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Patterson v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)[2024] QIRC 193

Patterson v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)[2024] QIRC 193

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Patterson v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 193

PARTIES:

Patterson, Gail

Appellant

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

Respondent

CASE NO:

PSA/2024/47

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

7 August 2024

HEARING DATE:

Friday, 21 June 2024

MEMBER:

Pratt IC

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDER:

  1. The application is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – APPLICATION IN EXISTING PROCEEDINGS – where respondent in substantive matter seeks suppression order – where substantive matter is an appeal against a disciplinary decision made against the appellant for conduct towards a prisoner – where respondent seeks suppression of the prisoner’s name – where respondent seeks suppression of materials that it filed with the Commission in the substantive matter – where the material sought to be suppressed includes correspondence between the appellant and the respondent, briefing notes, an investigation report, and camera footage – section 451(2)(c) and 580(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – consideration of Practice Direction Number 3 of 2023 – Modification of a Document Before Publication and Practice Direction Number 4 of 2023 – Guideline for the Modification of a Document Before Publication – consideration of legal principles of suppression orders generally – where respondent submits making the suppression order would  be in the public interest because of sensitive nature of the materials – where respondent submits the proposed suppression order does not infringe on open justice principles because the prisoner is not a party to, or witness in, the proceedings – where respondent submits that not making the suppression order may cause harm to the prisoner and may cause the prisoner to lose privacy – where respondent submits that suppression order should be made because camera footage may disclose the layout of the correctional facility – where respondent submits that not making suppression order may lead to unauthorised persons gaining access to procedures and codes of practice – where appellant neither opposes nor supports the suppression order – held that consideration of the substantive matter will require consideration of  all materials – held that submissions relating to safety and privacy of the prisoner amount to an argument that the prisoner will be embarrassed, distressed or lose privacy if the suppression order is not made – held that nothing in training manuals or relevant codes of practice that is particularly sensitive – held that camera footage does not reveal layout of correctional facility or pose risk to security of the facility – application dismissed.

LEGISLATION & OTHER INSTRUMENTS:

Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 341

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 451, s 580

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), r 97

Practice Direction Number 3 of 2023 – Modification of a Document Before Publication

Practice Direction Number 4 of 2023 – Guideline for the Modification of a Document Before Publication

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 91, s 130

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 191

CASES:

AB v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 49

Alderding v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 268

Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) [2021] QIRC 223

AN v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 289

AP v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 170

Augustine v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 184

Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263

Barnett v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 424

Biddle v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 321

Brady v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 63

BR v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 146

Dhanapathy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 17

Edgar v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2023] QIRC 167

EY v The Store [2021] QIRC 135

EY v The Store [2021] ICQ 6

Fischer v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2021] QIRC 332

J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] Qd R 10

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Anor (No 2) [2018] QIRC 17

Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 164.

LP v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 432

Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works) [2023] QIRC 91

MacKenzie v State of Queensland (Department of Employment, Small Business and Training) [2023] QIRC 123

Maish v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 235

Mohr-Edgar v State of Queensland (Legal Aid Queensland) [2020] QIRC 136

Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2024] QIRC 68

Mr A v Viva Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 309

Murphy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 213

Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council [2024] QIRC 41

Neil v Lee (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 149

Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 2) [2020] QIRC 23

Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 3) [2020] QIRC 28

Rutter v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 54

RY v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 208

R v O'Dempsey (No 3) [2017] QSC 338

Sane v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 143

Schiffer v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 286

Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417

Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327

Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2021] QIRC 327

Timmins v State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General, (Queensland Corrective Services) [2018] QIRC 29

State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Queensland Corrective Services) v Timmins (No. 2) [2018] QIRC 117

Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 20

Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 169

Waite v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2024] QIRC 144

Weston and Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 2) ('Weston'), [2016] QIRC 56

White v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 49

Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 329

W v K [2020] QIRC 36

APPEARANCES:

Ms G Patterson for the Applicant

Ms N Smith for the Respondent

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    By way of this application in existing proceedings, the State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) ('Corrective Services') seeks suppression orders. Corrective Services is the respondent in a public sector appeal brought by Ms Gail Patterson (‘Appellant') concerning a disciplinary decision it imposed on the Appellant relating to conduct towards a prisoner ('Prisoner').
  1. [2]
    Corrective Services seeks orders that:
  1. (a)
    pursuant to section 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act') and rule 97(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('Rules'), the court, commission, or registrar de-identify and remove any reference to the Prisoner; and
  1. (b)
    pursuant to section 580(5) the IR Act, that the court, commission or registrar withhold all documents, exhibits and material filed in the matter from release or search.
  1. [3]
    The Appellant neither opposes nor supports the orders that are sought by Corrective Services.

