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  4. Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service - [2023] QSC 72

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Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service[2023] QSC 72

Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service[2023] QSC 72

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:   

Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & ors [2023] QSC 72

PARTIES:

TASO KARAMAROUDIS

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(first respondent)

v

MAGISTRATE TINA PREVITERA

(second respondent)

v

MAGISTRATE SUZETTE COATES

(third respondent)

v

CHIEF MAGISTRATE JANELLE BRASSINGTON

(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

13401/22

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

DELIVERED ON:

14 April 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 and 16 December 2022

JUDGE:

Wilson J

ORDER:

  1. Leave to amend the originating application is refused.
  2. The originating application is dismissed.
  3. The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – REFERENCE AND REMOVAL OF PROCEEDINGS AND APPEAL AND REVIEW WITHIN COURT – GENERALLY – where the applicant made an application for the Supreme Court to re-hear a partially heard committal hearing from the Magistrates Court – where the applicant made an application for leave to cross-examine three witnesses at a committal hearing – where the magistrate has not yet made a decision on the application for leave to cross-examine three witnesses at a committal hearing – whether the committal proceeding should be removed to the Supreme Court

COURTS AND JUDGES – JUDGES – DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – CONDUCT, INCLUDING PUBLISHED STATEMENTS – where the applicant alleged apprehended and actual bias due to the magistrate’s conduct during a hearing – where the applicant sought that the magistrate recuse herself – whether a fair-minded lay observer could reasonably apprehend that the magistrate might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions arising in the application – whether the magistrate was so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented

Constitution of Queensland Act 2001, s 58

Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 83A, s 83A (5AA), s 103B, s 110B(3)

Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld), s 12(2)(c)

Barton v R [1980] HCA 48, cited

Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 95 ALJR 824, cited

Dupois v Queensland Police & anor [2022] QSC 241, cited

Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 137, cited

Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 240, cited

Frugtniet v Victoria (1997) 71 ALJR 1598, cited

Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97, cited

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, cited

McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 81, cited

Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427, cited

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, cited

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, cited

Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors; Palmer v Magistrates Court of Queensland & Ors [2022] QSC 227, cited

Palmer v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors; Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors (2020) 3 QR 546

Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213, cited

Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 249, cited

Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98, cited

SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous [2002] FCA 668, cited

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf

M F Bonasia for the first respondent

P H Nevard for the second, third and fourth respondents

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf

Queensland Police Service Legal Unit for the first respondent

Crown’s Solicitor Office for the second, third and fourth respondents

Originating Application

  1. [1]
    The applicant, Mr Taso Karamaroudis, filed an originating application on 1 November 2022 in the Supreme Court seeking the following relief:
    1. (a)
      The Supreme Court or District Court re-hear the partially heard committal proceeding involving the applicant currently on foot in the Brisbane Magistrates Court and make a determination or decision on the application to cross-examine witnesses in accordance with section 83A(5AA) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (the Justices Act); and
    2. (b)
      In the event that the Court refuses to rehear the matter in the Supreme or District Courts, that Magistrate Previtera be disqualified from further presiding over or hearing the applicant’s District Court matter.[1]
  2. [2]
    The applicant has filed voluminous material, including eight affidavits with hundreds of pages of annexures and a USB containing audio/video recordings and documents.
  3. [3]
    In the applicant’s filed material, the applicant raises many grievances with the police, magistrates and the legal representatives for the first respondent. An overarching theme of this material is his perception of the Magistrates Court’s inability to conduct the committal process fairly and lawfully and what he calls a “continuation of the organised campaign of prejudice conducted by the Brisbane Magistrates Court”.
  4. [4]
    The applicant’s Magistrates Court matter remains part heard before Magistrate Previtera, who is considering an application for the applicant to cross-examine three witnesses at his committal hearing. The applicant is seeking the Supreme Court or District Court to effectively take over this matter, or, in the alternative, for Magistrate Previtera to be disqualified on the basis of both actual and apprehended bias.

