Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service
[2023] QSC 101
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- Unreported Judgment
- Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service[2023] QSC 101
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Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service[2023] QSC 101
Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service[2023] QSC 101
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & ors [2023] QSC 101 |
PARTIES: | TASO KARAMAROUDIS (applicant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (first respondent) v MAGISTRATE TINA PREVITERA (second respondent) v MAGISTRATE SUZETTE COATES (third respondent) v CHIEF MAGISTRATE JANELLE BRASSINGTON (fourth respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | 13401/22 |
DIVISION: | Trial Division |
PROCEEDING: | Originating Application |
DELIVERED ON: | 15 June 2023 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
JUDGE: | Wilson J |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – PARTIES AND NON–PARTIES – COSTS IN PROCEEDINGS WHERE MULTIPLE PARTIES – GENERALLY – where the applicant made an application for the Supreme Court to re-hear a partially heard committal hearing from the Magistrates Court – where the applicant made an application for leave to cross–examine three witnesses at a committal hearing – where the magistrate has not yet made a decision on the application for leave to cross-examine three witnesses at a committal hearing – where the applicant alleged apprehended and actual bias due to the magistrate’s conduct during a hearing – where the applicant sought that the magistrate recuse herself – where leave to amend the originating application was refused – where the originating application was dismissed – where the question of costs was adjourned to a date to be fixed – whether costs should be decided in accordance with the general rule Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474, cited Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97, cited Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & ors [2023] QSC 72, cited Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, cited McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 811, cited NJF Holdings Pty Ltd v De Pasquale Bros Pty Ltd [1999] QSC 328, cited Oldfield v Gold Coast City Council [2010] 1 Qd R 158, cited Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, cited Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2)[1953] 1 WLR 1481, cited Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 83 A (5AA) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 681, r 698 |
COUNSEL: | The applicant appeared on his own behalf M F Bonasia for the first respondent |
SOLICITORS: | The applicant appeared on his own behalf Queensland Police Service Legal Unit for the first respondent |
- [1]In this matter, the applicant, Mr Taso Karamaroudis, filed an originating application on 1 November 2022 in the Supreme Court seeking the following relief:
- The Supreme Court or District Court re-hear the partially heard committal proceeding involving the applicant currently on foot in the Brisbane Magistrates Court and make a determination or decision on the application to cross-examine witnesses in accordance with section 83 A (5AA) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld); and
- In the event that the Court refuses to rehear the matter in the Supreme or District Courts, that Magistrate Previtera be disqualified from further presiding over or hearing the applicant’s District Court matter.
- [2]The applicant’s originating application named four respondents. However, in the applicant’s written submissions filed on 13 December 2022, the applicant stated that he would be making an application to include nine other respondents, which include legal representatives for the respondents and police officers.
- [3]None of these proposed respondents were served with any such application or material.
- [4]Accordingly, it was agreed by the parties at the hearing that I would hear all the applicant’s submissions and if in my view I accepted that it was necessary to hear from the proposed respondents, then I would adjourn the matter to give them the opportunity to provide submissions. In the end, this was not required as I dismissed the application.
- [5]Pursuant to Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97 (Hassan) and McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 811 (McEwan) I found that the applicant was not entitled to the relief he sought of referring individuals for investigation or prosecution.[1] Accordingly, the application for leave to amend the original application was refused.
- [6]In relation to the substantive application, the applicant sought two orders, the first being the removal of proceedings from the Magistrates Court to the Supreme or District Court. In the alternative, the applicant sought that the presiding magistrate be disqualified from further involvement.
- [7]In relation to both orders sought by the applicant, each of the matters raised by the applicant were considered, and as the reasons set out, none of the matters raised by the applicant had any bases.
- [8]On 14 April 2022, I published my reasons with the following orders:
- Leave to amend the originating application is refused;
- The originating application is dismissed; and
- The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.
- [9]I indicated that I would deal with the question of costs on the papers unless either party requested a hearing. Accordingly, in relation to the issue of costs, I received material from the applicant and the first respondent.
- [10]The applicant indicated that even if there was a hearing he would not appear, and the first respondent stated that they did not require a hearing.
- [11]In my view this matter can proceed on the papers without a hearing.
- [12]The first respondent submits that the question of costs should be decided in accordance with the general rule, that is that costs follow the event. They seek an order that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, including any reserved costs, to be assessed on a standard basis.
- [13]In relation to the issue of costs, the applicant sent two emails to the Court. The first email was sent on 17 April 2023 and stated:
“in relation to the issue of costs:
I seem to recall crown law submitting that due to them adopting the Hardiman principle, that they wouldn't be seeking costs.