Background

  1. [4]
    The Appellant is a Correctional Supervisor at Brisbane Correctional Centre. After an investigation, Corrective Services determined that on 14 January 2023, at the Brisbane Correctional Centre, the Appellant used force that was not reasonably necessary against the Prisoner by deploying a chemical agent on the Prisoner while the Appellant and other officers restrained and ground stabilised the Prisoner (‘14 January 2023 Incident').
  1. [5]
    The investigation process that preceded those findings involved the review of body worn camera footage, written statements, incident reports and records of interview from several prison officers who were involved in the relevant incident or who witnessed it. On 26 February 2024, Corrective Services issued the disciplinary decision based on the finding that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct pursuant to section 91(1)(b) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act').
  1. [6]
    Corrective Services proposes to discipline the Appellant by demoting her from Correctional Supervisor (GS 3.4) down to a Custodial Correctional Officer (GS 2.4) for a period of 18 months and directing her to undertake specified training ('Decision'). The Appellant, pursuant to s 130 of the PS Act, appeals the demotion part of the Decision. The Appellant's appeal of the Decision is the substantive proceeding to which this application within an existing proceeding relates.
  1. [7]
    On 26 March 2024, I issued orders requiring Corrective Services to file and serve a copy of each relevant document that was before the decision-maker at the time the Decision was made, save for any documents that Corrective Services claimed immunity or privilege over, that are already with the Commission, or that are publicly available. Corrective Services filed material in response to those orders and those materials included ('Materials'):
  1. (a)
    submissions;
  1. (b)
    correspondence between the Corrective Services and the Appellant and the Appellant's then solicitor;
  1. (c)
    various briefing notes in relation to the 14 January 2023 Incident and the investigation of it, including the recommendations to take disciplinary action;
  1. (d)
    an Ethical Standards Group Investigation Report, along with 33 attachments which included:
  1. (i)
    the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service;
  1. (ii)
    the Custodial Operations Practice Directive - Use of Force;
  1. (iii)
    the Queensland Corrective Services Control and Restraint Manual, version 7;
  1. (iv)
    the Queensland Corrective Services Tactical Options Manual, V2-2021;
  1. (v)
    exams and training carried out by the Appellant in relation to the deployment of chemical weapons;
  1. (vi)
    incident reports by Corrective Services Officers involved in or who witnessed the incident;
  1. (vii)
    transcripts of interviews given by Corrective Services Officers involved in or who witnessed the incident; and
  1. (e)
    Body worn camera footage, cell CCTV footage and recordings of interviews of several Corrective Services Officers involved in the incident.

Issues

  1. [8]
    There are two issues to resolve in this application. The first is whether the Commission should de-identify the Prisoner in any decision. The second is whether the Commission should withhold all the Materials filed in the matter from release or search.

Relevant law

Legislation

  1. [9]
    Section 451(2)(c) of the IR Act says:
  1. (2)
    Without limiting subsection (1) , the commission in proceedings may—…
  1. … (c)
    make an order it considers appropriate.
  1. [10]
    Rule 97(3)(b) of the Rules says:
  1. (3)
    The court, commission or registrar may, in the public interest or for another reason the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate—…
  1. … (b)
    modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document.
  1. [11]
    Section 580(5) of the IR Act says:
  1. (5)
    The court, commission or registrar may direct—
  1. (a)
    a report, or part of a report, of proceedings in an industrial cause not be published; or
  1. (b)
    evidence given, records tendered or things exhibited in proceedings for an industrial cause be withheld from release or search.

Practice Directions

  1. [12]
    Practice Direction Number 3 of 2023 – Modification of a Document Before Publication ('Practice Direction 3 of 2023') provides guidance on the modification of a document before publication by the Industrial Court of Queensland ('Court'), the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('Commission') or the Industrial Registrar ('Registrar'). Those three bodies are altogether 'the Tribunal'. Practice Direction 3 of 2023 notes at paragraph 2 that:

Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 confers discretion on the Tribunal to, in the public interest or for another reason the Tribunal considers appropriate, modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document.

  1. [13]
    Practice Direction Number 4 of 2023 – Guideline for the Modification of a Document Before Publication ('Practice Direction 4 of 2023') also provides guidance on the modification of a document before publication by the Tribunal. It observes at paragraph 2 that:

Open justice is one of the fundamental principles of our justice system.[1] Generally, all hearings and records of proceedings before the Court or Commission are open to the public. The open justice principle may, on rare occasions, be limited where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice.

  1. [14]
    Practice Direction 4 of 2023 then observes at paragraph 3 that:

Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 confers discretion on the Court, Commission, or Industrial Registrar ('Tribunal') to, in the public interest or for another reason the Tribunal considers appropriate, withhold publication of a document, or modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document.

  1. [15]
    Practice Direction 4 of 2023 also observes at paragraph 4(a)(iii) that:

The circumstances where the Tribunal may consider it appropriate, in the public interest or for another reason, to modify a document before publication may include:…

  1. (a)
    not releasing identifying information of:…
  1. …(iii)
    a prisoner within the meaning of the Corrective Services Act 2006;
  1. [16]
    Paragraph 5 of Practice Direction 4 of 2023 states that:

The decision as to whether or not a document is de-identified and, if so, to what extent, is a matter for the Tribunal to determine.