Chronology

  1. [5]
    On 25 March 2021 the applicant was charged with unlawfully stalking his neighbour from between 1 February 2018 and 25 March 2021. On this date, a bail affidavit was sworn by the arresting officer opposing bail.
  2. [6]
    At the first mention on 26 March 2021, the applicant was denied bail and it was not until 12 April 2021 that he was granted bail. 
  3. [7]
    This matter then had a number of mentions and between November 2021 and February 2022, various legal representatives of the applicant were given leave to withdraw. 
  4. [8]
    On 7 March 2022, directions were made by Magistrate Coates for the filing of applications and the matter was listed for 11 April 2022. 
  5. [9]
    On 17 March 2022, there was a directions hearing before Acting Magistrate Paul Byrne. The applicant made an application for disclosure and an order was made requiring police disclosure within 21 days in relation to a copy of a list of dates and reasons for police call-out and attendance upon the applicant during the period of March 2011 and March 2021. The applicant’s other applications were dismissed. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred at this hearing as no transcript has been provided.
  6. [10]
    The applicant then made an application to re-open the directions hearing of 17 March 2022. On 21 March 2022 this application was refused in chambers with the matter to remain as listed for 31 March 2022. 
  7. [11]
    On 31 March 2022, the applicant made two applications before Magistrate Previtera:
    1. (a)
      an application to re-open the directions hearing of 17 March 2022; and  
    2. (b)
      an application for a permanent stay of the proceedings.  
  8. [12]
    Both applications were refused. Directions were made for the serving of a notice[2] by 14 April 2022 requiring police to respond by 28 April 2022. An application for leave to cross-examine was listed for half a day on 14 June 2022.  
  9. [13]
    On 4 April 2022, the applicant filed an application to re-open a hearing. The application did not particularise which hearing he wished to re-open. The then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington proceeded on the basis it was the 31 March 2022 hearing and refused the application on 5 April 2022. 
  10. [14]
    Pursuant to section 110B of the Justices Act the applicant sent correspondence (dated 14 April 2022 and 28 June 2022) to Brisbane Police Prosecutions stating that he wished to cross-examine:
    1. (a)
      the arresting officer; 
    2. (b)
      the complainant; and 
    3. (c)
      a witness who gave a statement for the prosecution.
  11. [15]
    The prosecution responded on 20 April 2022 and on 4 July 2022. Whilst the prosecution did consent to some topics, they did not consent to a range of topics of cross-examination as set out by the applicant. 
  12. [16]
    On 14 June 2022, O'Sullivan Lawyers was given a Legal Aid grant and appeared on the record. Directions were made for the parties to file and serve material.  
  13. [17]
    On 7 July 2022, O'Sullivan Lawyers was no longer acting for the applicant.   
  14. [18]
    On 25 August 2022, the applicant represented himself before Magistrate Previtera in relation to an:
    1. (a)
      application to recuse Magistrate Previtera; and 
    2. (b)
      application for leave to cross-examine three witnesses at a committal hearing.
  15. [19]
    Magistrate Previtera refused the application to recuse herself.  
  16. [20]
    Later in the afternoon, the applicant had difficulty with his breathing and applied for an adjournment of the hearing. Her Honour stood the matter down for five minutes, during which, an ambulance was called. The applicant was unable to return to court to finalise the leave to cross-examine hearing. 
  17. [21]
    The magistrate has not made a decision in relation to the three witnesses required for cross-examination by the applicant. This matter remains part heard. 
  18. [22]
    On 1 November the applicant filed this application in the Supreme Court.

Application seeking leave to amend the originating application

  1. [23]
    The applicant’s originating application names four respondents:
    1. (a)
      the Queensland Police Service (QPS) as the first respondent;
    2. (b)
      Magistrate Previtera as the second respondent;
    3. (c)
      Magistrate Coates as the third respondent; and
    4. (d)
      Chief Magistrate Brassington as the fourth respondent. 
  2. [24]
    However, in the applicant’s written submissions filed on 13 December 2022, the applicant stated that he would be making an application to include nine other respondents, which include legal representatives for the respondents, police officers, and police prosecutors.
  3. [25]
    The applicant states that the interests of justice favour the sought amendments because:
    1. (a)
      as the legal representatives for the QPS has confirmed, any illegalities committed by members of the police service are an issue in this matter;
    2. (b)
      the amendments constitute issues that are causal and at the heart of the relief originally sought;
    3. (c)
      serving members of the QPS have committed illegalities and have not faced justice for doings so; and
    4. (d)
      counsel for the QPS has “stained the face of the court with his reckless attempt at perverting the course of justice in his written submissions”.
  4. [26]
    The applicant did not serve any such application, or material, on these proposed respondents.[3]
  5. [27]
    I note that the applicant has inundated the Crime and Corruption Commission Queensland (CCC) with complaints about a number of these proposed respondents. These complaints to the CCC are largely about the same matters that he wishes to agitate in this Court. Ultimately, the CCC took no action in relation to any of the applicant’s complaints and advised him that they would not engage in further communication with him.
  6. [28]
    The applicant then complained to the Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee (PCCC) about the CCC not allowing further communication with him. Further, he also complained to PCCC about the conduct of one of the proposed respondents. As at the date of the hearing the applicant had not received a response from the PCCC. 
  7. [29]
    The applicant now seeks for this Court to refer documents to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Legal Services Commissioner in relation to these proposed respondents.
  8. [30]
    However, any such application is doomed to fail. 
  9. [31]
    In the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97 (Hassan v Sydney Local Health District), Brereton JA said:[4]

“…While as an incident of its jurisdiction a court may, if it appears in the course of the proceedings before it that there is evidence of a crime, occasionally refer the papers, at the end of the hearing, to prosecuting authorities, that is not relief which a party to proceedings is entitled to seek from a court. Even less so is it appropriate to seek such relief by an interlocutory application in this Court, before the proceedings have been heard. The applications for orders of referral are entirely inappropriate, quite apart from any question of merit. They invoke this Court’s jurisdiction for an improper purpose, and thus are also an abuse of process.”