Crown law was so determined not to cross the Hardiman line, they went to the extreme length of failing to deny any of the allegations made of their clients.
Kurt Pitman was the subject of a referral to the Law Society, however it appears that the authority her Honour relied on for dismissing this consideration is McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 81, however, relying on this authority is non-sensical in that s 5E(1) of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 permits a person to make such a complaint.
Justice Wilson is a person.
To further demonstrate the absurdity, orders made in Chapel of Angels Pty Ltd & Ors v Hennessey Building Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] QCA 232 confirm jurisdictional power to refer practitioners to an investigative authority.
Thus, as the Court failed to deal with the matter of Mr Pitmans conduct, then the court ought not charge for failing to provide the service it was required to provide.
In relation to the QPS, Michael Bonasia has indicated he will be seeking costs.
Michael Bonasia himself was the subject of a referral to a prosecuting authority as part of the leave to amend the original application.
Several Hours of court time was spent leading her Honour to evidence of his corrupt conduct and the corrupt conduct of his police officer clients.
The transcript clearly shows her Honour discovering, along with all the people in the court, the unlawful conduct of the police officers and Micheal Bonasia.
s 38 of the Crime and Corruption Act Qld states:
s 38 Duty to notify commission of corrupt conduct
- This section applies if a public official reasonably suspects that a complaint, or information or matter (also a complaint), involves, or may involve, corrupt conduct.
- The public official must notify the commission of the complaint, subject to section 40.
5) Disturbingly, considering the seriousness and grave nature of the allegations made against members of the police force and their Counsel and the discovery of the weight of the evidence substantiating those allegations, the orders made by Justice Wilson reflect that no such notifications were made
6) After reviewing the transcript and the evidence that was led to the court at the hearing, it appears that any reasonably minded person, or any person with substantially reduced power of mental acuity would suspect that the matter involves corrupt conduct, the transcript shows that Justice Wilson herself was convinced that conduct far exceeded mere ' suspicion that conduct maybe involve corrupt conduct' as her Honour gave Mr Bonasia his homework, Mr Bonasia did his homework and delivered it to the Court and made his report. Mr Bonasia was directed to make comment in relation to perverting the course allegations and evidence substantiating those allegations in relation to police engagement records. The transcript shows Justice Wilson was led to evidence substantiating very serious allegations against several police officers. Comments were made by Justice Wilson during and after these events in Court.The comments made by her Honour indicate how convinced she was of the weight of evidence proving corrupt conduct by members of the police force.
7) Astonishingly, comments made by Mr Bonasia himself during the hearing constituted a confession in that he confirmed in comments he made specifically regarding the allegation I'd made of perjury by the arresting officer in relation to my demeanour at the Cleveland Watchhouse, was an allegation that was made on an objective basis, effectively admitting he'd submitted material that was an attempt to pervert the course of Justice.
8) In relation to the reliance on the common law authorities relied on by her Honour to justify her conduct in relation to refusing leave to amend, I am currently preparing an appeal, relevant draft grounds include:
- In refusing leave to amend the application , Justice Wilson erred in law as referring to and relying on Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97 (Hassan v Sydney Local Health District) was plainly wrong-1- and as such is irrelevant to the matter as the reference taken from that authority turns on a Judge or Judges in New South Wales removing a parties right to seek referrals in proceedings, more so in interlocutory applications , whereas in Queensland in the presence of, and in accordance with s 38 of the CCC act 2001, to seek relief in the form of referrals to a prosecuting authority at any stage of proceedings interlocutory or otherwise is the same as asking a Judge to apply the relevant statute to the circumstances of any issue in any proceeding.
- Justice Wilson erred in law by referring and relying on a reference taken from McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 81. as s 38 of the CCC Act Qld 2001 overrides this authority
- Justice Wilson erred in law by referring and relying on two common law authorities as justification for refusing leave to amend that contradict each other.
9) Justice Wilson was led to Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97 (Hassan v Sydney Local Health District) before her honour asked to be led to the evidence substantiating the allegations of corrupt conduct , yet, only after hearing the evidence did her Honour decide that this authority blocked my leave to amend application.
I shouldn't be financially penalised for her Honours inability to understand this authority both at the time it was submitted ,and now, in the presence of statutory authority here in Qld that overrides it.
Conclusion
No order for costs ought to be made in the circumstances.
Crown law have already submitted they won't be seeking costs.