Case law

  1. [17]
    Corrective Services refers me to the much cited and followed decision in J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) ('L & A Services').[2] In that case, their Honours, Fitzgerald P and Lee J, laid down six principles underpinning the exercise of discretion to issue suppression orders. They are often summarised or partly cited in decisions made by the Commission. I set the relevant passages out in full below (citations omitted):[3]
  1. Although there is a public interest in avoiding or minimising disadvantages to private citizens from public activities, paramount public interests in the due administration of justice, freedom of speech, a free media and an open society require that court proceedings be open to the public and able to be reported and discussed publicly.
  1. The public may be excluded and publicity prohibited when public access or publicity would frustrate the purpose of a court proceeding by preventing the effective enforcement of some substantive law and depriving the court’s decision of practical utility. National security provides a further special, broadly analogous exception to the requirement of open justice because of its fundamental importance to the preservation of a democratic society based on the rule of law.
  1. The permitted exceptions to the requirement of open justice are not based upon the premise that parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing court proceedings by an apprehension that public access or publicity would deprive the proceeding of practical utility, but upon the actual loss of utility which would occur, and the exceptions do not extend to proceedings which parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing if the utility of the proceedings would not be affected. Courts do not have access to the information needed to determine whether or not parties are reasonably deterred by openness or publicity from bringing particular kinds of proceedings; for example, sexual complaints. Legislatures are better equipped than courts to make informed decisions on such matters.
  1. No unnecessary restriction upon public access or publicity in respect of court proceedings is permissible.
  1. Different degrees of restraint are permissible for different purposes. Although the categories tend to coalesce, they are broadly as follows:
  1. Exclusion of the public or a substantive restraint upon publicity is not permissible unless abstractly essential to the practical utility of a proceeding; for example, prosecutions for blackmail or proceedings for the legitimate protection of confidential information: cf. R. v. Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, Ex parte New Cross Building Society.
  1. A limited exclusion or restraint is permissible if necessary to ensure that a proceeding is fair; for example, witnesses may be required to absent themselves from hearings, parts of jury trials may take place in the absence of the jury and limited or temporary restrictions on publicity may be imposed during the course of jury proceedings.
  1. An incidental, procedural restriction is permissible if necessary in the interests of a party or witness in a particular proceeding; for example, identities of witnesses or details of particular activities which are not directly material such as engaging in covert law enforcement operations or providing information to police may be suppressed.
  1. It is the last category which gives rise to the most difficulty because of unresolved questions concerning the nature and ambit of the power. Support for a more liberal approach seems substantially confined to modern authority. Even so, information may not be withheld from the public merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm, or other “collateral disadvantage”, to use the expression adopted in R. v. Tait. Additionally, when it is the interests of a party or a witness which is relied on as the basis for a proposed restraint, those considerations must be balanced against other factors, including the interests of others involved in the proceeding and others who may be affected. Open justice is non-discriminatory, whereas exceptions to the principle of open justice deny equal rights to the disputing litigants and provide a benefit to some litigants which is unavailable to members of the general public. Further, public scrutiny is a strong disincentive to false allegations and a powerful incentive to honest evidence, and publicity may attract the attention of persons with material information who are unaware of the proceeding. Again, as was pointed out by McHugh J.A. in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v. Police Tribunal of New South Wales, if information is suppressed “proceedings would inevitably become the subject of rumours, misunderstandings, exaggerations and falsehoods…”: cf. Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v. Jones at 59 per Kirby P., citing McPherson J. in Ex parte The Queensland Law Society Incorporated [1984] 1 Qd.R. 166, 171. A particularly unsatisfactory manifestation of this difficulty occurs when uncertainty as to the particular person concerned leads to speculation concerning other members of a relevant group. Finally, it is important to remember that what appears to be a more liberal approach involving the exercise of a discretionary power in the interests of an individual involves an erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms of the general public. The occasional misuse or abuse of these rights and freedoms or other disadvantages associated with public information and discussion, which is sometimes misinformed, together with any resultant harm are part of the cost of living in a free, democratic society. It is common for sensitive issues to be litigated and for information which is extremely personal or confidential to be disclosed. It is of obvious concern that such a paramount principle as the requirement of open justice should not be whittled away on a case by case basis according to individual judges’ subjective views of the merits or demerits of the claims to privacy of individual litigants. It is also of concern that there should not be an expenditure of time, resources and costs on arguments that do not bear directly on the merits of disputes.
  1. [18]
    In R v O'Dempsey (No 3) ('O'Dempsey'),[4] his Honour, Applegarth J, granted a non-publication order of the name of a witness who was a police informant and was at risk of being imprisoned.[5] His Honour found that the case went beyond mere loss of privacy, embarrassment or distress. His Honour recognised the unique case of police informants that are former criminals, who face a tangible risk of recrimination, and whose information is particularly useful for bringing other criminals to justice.[6]
  1. [19]
