 410
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 24
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Anor v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (2022) 275 CLR 165
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2022) 275 CLR 165
Cite 2 - (2022) 275 CLR 165
Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan (2020) 281 FCR 421
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 281 FCR 421
Cite 2 - (2020) 281 FCR 421
Cummins South Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan [2020] FCAFC 204
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] FCAFC 204
Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1930) 43 CLR 472
Cite 2 - (1930) 43 CLR 472
Ex parte McLean [1930] HCA 12
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1930] HCA 12
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] HCA 22
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) 230 CLR 89
Cite 2 - (2007) 230 CLR 89
Infosys Technologies Ltd v State of Victoria (2021) 64 VR 61
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2021) 64 VR 61
Cite 2 - (2021) 64 VR 61
Cite 3 - (2021) 64 VR 61
International Computers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Weaving [1981] 2 NSWLR 64
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64
Cite 2 - [1981] 2 NSWLR 64
London Press Ltd. v University Tutorial Press Ltd. (1916) 2 Ch 601
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1916) 2 Ch 601
Cite 2 - (1916) 2 Ch 601
Mears v Vector Aerospace Australia Pty Ltd [2022] QIRC 348
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 348
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 348
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 348
Cite 4 - [2022] QIRC 348
Cite 5 - [2022] QIRC 348
Cite 6 - [2022] QIRC 348
Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 169 CLR 214
Cite 2 - (1990) 169 CLR 214
Mills v Meeking [1990] HCA 6
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1990] HCA 6
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2002] HCA 27
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] HCA 27
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 211 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2002) 211 CLR 1
Cite 3 - (2002) 211 CLR 1
Mynott v Barnard (1939) 62 CLR 68
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1939) 62 CLR 68
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 229 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2006) 229 CLR 1
New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) HCA 52
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) HCA 52
Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1976) 135 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (1976) 135 CLR 507
Pearce v Florenca [1976] HCA 26
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1976] HCA 26
Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermens Association Inc v South Australia [1989] HCA 49
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1989] HCA 49
Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermens Association Inc. v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 168 CLR 340
Cite 2 - (1989) 168 CLR 340
Cite 3 - (1989) 168 CLR 340
Cite 4 - (1989) 168 CLR 340
Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah & District Kindergarten Association Inc. [2008] ICQ 18
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] ICQ 18
Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah and District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 QGIG 169
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2008) 188 QGIG 169
Cite 2 - (2008) 188 QGIG 169
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Raman v Infosys Limited [2021] QIRC 275
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 275
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 275
Simmons v Heath Laundry Co. (1910) 1 KB 543
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1910) 1 KB 543
Cite 2 - (1910) 1 KB 543
Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King [1988] HCA 55
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1988] HCA 55
Union Steamship Co. of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1988) 166 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1988) 166 CLR 1
Cite 3 - (1988) 166 CLR 1
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] HCA 23
Workpac v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2021) 271 CLR 456
Cite 2 - (2021) 271 CLR 456

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Infosys Technologies Ltd v Fox [2025] QCA 45 1 citation
1

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