  1. [32]
    The applicant’s only response to Hassan v Sydney Local Health District is that he has been to the appropriate authorities with his complaints, and they have done nothing. He states that one official government body is passing it to the next and he is stuck in the middle.
  2. [33]
    What the applicant seeks to do in this Court is entirely inappropriate. In McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 81, Martin SJA said:[5]

“This Court cannot direct the prosecution or investigation of any party. Nor can the plaintiff obtain orders of this kind as there is no cause of action which would entitle the plaintiff to that form of relief. This is a clear abuse of the Court’s process.”

  1. [34]
    The applicant is not entitled to seek relief in the form of referring individuals for investigation or prosecution. Accordingly, the application for leave to amend the original application is refused.

Removal of proceedings to the Supreme and District Court

  1. [35]
    The applicant submits that the Magistrates Court has demonstrated a conspiracy to prejudice him and that the QPS continually seeks and receives symbiotic protection from the Magistrates Court. The applicant believes the Magistrates Court is closing ranks:

“APPLICANT:…I’ve made allegations against Magistrates Coates and Magistrates Previtera.  They’re closing ranks.  The conflict or the dispute started when I accused police of corruption.  That was the catalyst.

Then I accused Magistrates of protecting those corrupt police.  And as soon as I did that, even before that point, I was persona non grata and I was treated unfairly from that point…”

  1. [36]
    In relation to this alleged conspiracy against him by the Magistrates Court, the applicant raises many issues that can be broadly summarised into three categories:
    1. (a)
      hostility from magistrates;
    2. (b)
      complicity by the Magistrates Court registry to keep magistrate orders secret; and
    3. (c)
      indifference and inaction by the Chief Magistrate.
  2. [37]
    I have considered each of the matters raised by the applicant and none of them, either individually or cumulatively, have any bases.

The mention before Magistrate Coates on 7 March 2022

  1. [38]
    The applicant states that the “first incidence of real, unexplainable hostility” towards him in relation to this conspiracy of prejudice was a hearing before Magistrate Coates on 7 March 2022.
  2. [39]
    On that date, the applicant had not yet entered the court and the following exchange occurred between a Mr McDowell, who was appearing as a friend of the court (his firm having received a grant of Legal Aid in relation to the matter, and the applicant having declined their representation), and Magistrate Coates:

“MR McDOWELL: Yes, your Honour. That was the matter I appeared as friend of the court for. Legal Aid gave us the grant and then he declined our representation. I was just outside, believe it or not, talking to the - from Salvation Army to see if someone has actually checked in if this man has attended, but he says he hasn't spoken to them.

HER HONOUR: All right. So we will - I'll just leave it, then, to a little bit later.

MR McDOWELL: Yes. As I said, we' re not on the record for that matter.

HER HONOUR: Okay. Not on the record.

MR McDOWELL: We got the grant, but he declined it, so I thought I'd raise that, why I attended.

HER HONOUR: All right. Well, I'll call him now and see if I can get him. You haven' t seen him - - -

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: No? No go out the back there? No rumble in the jungle? All right. Thanks a lot. Thanks a lot, Mr McDowell. Can we call this man? Does he suffer from mental illness, this fellow?”

  1. [40]
    The applicant emphasised that Magistrate Coates questioned his mental health in court before he had entered the room. In my view nothing turns on this. It was just a general question and not in any way an accusation or a derogatory assessment of the applicant. 
  2. [41]
    The matter then went on:

“HER HONOUR: All right. Okay. So the OPP are acting in this matter of Mr Karamaroudis, and there's been multiple- Ms Gittens, you're acting for him.

MS GITTENS: Yes. Thank you, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: Does the DPP appear as well?

MS GITTENS: I think not. I think it's just the one charge: unlawful stalking.

HER HONOUR: But there's a whole box of- is this just a box of tricks, is it? He's here.

DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honour. Yes, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: All right. Come on down, sir. All right. Mr Karamaroudis. Good morning to you, sir.

DEFENDANT: Good morning, your Honour.”