    In Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd ('Aurizon'),[7] his Honour, Vice President O'Connor, considered an application under section 580(5) of the IR Act from the respondent during proceedings for a workplace health and safety matter. The application sought that the names of the individual workers that were the subject of the dispute not be identified.[8] The applicant supported the respondent's application.[9] The dispute at the heart of Aurizon was whether the respondent breached its duty to eliminate all hazards in the workplace by refusing to move Mr B away from Ms A after Mr B allegedly sexually harassed Ms A.[10] His Honour accepted the respondent's application for suppression orders under rule 97 of the Rules.[11] His Honour found that there was a likelihood in that case of damage to those individuals of a kind that required some relief in the interests of justice. In coming to that conclusion his Honour had regard to the relative size of the depot, the people involved, and the support of the applicant.[12]
  1. [20]
    In Neil v Lee (No. 2) ('Lee'),[13] the applicant relevantly applied to be de-identified in the decision and sought orders that any publication of her name be prohibited to the extent it could identify her as the complainant in the decision.[14] That application was made in proceedings for an anti-discrimination matter and was made pursuant to either s 451(2)(c) of the IR Act or section 191 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ('AD Act').[15] Section 191 of the AD Act allows the Commission to make an order prohibiting the disclosure of the person's identity if the Commission is of the reasonable opinion that the preservation of anonymity of a person who has been involved in a proceeding under the AD Act is necessary to protect the work security, privacy or any human right of the person.[16]
  1. [21]
    In support of this application, the applicant effectively submitted that publishing her name in a decision that included allegations that her father sexually abused her would cause distress and harm her and her family.[17] The applicant also said that she was unaware that the decision would go into such detail about the alleged abuse, and argued that identifying her may discourage potential applicants in similar circumstances from bringing similar claims.[18]
  1. [22]
    In dismissing the application,[19] his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, first noted the principles of open justice discussed in Aurizon.[20] His Honour held that a key consequence of the open justice principle was that "mere embarrassment, inconvenience or annoyance will not suffice to grant an application for suppression or non-publication".[21] His Honour also found that the allegations against the father were part and parcel of, rather than tangential to, the case the applicant advanced in the substantive matter before the Commission.[22] His Honour did not accept that declining to suppress the applicant's name would deter other potential complainants from making complaints of sexual harassment.[23]
  1. [23]
    The applicant in Lee also advanced an argument in favour of de-identification and, or in the alternative, non-publication that the respondents made threats to the applicant's lawyers about going to the media.[24] The applicant argued that going to the media may contravene the AD Act and other laws.[25] However, his Honour noted that there were remedies available to the applicant should the respondent contravene those laws.[26] The availability of such remedies did, in his Honour's opinion, militate against making a suppression order.[27]
  1. [24]
    In Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs ('Smith'),[28] his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, declined to order that the Appellant's name, that of her husband, as well as her husband’s medical condition, be suppressed.[29] In coming to that conclusion, his Honour referred to the principles governing the discretion of making suppression orders outlined in O'Dempsey and L & A Services.[30] His Honour expressed sympathy for the appellant, but observed that the appellant's privacy concerns did not overcome the principles of open justice, concluding that publication of private and embarrassing information was part of the nature of public decisions.[31] His Honour also noted that public service disciplinary proceedings are for the protection of the public and so the Commission must be especially cautious in making suppression orders in such a situation.[32]
  1. [25]
    In Mr A v Viva Energy Australia Pty Ltd ('Viva Energy'),[33] his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, granted an application for suppression of the names and documents filed in a matter concerning alleged sexual advances towards a female co-worker.[34] His Honour's key reasons for doing so were that it was a matter of a sexual nature and also in its early stages and that both parties consented to the suppression orders,[35] and that suppressing the documents altogether would prevent the Industrial Registry from having to review and modify every document in the matter.[36]
  1. [26]
    In Montesin v Brisbane City Council ('Montesin'),[37] her Honour, Deputy President Hartigan, declined to de-identify the applicant in a decision on the basis that the applicant's assertions were just that – assertions. The applicant provided no evidence establishing a factual foundation for his fears of potential assault on him or his children.[38] Her Honour found this lack of evidence, combined with the paramountcy of the principles of open justice propounded in L & A Services, Aurizon and O'Dempsey, to be persuasive.[39]
  1. [27]
    In Edgar v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs, ('Edgar'),[40] her Honour, Deputy President Hartigan, considered an application to suppress the names of the appellant, the complainant, and the co-workers in a case involving allegations of inappropriate touching and verbal references made towards the complainant.[41] Her Honour did not order suppression of the appellant's private and personal matters or the suppression of the complainant's name because her Honour deemed that it would suffice to simply not name them in the decision.[42] Her Honour also refused to suppress the appellant's name because she was not a class of persons whose identity should be suppressed.[43] Her Honour dismissed the application.[44]
  1. [28]
    In Timmins v State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General, (Queensland Corrective Services) ('Timmins'),[45] her Honour, Deputy President Swan, dealt with an application for reinstatement where the applicant was dismissed from his role as a custodial corrections officer at a corrective centre for repeatedly refusing to follow instructions to pack up cells.[46] As part of a decision dealing with the unfair dismissal claim, her Honour ordered the continuance of orders made previously pursuant to section 580 of the IR Act for the suppression of all documents in the matter. The stated reasons were brief. They included an apparent acceptance of the respondent’s submissions that the publication of prisoner identities and parts of custodial facilities was information that was proscribed by the Corrective Services Act 2006 ('CS Act').[47] Her Honour also found persuasive that the appellant in the substantive matter wanted to use the material for collateral purposes of damaging the respondent's witness.[48] Later, in State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Queensland Corrective Services) v Timmins (No. 2),[49] her Honour confirmed that the suppression order was ordered because:[50]