In return for exposing the corrupt conduct of several serving police officers and counsel that represents them, the Court saw the evidence thereof and responded by failing to refer the corrupt conduct to the relevant authority as obliged to do under statute and failed to refer it to another prosecuting authority, the Director of Public Prosecutions, then invited the police force to effectively fine me for performing this public service.
As stated, The court is also asking Crown law to effectively fine me for dealing with an allegation made against one of their own, without dealing with the allegation.
I now ask Justice Wilson to make the orders her honour is obliged to make pursuant to s 38 of the CCC Act 2001 as the mandatory requirement to notify is not time limited.
S 58 Constitution of Qld permits this.”
- [14]The applicant sent another email to the Court on 19 April 2023 which states:
“In the circumstances of
i) corrupt conduct allegations aimed at the police and their counsel, and
Ii) justice wilsons failure to rule on those allegations after being led to the evidence thereof ,and
III) the reasons justice wilson provided for refusing to rule on those allegations
Ill) justice wilsons failure to make referrals to the DPP and CCC in accordance with s 38 of the Ccc Act 2001 in the face of the admissions made in court and evidence presented
Iv) complaint now made about her honours conduct to the Ccc and the cheif justice,
It is entirely inappropriate for
i) any party to seek costs
ii) justice wilson to conduct a hearing to determine costs
- until determinations can be made on the complaints of corrupt conduct by a higher court or another authority.
If there is a costs hearing and appearance is not required, I will not be attending that hearing as it is inappropriate for me ( or for anyone else) to attend such a hearing due to the circumstances listed above.
An appeal on the orders of justice wilson is currently being prepared”
- [15]The matters that the applicant raise are largely irrelevant to the issue of costs.
General rule as to costs
- [16]Rule 681 (1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (the Rules) provides:
“681 General rule about costs
- (1)Costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise.
- (2)Subrule (1) applies unless these rules provide otherwise.”
- [17]Likewise, r 698 provides:
“698 Reserved costs
If the court reserves costs of an application in a proceeding, the costs reserved follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise.”
- [18]There must be “special” or “exceptional” circumstances to depart from the general rule. In Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 (Oshlack), McHugh J (with whom Brennan CJ agreed) endorsed a statement of Devlin J in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2) [1953] 1 WLR 1481 that:[2]
“... Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to his costs. To deprive him of his costs or to require him to pay a part of the costs of the other side is an exceptional measure.”
- [19]The rationale for that statement of general principle was explained by McHugh J in Oshlack in the following terms:[3]
“[67] … The principle is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy and operates whether the successful party is the plaintiff or the defendant. Costs are not awarded to punish an unsuccessful party. The primary purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party. If the litigation had not been brought, or defended, by the unsuccessful party the successful party would not have incurred the expense which it did. As between the parties, fairness dictates that the unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for the costs of the unsuccessful litigation.”
- [20]The discretion in awarding costs is a wide one, but it must be exercised judicially and not by reference to irrelevant considerations.[4] The general order that a successful party in litigation is entitled to an order of costs in its favour is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy,[5] and should only be departed from, in the Court’s discretion, with “good reason”.[6] Good reason does not include that the losing party disagrees with the result.
- [21]There are limited exceptions to the usual order as to costs, which focus on:
- The conduct of the successful party which disentitles it to the beneficial exercise of the discretion;[7] or
- The existence of “special” or “exceptional” circumstances.[8]
- [22]In my view, none of the exceptions apply in this case.
- [23]The hearing occupied a day and a half. This does not include the first listing of the hearing which was before his Honour Justice Boddice on 24 November 2022. On this day the applicant did not appear and sent correspondence to the Court citing COVID-19- like symptoms as the reason for his failure to appear. The respondents appeared, only to then be informed of the applicant’s absence. In adjourning the matter, his Honour Justice Boddice ordered those costs be reserved.
- [24]In relation to the amount of time the hearing took, the applicant raises that most of the time was taken up dealing with the issue of whether leave should be granted to amend his application to include nine further respondents. At the hearing, the applicant spent some time going through his complaints in relation to each of the proposed respondents. The applicant states that as the issue in relation to the proposed respondents was determined in accordance with Hassan and McEwan, this time was not necessary, and he should not have to bear the burden of these costs.