  1. [42]
    The applicant states that a “box of tricks” should be interpreted as being a “box of deception”. However, in my view, the magistrate’s remarks were nothing more than a turn of phrase which did not imply any form of deception by the applicant. 
  2. [43]
    The applicant also highlighted that, when he pulled out his material and put it where he could reference it, prior to making any submissions, the learned magistrate said:

“HER HONOUR: Okay. Now - no, leave that all there. Right. This is just a mention. This is a callover. We don't need the whole box and dice today. Now, what are you doing about the matter? How do you want to proceed with it? This is the charge of unlawful stalking.”

  1. [44]
    The magistrate then went on and made orders to progress the matter:

“…This is the charge of unlawful stalking.

DEFENDANT: Yes.

HER HONOUR: Right. And that’s a committal matter. So have you got your court brief?

DEFENDANT: I've got the court brief. There's been considerable drama with my solicitors.

HER HONOUR: I don't want to hear about that, really. I'm just here to progress the matter on.

DEFENDANT: Okay. Okay. Well, I'd like to - - -

HER HONOUR: Righto. Okay. So you’ve got the brief and you're all ready to go and for a hand up committal.

DEFENDANT: No, no, no.

HER HONOUR: Well, all right. Well, tell me the no. What's in the no? Give us the no.

DEFENDANT: The no is that I've given my intention to the court previously to contest the committal. I've also - I've also asked for disclosure from the police in relation to an order made by Magistrate Sarra out at Wynnum. I asked for certain things from the - - -

HER HONOUR: Well, you’ll have to deal with that with Wynnum. I'm- can't help you with Wynnum.

DEFENDANT: That's okay. I'd like to ask for a directions hearing today in order to obtain a urgent telephone record and - - -

HER HONOUR: No. You’ve filed your application, have you?

DEFENDANT: I beg your pardon, madam?

HER HONOUR: You filed any application?

DEFENDANT: I - this is the application.

HER HONOUR: No, you have to file it. Has to be filed and served. Okay. Any applications - - -

DEFENDANT: I have - - -

HER HONOUR: Any applications to the court - - -

DEFENDANT: I have applied for - I have made an application for disclosure.

HER HONOUR: Any application to the court by close of business - close of business- I' m making directions now. Close of business, 28th of March.

DEFENDANT: Your Honour, there' s an issue with a telephone record. I've been trying to speak - - -

HER HONOUR : I’m not dealing with any matters. This is a callover.

DEFENDANT: I've been trying to speak to the court for months, but the court won't let me speak.

HER HONOUR: Okay. Eleventh of April - - -

DEFENDANT: - - - there is an urgent telephone record that I require by the - - -

HER HONOUR: Eleventh of April 2022, Court 19, 9am. Now, you are on - - -

DEFENDANT: Your Honour, I require a directions hearing so that I can obtain - - -

HER HONOUR: I have got - - -

DEFENDANT: - - - a time-limited telephone record that is critical to my Defence.

HER HONOUR: - - - any applications have got to be in - bail is enlarged. Appearance required. l have heard you. Thank you. Okay. Any application by 28th of March. Bail is enlarged. Appearance required. Court 19.

DEFENDANT: How do I get this phone record if you will not let me speak? I need - I require, for my Defence, a time-sensitive telephone record.

HER HONOUR: Okay. Thank you and good morning to you, sir. Thank you.

Thank you. Bring your application, thank you. Good morning.

DEFENDANT: Thank you. Thank you, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: Thank you.

DEFENDANT: I will just go and get the transcript and we will go from there.

HER HONOUR: Excellent.”

  1. [45]
    The applicant raises a number of complaints with how Magistrate Coates conducted this mention, including that the applicant feels that: 
    1. (a)
      he was ridiculed in open court by a magistrate he had never met, seen or heard from before;
    2. (b)
      his mental health was questioned, and his affidavit material was called a box of tricks without him being in the room;
    3. (c)
      he wanted a contested committal as opposed to a hand up committal which enraged the magistrate as she was pushing him to do a hand up committal;
    4. (d)
      the transcript does not properly reflect the magistrate’s enraged tone;
    5. (e)
      the magistrate did not hear submissions from either the applicant or the police prosecutor;
    6. (f)
      he was deprived of procedural fairness, as the magistrate yelled at him, told him to put his paperwork away, made orders that he did not hear, and never articulated the orders in a fashion that a self-represented person would understand; and
    7. (g)
      the magistrate’s hostile conduct towards him shows both apprehended and actual bias.
  2. [46]
    In my view, none of the matters raised by the applicant have any bases. 
  3. [47]
    The applicant perceives relatively benign comments made by the magistrate as acts of hostility and as part of a co-ordinated plan to deprive him of procedural fairness; this is not the case.   
  4. [48]
    Further, it could not be said that Magistrate Coates was pushing the applicant to do a hand up committal. The magistrate was trying to find out how this matter was going to proceed and to make the appropriate orders to progress the matter.
  5. [49]
    The magistrate ultimately made the orders necessary for the progression of the matter which was the entire point of the mention at a callover. However, the applicant places weight upon how Magistrate Coates set this matter down for any application to be filed by the 28th of March:

“APPLICANT:   My point is that her Honour made an order to me - she was yelling it so I couldn’t understand anyway, but even if I could understand it, I was being tricked by that court because any application by the 28th of March to any self represented litigant doesn’t make sense.  So I couldn’t - you see - you see my point.  So my first point is that she delivered an order to me in a format that I couldn’t - it couldn’t be seen that I could understand as a self-represented litigant.”

  1. [50]
    The magistrate twice informed the applicant that any applications to the court were to be made by the 28th of March:

“HER HONOUR: Any applications to the court - - -

DEFENDANT: I have applied for – I have made an application for disclosure.

HER HONOUR: Any application to the court by close of business – close of business – I’m making directions now. Close of business, 28th of March.

…

HER HONOUR: I have got - - -

DEFENDANT: - - - a time-limited telephone record that is critical to my Defence.

HER HONOUR: - - - any applications have got to be in – bail is enlarged. Appearance required. I have heard you. Thank you. Okay. Any application by 28th of March. Bail is enlarged…”

  1. [51]
    This was in the context of the applicant stating that he required a directions hearing for disclosure of telephone records. The magistrate made it clear that she was not dealing with the substance of any such application at this hearing.
  2. [52]
    The applicant states that he could not understand the orders of Magistrate Coates. I note that as Magistrate Coates was making the orders she was interrupted by the applicant and consequently the orders do not flow easily. However, in my view the orders were in an understandable form. 
  3. [53]
    The applicant states that he has been prejudiced by the Brisbane Magistrates Court in that he has been denied procedural fairness and shown apprehended bias by Magistrate Coates; this is not the case.
  4. [54]
    Taking into account all of the circumstances and everything the applicant has raised, in my view the learned magistrate acted appropriately at this committal mention. There was no procedural unfairness towards the applicant at this mention.
  5. [55]
    I have set out the principles in relation to apprehended bias later in my reasons at [129] to [135].
  6. [56]
    In my view, it would apparent to a fair minded lay observer that the magistrate brought an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the progression of this matter at the mention.

The applicant’s contact with the registry

  1. [57]
    The applicant states that despite emailing and calling the registry, he was not able to get a copy of the orders made by Magistrate Coates. The applicant submits that there was a coordinated campaign to deprive him of these orders, as:
    1. (a)
      first, they were not delivered in a format he could understand; and
    2. (b)
      second, when he tried to get a copy of the orders, after multiple emails and phone calls, the orders were not provided to him.
  2. [58]
    The applicant states that the Magistrates Court’s registry kept Magistrate Coates’ orders secret from him “…in an astonishing code of silence ritual by court staff who also lied to the Applicant in emails in relation to orders made which ultimately damaged the Applicants defence [sic]”.
  3. [59]
    After the committal mention before Magistrate Coates, the applicant made multiple calls to the registry. The audio recordings of phone calls provided by the applicant reveal that the applicant made disparaging comments about Magistrate Coates to registry staff. In these recordings it is sometimes difficult to hear the responses from the registry staff, but where they are discernible, it is evident that the registry staff responded calmly in an effort to assist the applicant with his concerns.
  4. [60]
    In response to a call on 7 March 2022, the registry emailed the applicant stating that:

“I confirm your matters before the court today have been adjourned to Court 19 on the 11th of April 2022 at 9am. Your bail will continue as before.”

  1. [61]
    In addition to phone calls, the applicant also sent multiple emails to the registry seeking the orders that Magistrate Coates made and whether the next appearance was a mention or a hearing. In particular, on 10 March 2022, the applicant sent the following email to the Magistrates Court’s criminal listings contact email:

“On the 7th March 2022 I formally asked for a Court date to be brought forward, it turns out that the date the Magistrate ordered on the 7th March 2022 for the next event is to be the 11th April 2022.

The last time I asked for a date to be brought forward, this was part of the response:

  1. No special urgency identified why matter cannot be heard on the next listing date in open court.

Ok so now there is urgency.

Typically, you guys respond to these requests within a day or two.

It’s been longer than that, which I can’t help but note suits Magistrate Coates who seemed to suffering some kind of psychosis induced rage at the time of the last mention on the 7th March 2022.