there was contained within the Respondent's material, amongst other things, reference to prisoners' names, cell numbers and other workplace practices relevant to the secure unit of the correctional facility. Also of concern was that the Respondent wished this material to be made available to the public in order to pursue his claim.

  1. [29]
    I have also canvassed the recent jurisprudence of this Commission on suppression orders.  The Commission has:
  1. (a)
    frequently declined suppression orders sought only to maintain privacy, avoid gossip and embarrassment, mitigate reputational damage, keep private health or finances, or avoid disincentivising applicants in similar positions from bringing similar applications;[51]
  1. (b)
    declined to suppress names because it was unnecessary in that case to make the orders sought;[52]
  1. (c)
    declined to suppress the details of a person's family law proceedings, as well as an application made under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), where there was insufficient evidence to prove harm and the applicant’s reasons amounted to embarrassment.[53] However, the Commission has suppressed a person's identity when not doing so would pose a real risk of family and domestic violence;[54]
  1. (d)
    suppressed the identity of an appellant where the case dealt with matters that were the subject of ongoing criminal charges against the appellant and where suppression of the appellant's identity was necessary to give effect to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld);[55]
  1. (e)
    declined to de-identify an applicant when the applicant argued mental harm might arise without suppression because the evidence of potential mental harm was vague, limited, and ultimately not persuasive.[56] However, the Commission has suppressed the names of a complainant and a witness in a matter where racist comments towards the complainant were a feature of the case and the Commission was satisfied on the evidence that there was a real risk of harm to the mental health of the relevant persons by not doing so and that suppression would not affect the essence of the decision;[57]
  1. (f)
    prohibited the disclosure of the complainant's and respondent's identity under section 191 of the AD Act in a case involving allegations of public masturbation on the basis that revealing identities would cause not just embarrassment, but also humiliation and degradation, and where a previous suppression order made in largely the same terms had been made in a related proceeding with the same parties;[58]
  1. (g)
    declined to suppress evidence filed and transcripts in a matter where it was claimed that those materials may contain information covered by legal professional privilege because the terms of the orders sought were too broad, the alleged potential harm was speculative, and the application itself was premature;[59]
  1. (h)
    declined to suppress material and evidence relevant to sexual harassment allegations and pseudonymise the witnesses on the basis that the application to do so was made long after the topic of sexual harassment was raised in open court, there was no reason made out for departing from the principles of open justice, and the witness was not merely peripheral to the matter;[60]
  1. (i)
    anonymised an applicant and his wife in an application for long service leave because the information was personal;[61]
  1. (j)
    withheld from release or search absolutely a confidential strategy document for potential future projects;[62]
  1. (k)
    suppressed material containing descriptions of public interest disclosures made pursuant to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) and the name of employees involved in such disclosures to give effect to obligations under that Act. However, the Commission did not suppress all of the material in the case because some of the material was about local government authorities and publicly elected officials and there was a public interest in that information not being suppressed.[63] The Commission has also more recently suppressed the name of a person making public interest disclosures and the names of service users in a case concerning an unresolved public interest disclosure in order to honour the legislative requirement to maintain confidentiality of the discloser's identity;[64]
  1. (l)
    declined to suppress the name of an appellant where the appellant had made allegations of corrupt conduct and submitted that alleged harm might befall her if her name were revealed, because the asserted harm did not go beyond privacy, embarrassment, distress and potential 'collateral damage' and did not warrant deviating from the open justice principles;[65]
  1. (m)
    declined to suppress patient details in a case concerning an alleged assault on the patient on the basis that the application was simply seeking to avoid a loss of privacy;[66]
  1. (n)
    suppressed the personal details of a person where the details of that person's identity were tangential to the case and were related to unsubstantiated grievances made over 8 years beforehand and where there was a real risk of harm to the relevant person if past grievances were published in circumstances where they had no right of reply;[67]
  1. (o)
    suppressed the identities of school students and school names on the basis that doing so had no impact on the essence of the decision and because, in one instance, there was a criminal proceedings afoot.[68] The Commission has also suppressed the identities of school students, staff and the name of the relevant school having regard to the consent to the de-identification, and also suppressed the appellant's name to give effect to the suppression of the school name and the names of the relevant students and staff;[69]
  1. (p)
    suppressed the name of an appellant in a case where the appellant was alleged to have acted inappropriately around a patient because the appellant would remain employed by the respondent and the Commission was satisfied on the evidence that there was a real risk of stigmatisation, well beyond mere embarrassment.[70]

Submissions

  1. [30]
    In its written submissions, Corrective Services noted that section 451 of the IR Act, in conjunction with rule 97 of the Rules, provides for a broad discretion to make suppression orders. Corrective Services also noted that sections 580(5)-(7) of the IR Act combine to allow for orders as to non-publication of a report or part of a report of proceedings or evidence given, records tendered or things exhibited if disclosure would not be in the public interest or that persons, other than parties to the cause, do not have sufficient legitimate interest in being informed of the matter. Corrective Services argues that the above-mentioned practice notes support the argument that the orders sought are appropriate.
  1. [31]
    Noting that the identity of the Prisoner is not material to any decision, Corrective Services argues that suppressing the Prisoner’s name does not infringe upon the principles of open justice. Corrective Services argues that "on the contrary, not withholding [the Prisoner's] identity may cause harm".[71] However, this is speculation. The assertion went no higher than suggesting that the Prisoner could potentially be the target of other prisoners. No detail was provided in the written submissions on this point, let alone any evidence, as to the specific harm that was likely to be, or even might be, caused to the Prisoner by not concealing his identity, or by refusing to prohibit public access to the Materials.
  1. [32]
    The body worn camera footage is argued to show the Prisoner in a very distressed state. The submission is that it is not in the public interest for the Prisoner’s identity to be published, or any documents or video referring to him, to be made available to anyone other than a party to the proceedings. Corrective Services does not elaborate in its written submissions as to why that is so, however, and no evidence was put on to support that submission.
  1. [33]
    Corrective Services also argues that there was material that was before the decision-maker that "… is not in the public domain, including training materials and video footage from inside a corrective services facility". The submission is that it is not in the public interest for this material to be searchable in the Industrial Registry by the general public. Again, however, Corrective Services did not elaborate in its written submissions as to why that is the case.
  1. [34]
    At the hearing of this matter, I made enquiries of Corrective Services as to the above-mentioned gaps in its written submissions. The concern for the Prisoner was said to arise from the footage depicting some self-harming behaviour and the Prisoner being in a very distressed state. My understanding of the argument is that the footage may be distressing to the Prisoner or others should they view it. It was also argued in relation to this point of harm to the Prisoner that there could be a potential risk of being his being "stood over" by other prisoners should it become public knowledge that the Prisoner was afflicted with some sort of psychological disorder. That is said to be because those other prisoners might perceive the Prisoner as weaker than them.
  1. [35]
    It was further argued that people who are not familiar with the inside of the relevant facility may be able to deduce the layout of some of it from the footage, potentially causing a risk to the facility's security. What that risk might be, and how real it is, was not explained.
  1. [36]
    Corrective Services also submitted at the hearing of this matter that material such as training manuals and codes of practice that are not in the public domain should not be something that unauthorised persons could potentially gain access to. As I understand the submission, the basis for that assertion is that those documents may disclose certain procedures, including the use of restraint methods and equipment to persons who have no legitimate interest in learning of those things.
  1. [37]
    The Appellant is not opposed to the application, nor particularly in favour of it. Understandably, her primary focus is the substantive appeal. Given her significant experience in the field, I asked the appellant to comment on Corrective Services' submissions regarding potential 'standover' by prisoners of a perceived weaker prisoner. The Appellant speculated that it can happen.