- [25]At the beginning of the hearing, the applicant raised Hassan, and later, I set out the basis of how this matter should proceed, which was agreed upon by the parties:
“HER HONOUR: Now, I thought about the best way how to deal with all the matters that I’ve got to deal with today - is to hear all of your submissions today in relation to everything. And then, because there’s - stand up when I’m talking to you - so much to deal with Mr Karamaroudis, that I was going to hear all of your submissions. I was going to hear your submissions about why these people should be added, I’m going to hear all of your submissions in relation to your originating application - I’m going to hear it all. There is a lot of material to go over, and I think they will probably give it actually better context, because I’ll understand what your originating application is about, and I’ll understand what you’re saying about these persons.
Then I will go away so that I can actually sit down and view all the documents with some time. And then I will give my reasons, and if I am of the view that these people should also be added, then I will include that in my reasons, and then that is a process - natural justice will have to apply then. And then they will have to be
contacted and we can then renew in relation to that; you happy with that?
APPLICANT: Yes, your Honour.
HER HONOUR: Okay. So I just want to get as much done today as we possibly can.
APPLICANT: Okay. Right. Yes. Shall I continue?
HER HONOUR: What about Mr Bonasia; are you happy with that?
APPLICANT: Sorry.
MR BONASIA: Thank you, your Honour. That’s appropriate.”
- [26]In this matter the applicant made a number of allegations, including complaints about the proposed respondents, an organised campaign of prejudice conducted by the Magistrate’s Court against him, and actual and apprehended bias against him by a magistrate who he also alleged was in a symbiotic relationship with the police. The evidence in relation to these complaints was often inter-related. For example, the applicant relied upon video footage of him in the watchhouse in relation to his complaint about the arresting officer (a proposed respondent) and also the presiding magistrate (the second respondent). The applicant told the magistrate that the footage impugned the arresting officer’s credit and showed her criminality in making a false affidavit. In relation to the applicant’s claim of the magistrate’s actual and apprehended bias against him, the applicant submitted that the magistrate created processes and practices which prevented consideration of material that he filed in order to impugn the credibility of the arresting officer.
- [27]This hearing did take some time, largely due to the voluminous material filed by the applicant (including eight affidavits with hundreds and hundreds of pages of annexures and a USB containing audio / video recordings and documents):
“HER HONOUR: Yes. So I’ve read all of that. So I just want to keep us focused on what the question that I’ve got to answer is and I think we’ve gone back and said, look, this what this application is about. We have all of these other things that you want to talk about, why these other people should be referred of, and I’m going to be dealing with that as well. And seeing if I should give you leave or not, as I said, in my reasons, and if leave is required, then we’ll get them back in then, to be able to answer that question. But we can deal substantively with your substantive application about, what you say, is the conspiracy that occurs.
APPLICANT: Conspiracy to prejudice. That’s correct. HER HONOUR: Okay. Well, we’re making slow headway.
APPLICANT: I’ll apologise, your Honour. The - the - there’s a voluminous amount of material. I’m a guitar player, and I have poor eyesight. So I - that - the combination of those things means that I can’t briskly and crisply lead you to the evidence, of which there is a lot.
HER HONOUR: Okay.
APPLICANT: And I’d - I’d like to submit to the court that I would like to show the court that evidence. I don’t want it to be the case where I get a judgment and I didn’t get a chance to present this evidence, or that it was told to me that it wasn’t relevant - I want to be heard.”
- [28]Prima facie, the first respondent is entitled to their costs. In my view, nothing that the applicant has raised amounts to a departure from the general rule.
- [29]Accordingly, the question of costs should be decided in accordance with the general rule, that is that costs follow the event.
Orders
- The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, including any reserved costs, to be assessed on a standard basis.
Footnotes
[1] See Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & ors [2023] QSC 72, at [23] – [34].
[2] Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, at [66], quoting Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2) [1953] 1 WLR 1481 at 1484.
[3]Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, at [67].
[4] Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474 at [17] per Philippides J, with whom McMurdo P and Williams JA agreed, citing Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534.
[5]Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474 at [17] per Philippides J, with whom McMurdo P and Williams JA agreed, citing Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 per McHugh J, with whom Brennan CJ agreed.
[6] NJF Holdings Pty Ltd v De Pasquale Bros Pty Ltd [1999] QSC 328 at [22] per Chesterman J.
[7]Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474 at [17] per Philippides J, with whom McMurdo P and Williams JA agreed, citing Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 per McHugh J, with whom Brennan CJ agreed. See also Oldfield v Gold Coast City Council [2010] 1 Qd R 158 at [71] per Muir JA, White and Wilson JJ.
[8] Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474 at [17] per Philippides J, with whom McMurdo P and Williams JA agreed, citing Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 120, 126 per Kirby J.