I have been trying to get the order/s that she made on that occasion for the purposes of appeal, but the registry won’t cough those up either.

Legal Aid are refusing my requests to provide me with telephone contact with a solicitor so that I can determine if an appeal on her order is even possible., gee I wonder why that is?

I can’t appeal without the order ‘Magistrate’ Coates made.

I need that information urgently, I am trying to get time sensitive telephone records critical to my defence.

Please provide me with either a new Court date in time to have the Court subpoena those phone records, or ‘Magistrate Coates’ order so that I can make appeal to the District Court.”

  1. [62]
    The next day the applicant received a reply from the registry stating the next court date was listed for a directions hearing on 17 March 2022.
  2. [63]
    On 17 March 2022, there was a directions hearing before Acting Magistrate Paul Byrne where orders were made requiring the police to provide a copy of a list of dates and reasons for police call out and attendance upon the applicant from March 2011 to March 2021. 
  3. [64]
    The applicant then made an application to re-open this 17 March 2022 directions hearing which was refused in chambers on 21 March 2022.
  4. [65]
    On 31 March 2022, the applicant appeared before Magistrate Previtera in relation to two applications which were both refused.
  5. [66]
    On 1 April 2022, the applicant sent the following email to the Magistrates Court’s criminal listings contact email:

“Hello,

I require the orders made by Suzette Coates on the 7th of March 2022, I have asked you for them before as she was having some kind of rage and i couldn't understand what she said, after Court that day I went to the Registry to find out what the orders made were, no luck, then i wrote to you a few times about it.

The registry from memory ending up telling me in an email that the only info she could dig up was that the next court date was the 11th April 2022

It became apparent to me yesterday that Suzette Coates had ordered that there be no more applications made after the 28th March 2022 and that a committal hearing, not mention had been ordered for the 11th April 2022.

This, if true, is procedurally unfair as You've kept information from me that has prevented me from understanding that I could no longer make applications after the 28th March 2022.

I clearly and plainly asked you for the Orders several times in writing, and a couple of times in person.

In addition, i complained to the Chief Magistrate after Court that “By this time she'd worked herself up to some kind of rage and I barely understood what she was saying.”

I will come into the Court around lunchtime on Monday to ask that her orders be extended for a period of one month, It would be helpful in the circumstances if you could have the orders made on the 7th March 2022 sent to me by email by lunchtime on Monday the 4/04/2022.”

  1. [67]
    The applicant submits that the registry lied to him in their email dated 11 March 2022, as they should have said that there was an order that he had to make applications by 28 March 2022.
  2. [68]
    The applicant also states this is relevant as he was in the middle of disclosure, and not being able to make any more applications prejudiced him.
  3. [69]
    The applicant submits that the recorded phone calls and emails demonstrate a “coordinated, well-disciplined and successfully executed plan by the entire Brisbane Magistrates Court of depriving me of procedural fairness on a total scale”.
  4. [70]
    In my view, there is nothing in any of the material to substantiate any of the applicant’s assertions.
  5. [71]
    At worst, there appears to have been some confusion which does not amount to a plan by the entire Magistrates Court to deprive the applicant of procedural fairness. I have seen nothing to elevate anything to this egregious level.     

The hearing before Magistrate Previtera on 31 March 2022

  1. [72]
    The applicant believes he has been subjected to a number of hearings before magistrates, that were held close together, where they exhibited hostility towards him:

“APPLICANT: The significance is that, if that happens once, it’s - the magistrate might have been having a bad day. But if you have a successive series of magistrates who are prejudicing me…”

  1. [73]
    The applicant further states that:

“APPLICANT:…the trap was set on the 7th of March by Magistrate Coates, and the trap was sprung on the 31st of March by Magistrate Previtera.” 