Consideration

  1. [38]
    In light of the above authorities, and with particular regard to, L & A Services, O'Dempsey, and Aurizon, my task is to assess whether there are any compelling reasons to deviate from the principles of open justice and make the suppression order in the terms sought. Mere loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm, or other collateral damage will be insufficient.
  1. [39]
    I am guided by the paramountcy of the principle of open justice as his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, highlighted in Lee, Smith and Viva Energy. I am also guided by the observations of her Honour, Deputy President Hartigan, in Montesin and Edgar regarding the need for specific and convincing evidence in these types of proceedings and of the need to make suppression orders only to the extent that they are necessary. I have also had regard to the numerous other cases relating to suppression orders explored above.
  1. [40]
    As a preliminary matter, I note that in some of the decisions I have discussed above, regard was had to whether the other party consented to the application. The relevant parties’ views are always an important consideration when determining issues put before the Commission. However, the parties’ views do not feature anywhere in the principles guiding the discretion to make suppression orders. The bar is set very high for making out an exception to the open justice principles. That bar is not cleared because those who happen to be involved in the matter do not oppose the suppression sought. On my reading of those decisions that I have referred to, they merely mention in passing that the parties consented. I do not construe those decisions to be saying that party consent had any real influence on whether an exception to the principles of open justice was made out.

Application to suppress the Prisoner's name

  1. [41]
    I see no reason why I would need to use the Prisoner’s name in a decision. But I am not persuaded by suggestions that other prisoners might harm him if those prisoners deduced, from gaining access to some of the Materials, that there were mental health issues and formed a view that such health issues constituted weakness. I appreciate that the submission is coming from a place of concern. However, it is no more than speculation.
  1. [42]
    Much of the same can be said about Corrective Services’ submissions concerning the potential impact on the Prisoner’s mental health if he were to read about the 14 January 2023 Incident in a decision. That too is speculation, albeit well-meaning. Corrective Services puts nothing forward proving that there is a real and specific risk of harm. I cannot therefore accept that the Prisoner is exposed to a real risk of harm if the orders sought are not granted.
  1. [43]
    The Corrective Services' argument essentially boils down to the Prisoner potentially being embarrassed, distressed or losing his privacy if the orders sought are not granted. That is clearly an argument that L & A Services contemplates as being insufficient to override the principles of open justice.
  1. [44]
    I also have given careful consideration to the Practice Directions, in particular Practice Direction 4 of 2023, noting the guidance as to prisoner's names. I cannot accept the submission that this supports suppressing the Prisoner’s name in this case. The Practice Directions do not amend the principles of open justice or list out fixed exceptions to the principles. In fact, it is quite the opposite. The reference to identifying information of a prisoner within clause 4 of Practice Direction 4 of 2023 is simply an example of a class of information that might, in the right circumstances, constitute one of the exceptions to the principles of open justice. Open justice, as stated so clearly in clause 2 of Practice Direction 4 of 2023, is paramount. Clause 2 also makes clear how high the bar is set for a case to qualify as an exception to the general rule. It will be “on rare occasions” and “where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice”. Whilst it might be said that prisoners are a somewhat established category of exceptional cases, that is only where the unique evidence of the case demonstrates that the prisoner is exposed to a real risk of harm without an order for suppression. As Applegarth J noted in O'Dempsey, that includes situations where the prisoner is acting as an informant or is a witness against other prisoners, officers or an accused persons and thereby proven to be at real risk of a tangible form of harm.
  1. [45]
    For the foregoing reasons, I decline to order that the Prisoner's name must be suppressed from any decision published.