  1. [74]
    At this hearing on 31 March 2022, Magistrate Previtera read into the record a chronology of the applicant’s matter in the Magistrates Court, including some of the emails that the applicant had sent to the registry.  
  2. [75]
    Magistrate Previtera informed the applicant that, if he was intending to file any further applications, then he should not be permitted to do so, as there was a clear direction made on the 7th of March 2022 that any application needed to be made by the 28th of March 2022.
  3. [76]
    The applicant did not, at this stage, inform the magistrate of the email sent to him by the registry on 11 March 2022. The applicant submits the registry lied to him in this email as they should have informed him that he had to make applications by 28 March 2022. The applicant’s justification for failing to inform the magistrate of the 11 March 2022 email was that:
    1. (a)
      he was busy with a complicated application;
    2. (b)
      he was not going to carry around emails; and
    3. (c)
      he said that “when a person is set up, and they well know that they’ve been set up, they accept that they’ve been set up”.
  4. [77]
    Magistrate Previtera heard the two applications that were before her, namely:
    1. (a)
      an application to re-open the directions hearing of 17 March 2022; and  
    2. (b)
      an application for a permanent stay of the proceedings.  
  5. [78]
    In relation to the first application, Magistrate Previtera acknowledged that this application had previously been refused on 21 March 2022. However, the magistrate determined that given that the applicant was not legally represented, she heard the application again. 
  6. [79]
    The magistrate noted that the applicant had filed an affidavit on 25 March 2022 which set out allegations made by the applicant, including abuses of power by police in relation to misrepresenting:
    1. (a)
      his demeanour at arrest;
    2. (b)
      his criminal antecedents; and
    3. (c)
      historical events.
  7. [80]
    The magistrate noted, in her reasons, that the applicant had the view that where a defendant disputes evidence given by a police officer, this can only mean that the police officer is corrupt, has committed perjury and has otherwise committed several offences. The magistrate stated that the applicant misunderstood the responsibilities of the prosecutorial services and misunderstood, either deliberately or not, the very clear information that has been given to him by the CCC in relation to his complaints.
  8. [81]
    The magistrate noted that the justice system was founded on police making allegations, which they say found a criminal offence, and then defendants coming before the Court to either accept or dispute the allegations.
  9. [82]
    The magistrate found that there was no further material placed before the court since the directions hearing on 17 March 2022 to justify a re-opening of the directions hearing.
  10. [83]
    In relation to the stay application, the magistrate found that the court had no power to stay the proceedings as an abuse of power.
  11. [84]
    The magistrate then went on to note that even if the court had power, then the application for a stay would be refused on the basis that:

“HER HONOUR:…[t]here is insufficient evidence and, indeed, no evidence to justify a stay of proceedings on the basis of an abuse of power, given that all of the alleged abuses of power, alleged criminal offences, alleged misrepresentations that have been made out – sorry – alleged by the defendant, are no more than what occurs in these proceedings as a matter of course, and on that basis, the applications is also refused.”

  1. [85]
    The applicant then made an application on 25 August 2022 for Magistrate Previtera to recuse herself, based upon the 31 March 2022 hearing. Magistrate Previtera dismissed such an application. 
  2. [86]
    The applicant submits to this Court, that:
    1. (a)
      in a continuation of the organised campaign of prejudice conducted by the Brisbane Magistrates Court against the applicant, Magistrate Previtera literally took over the applicant’s matter in the Magistrates Court and has conducted hearings which deny the applicant procedural fairness;
    2. (b)
      Magistrate Previtera exhibits apprehended and actual bias and makes comments that indicate her Honour’s court is a place where corrupt conduct and misconduct from police is normal and everyday behaviour; and
    3. (c)
      Magistrate Previtera’s conduct indicates that no matter what evidence he presents, she will order in the police’s favour.
  3. [87]
    I have considered, in detail, the applicant’s submission that Magistrate Previtera has demonstrated apprehended and/or actual bias at paragraphs [206] to [219] of my reasons and conclude that such allegations are baseless.

Application for re-opening

  1. [88]
    On 4 April 2022, the applicant made an application for re-opening, with the grounds stating:

“I made telephone calls on the 7th/03, 2022, at 322pm and 442pm,

I made a further telephone call on the 9th March 2022 at 1205pm, and another telephone call on the 10th March at 1003am asking what orders, and or what type of hearing was ordered by Her Honour Coates on the 7th March 2022.

I wrote to the registry by email on the

  1. I)
    8th March 2022
  2. II)
    9 March 2022
  3. III)
    10 March 2022 and
  4. IV)
    1st April 2022

asking the same things.

I was only provided the orders on the 4th April 2022, 5 days after the deadline passed for me filing further affidavits.

The Magistrate Court has withheld the Orders, I did not know I now cannot file any further applications, and as outlined in my affidavit filed 25/3/2022, I have further disclosures I’m seeking from Police in order to defend my case.

I only found out I cannot file any more applications on the 31st March when Her Honour told me in Court.

The Magistrates Court has been exceedingly unfair.

The telephone calls are attached to page 1.”

(USB attached to page 1 of the application)

  1. [89]
    The following day, on 5 April 2022, the applicant received an email attaching a letter of refusal regarding his application to re-open matters. It stated that the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington had refused his application.
  2. [90]
    The attached letter stated:

“Reference is made to your application for the re-opening of the above matter received 04.04.2022.

We regret to inform you that the Magistrate has ordered that your application for a Re-opening is REFUSED.

Please note further reasons for refusal by Magistrate;

“APPLICATION REFUSED – Magistrate Previtera has determined matters. Matters remain listed for 14 June 2022.”