Application to suppress the Materials

  1. [46]
    Resolving the substantive matter will require me to assess whether the Decision was fair and reasonable. It would be impossible to resolve this appeal without examining all of the relevant body worn camera footage and other evidence considered by the decision-maker. The 'who, what, when, where and why' of the 14 January 2023 Incident are all facts that were investigated and found by the decision-maker based on the Materials. All of the Materials that were before the decision-maker are integral to each party’s case and will be integral to the Commission’s consideration of those cases.
  1. [47]
    I am not persuaded by the submissions relating to those documents within the Materials that are not in the public domain. No evidence demonstrates that there is anything particularly revealing or sensitive in any of the training manuals or relevant codes of practice as to restraining prisoners or security measures. I expressed to Corrective Services at the hearing of this matter that information like that, such as how to carry out chokeholds or arm locks, could be found by viewing videos on the Internet. Corrective Services conceded the point, appropriately in my view.
  1. [48]
    Furthermore, the relevant training manuals and codes of practice concerning the deployment of chemical weapons are integral to each party’s case and will be integral to the Commission’s consideration of the substantive matter. Whether the Appellant's deployment of a chemical weapon against the Prisoner in the specific circumstances of this case was in accordance with, or outside the scope of, those guidelines was integral to the Decision concerning what sort of discipline was imposed. I am not persuaded by any of the assertions that it is not in the public interest to allow that material to be discussed and reviewed openly as part of these proceedings. A review of the Decision requires a review of that material and I see no proper reason why any of that should be conducted behind closed doors.
  1. [49]
    I cannot accept the submission that a person who might watch the body worn camera footage may discern parts of the layout of the prison and thus a risk to security arises. I have reviewed the footage in considering this application.  It is very difficult to tell from any of it where any of the locations are in relation to any landmarks, or even which direction on the compass any of persons might be facing or travelling. All that is apparent is that the areas depicted are somewhere well within the facility itself. There was no submission made as to how it was that viewing the footage could lead a person to acquiring knowledge that presented a risk to security of the facility, or those working or accommodated within it.
  1. [50]
    The Respondent has not relied on the case of Timmins but it does warrant some discussion. The facts underlying decision of her Honour, Deputy President Swan, in Timmins seem ostensibly the same as the facts here. Both involve suppression orders relating to prisoner names and other material concerning a prison facility. But the facts in this case can be distinguished from Timmins.
  1. [51]
    First, there was convincing evidence before the Commission in Timmins, as indicated by the making of the suppression order. However, I find there is no such evidence here.
  1. [52]
    Second, the appellant in Timmins sought to use the materials produced under the Commission’s orders to damage the respondent's witnesses.[72] There is clearly a public interest (by facilitating the due administration of justice) in preventing the misuse of material obtained through the process of litigation. Nothing of that nature is present in the case currently before the Commission.
  1. [53]
    Third, the materials in Timmins related to prisoners' names, cell numbers and workplace practices relevant to the secure unit of the correctional facility.[73] For obvious reasons, her Honour could not set out the detail of that evidence. However, it is clear that in that case, the evidence disclosed so much information, and of such a nature, that its being made public created a real risk to the security of that facility. In the case presently before the Commission, there is no such evidence. For instance, there is nothing in the footage that would reveal how the correctional facility operates. There is nothing in the training manuals for the use of force and the deployment of chemicals weapons of such a nature either.
  1. [54]
    Fourth, the respondent in Timmins relied on the prohibition of the disclosure of information about correctional facilities under CS Act in support of its application for suppression orders. The applicant in this case makes no references to such. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating whether the CS Act compels or supports granting of the suppression order that Corrective Services is seeking.
  1. [55]
    The respondent in Timmins did not say which provision of the CS Act proscribed the disclosure of confidential information. However, the only provision that could apply is section 341 of the CS Act. That provision prohibits an “informed person” from disclosing confidential information acquired by that person to anyone else except in certain circumstances.[74] However, not making the suppression order and making the material potentially searchable would not frustrate section 341 of the CS Act. That is because there are remedies for the contravention of section 341 contained with the CS Act. I adopt the approach taken in Lee by his Honour, Deputy President Merrell. The availability of remedies for the unlawful disclosure of confidential information militates against the making of a suppression order in relation to that information.[75] It is not a feature of the open justice principles that tribunals ought to shield material from view on the chance that a person could use that material to contravene another Act. On that basis, there is nothing in the CS Act compelling me to grant the suppression order sought. On the whole, therefore, Timmins is distinguished and does not assist the application in this case.
  1. [56]
    There may be cases where the evidence proves that a prisoner will likely suffer harm from being named in a decision. There may also be cases where training manuals and codes of practice contain such sensitive information that publishing them, or allowing access by the public to them, is proven to put security of people or facilities at risk. In such cases, with convincing enough evidence, there may well be grounds to deviate from the principles of open justice. However, this is not such a case. Accordingly, I do not see this case as falling within any of the exceptions to the above-mentioned principles of open justice. I dismiss the application.

Order

  1. The application is dismissed

Footnotes

[1] citing Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417.

[2] [1995] Qd R 10.

[3] Ibid 44-45.

[4] [2017] QSC 338.

[5] Ibid [1], [27].

[6] Ibid [20]-[21].

[7] [2021] QIRC 263.

[8] Ibid [38].

[9] Ibid [39].

[10] Ibid [2].

[11] Ibid [43], [47], [50].

[12] Ibid [45]-[47].

[13] [2024] QIRC 149 ('Lee').

[14] Ibid [2].

[15] Ibid [2].

[16] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 191 ('AD Act').

[17] Lee (n 13) [13].

[18] Ibid [13].

[19] Ibid [31].

[20] Ibid [22].

[21] Ibid [22].

[22] Ibid [21]-[22].

[23] Ibid [24].

[24] Ibid [27].

[25] Ibid [28].

[26] Lee (n 13) [28].

[27] Ibid [28].

[28] [2021] QIRC 327.

[29] Ibid 9-10.

[30] Ibid 7-8.

[31] Ibid 9.

[32] Ibid 10.

[33] [2021] QIRC 309.

[34] Ibid [3], [20].

[35] Ibid [18], [20].

[36] Ibid [19].

[37] [2024] QIRC 68.

[38] Ibid [53].

[39] Ibid [27], [54]-[55].

[40] [2023] QIRC 167.

[41] Ibid [15]-[35].

[42] Ibid [31].

[43] Ibid [33].

[44] Ibid [34].

[45] [2018] QIRC 29 ('Timmins (No 1)').

[46] Ibid [8]-[9].

[47] Ibid [3].

[48] Ibid [4].

[49] [2018] QIRC 117 ('Timmins (No 2)').

[50] Ibid [30].

[51] Alderding v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 268; see also Sane v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 143; Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works) [2023] QIRC 91; Dhanapathy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 017; Mohr-Edgar v State of Queensland (Legal Aid Queensland) [2020] QIRC 136; Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) [2021] QIRC 223; Fischer v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2021] QIRC 332; Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 329; Rutter v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 054; Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council [2024] QIRC 41; Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 169; White v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 49; Biddle v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 321.

[52] MacKenzie v State of Queensland (Department of Employment, Small Business and Training) [2023] QIRC 123, [50]-[53].

[53] Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 20, [15]-[23].

[54] LP v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 432, [26]-[30].

[55] BR v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 146.

[56] Schiffer v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 286.

[57] Waite v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2024] QIRC 144, [18]-[27].

[58] EY v The Store [2021] QIRC 135, citing EY v The Store [2021] ICQ 6.

[59] Weston and Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 2) [2016] QIRC 056.

[60] Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 2) [2020] QIRC 23; Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 3) [2020] QIRC 28.

[61] W v K [2020] QIRC 36, [22].

[62] Murphy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 213, [48].

[63] Kelsey v Logan City Council & Anor (No 2) [2018] QIRC 17.

[64] Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327, [43]-[46].

[65] Barnett v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 424.

[66] Maish v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 235.

[67] Brady v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 63.

[68] AB v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 49, [3]; Augustine v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 184, [137]; AN v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 289, [58]-[62]; Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 164, [159]-[169].

[69] AP v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 170, [37]-[42].

[70] RY v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 208, [32]-[38].

[71] My emphasis.

[72] Timmins (No 1) (n 45) [4].

[73] Timmins (No 2) (n 49) [30].

[74] Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 341.

[75] Lee (n 13) [28]

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Patterson v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Patterson v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 193

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pratt IC

  • Date:

    07 Aug 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
AB v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 49
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 49
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 49
Alderding v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 268
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 268
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 268
Algahamdi v State of Queensland (Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service) [2021] QIRC 223
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 223
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 223
AN v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 289
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 289
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 289
AP v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 170
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 170
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 170
Augustine v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 184
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 184
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 184
Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 263
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 263
Barnett v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 424
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 424
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 424
Biddle v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 321
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 321
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 321
BR v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 146
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 146
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 146
Brady v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 63
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 63
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 63
Dhanapathy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 17
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 17
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 17
Edgar v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2023] QIRC 167
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 167
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 167
Ex parte Queensland Law Society Incorporated [1984] 1 Qd R 166
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1984] 1 Qd R 166
EY v The Store [2021] ICQ 6
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] ICQ 6
Cite 2 - [2021] ICQ 6
EY v The Store [2021] QIRC 135
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 135
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 135
Fischer v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2021] QIRC 332
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 332
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 332
J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] Qd R 10
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [1995] Qd R 10
Cite 2 - [1995] Qd R 10
Kelsey v Logan City Council and Another (No. 2) [2018] QIRC 17
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2018] QIRC 17
Cite 2 - [2018] QIRC 17
Kemp v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 164
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 164
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 164
LP v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 432
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 432
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 432
Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works) [2023] QIRC 91
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 91
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 91
MacKenzie v State of Queensland (Department of Employment, Small Business and Training) [2023] QIRC 123
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 123
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 123
Maish v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 235
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 235
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 235
Mohr-Edgar v State of Queensland (Legal Aid Queensland) [2020] QIRC 136
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 136
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 136
Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2024] QIRC 68
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 68
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 68
Mr A v Viva Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 309
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 309
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 309
Murphy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 213
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 213
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 213
Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council [2024] QIRC 41
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 41
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 41
Neil v Lee (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 149
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 149
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 149
Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 2) [2020] QIRC 23
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 23
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 23
Paxton v Children's Health Queensland, Hospital and Health Service (No 3) [2020] QIRC 28
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 28
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 28
R v O'Dempsey (No 3) [2017] QSC 338
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2017] QSC 338
Cite 2 - [2017] QSC 338
Rutter v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 54
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 54
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 54
RY v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 208
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 208
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 208
Sane v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 143
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 143
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 143
Schiffer v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 286
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 286
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 286
Scott v Scott (1913) A.C., 417
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1913) A.C., 417
Cite 2 - (1913) A.C., 417
Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 327
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 327
Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2021] QIRC 327
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 327
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 327
State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Queensland Corrective Services) v Timmins (No. 2) [2018] QIRC 117
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2018] QIRC 117
Cite 2 - [2018] QIRC 117
Timmins v State of Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Queensland Corrective Services) [2018] QIRC 29
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2018] QIRC 29
Cite 2 - [2018] QIRC 29
Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 20
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 20
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 20
Turay v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 169
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 169
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 169
W v K [2020] QIRC 36
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 36
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 36
Waite v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2024] QIRC 144
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 144
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 144
Weston and Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 2) [2016] QIRC 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QIRC 56
Cite 2 - [2016] QIRC 56
White v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 49
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 49
Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 329
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 329
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 329

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Mylka v State of Queensland (Department of Housing, Local Government, Planning and Public Works) [2025] QIRC 222 citations
Sandford v State of Queensland (Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service) [2025] QIRC 2082 citations
SP v RB as Trustee for the R and R Family Trust [2024] QIRC 2802 citations
1

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