If you wish to pursue this matter please seek legal advice.”

  1. [91]
    The applicant makes a number of complaints about this response.
  2. [92]
    The applicant’s primary complaints are that the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington failed to even consider re-opening the hearing, got the name of the magistrate wrong (as the applicant was actually seeking a re-opening of the Magistrate Coates’ hearing on 7 March 2022) and dismissed his reasonable application to re-open the hearing with one a half lines of “nonsensical text”.
  3. [93]
    The applicant submits that by doing this, the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington showed contempt for him, and that this is an element of the overall conspiracy because he was getting very unfair treatment from the magistrates at that time, and ever since.
  4. [94]
    The response by the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington did not show contempt or even indifference towards the applicant. The applicant’s application does not make it clear which magistrate’s order he was seeking to re-open. It certainly does not make it clear that he was seeking to re-open Magistrate Coates’ order.
  5. [95]
    In his application before the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington, the applicant concludes by saying that he only found out that “I cannot file any more applications on the 31st March when Her Honour told me”.
  6. [96]
    On 31 March 2022, the applicant appeared before Magistrate Previtera.
  7. [97]
    Accordingly, it is not surprising that the then Deputy Chief Magistrate Brassington considered this as the order the applicant was seeking to re-open.  
  8. [98]
    The applicant further submits that Chief Magistrate Brassington knew about the conduct of Magistrate Previtera in his matter and has done nothing about it, as Magistrate Previtera continues to preside over his matter.
  9. [99]
    To support this, the applicant refers to a letter from Chief Magistrate Brassington dated 12 July 2022:

“Dear Mr Karamaroudis,

I acknowledge your emails received 7 and 14 June 2022 regarding your request to have Magistrate Previtera and Magistrate Coates recused from hearing your matter.

Since October 2021, you have sent significant correspondence to the Chief Magistrate's Office. I also note the previous correspondence sent to you by former Chief Magistrate Judge Gardiner on 26 November 2021, 31 January 2022, 3 March 2022 and 19 April 2022.

As previously explained to you, as Chief Magistrate, I do not have the power to remove a magistrate from hearing matters. I note your previous application to the Court for Magistrate Previtera to recuse herself was refused on 31 March 2022, with reasons given. Having regard to the previous correspondence sent to you, I do not intend to correspond with you further on this issue.

If you remain dissatisfied with any decision of a magistrate, I recommend you obtain legal advice regarding any remedy you may have.

As your matters are still before the Courts, I do not consider I can assist you further.”

  1. [100]
    The applicant submits that Chief Magistrate Brassington had the power to change the magistrate in his matter pursuant to section 12(2)(c) of the Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld) (the Magistrates Act), but did not, in full knowledge of the situation with Magistrate Previtera. The applicant submits that this prejudiced him.
  2. [101]
    Section 12(2)(c) of the Magistrates Act states:

“Subject to this Act and the Childrens Court Act 1992 and to such consultation with magistrates as the Chief Magistrate considers appropriate and practicable, the Chief Magistrate has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for ensuring the orderly and expeditious exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of Magistrates Courts, and of the Childrens Court when constituted by a Childrens Court magistrate, magistrate or justices, including, for example—

…

  1. (c)
    deciding the magistrates who are to exercise the jurisdiction and powers of Magistrates Courts in particular matters or particular classes of matters…”
  1. [102]
    This section does not give Chief Magistrate Brassington the power to remove a magistrate from hearing matters.
  2. [103]
    In my view, in the circumstances, the letter from Chief Magistrate Brassington to the applicant was entirely appropriate. 

This matter should continue in the Magistrates Court

  1. [104]
    The applicant wants the Supreme Court to hear his committal hearing because the committal process is an important protection for him. He highlighted the High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, where Gleeson CJ said:[6]

“Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.”

  1. [105]
    The applicant submits that the Magistrates Court has demonstrated a conspiracy to prejudice him and that the issues within the committal are outside the scope of the Magistrates Court to deal with in the “current climate of hostility towards me by several magistrates”.
  2. [106]
    The applicant submits that to “remit the matter back to Magistrates Court” would be submitting him to a grave injustice. However, this matter has never been removed from the Magistrates Court; there is nothing to remit back. This matter remains part heard before Magistrate Previtera in relation to an application to cross-examine witnesses at his committal hearing.
  3. [107]
    The Justices Act sets out the statutory regime governing committals in the Magistrates Court. 
  4. [108]
    A magistrate has an overall supervisory responsibility for any committal proceeding coming before a Magistrates Court.[7] The supervisory responsibility includes setting timetables for the committal proceeding.[8]
  5. [109]
    Pursuant to section 83A(5AA) of the Justices Act, a magistrate may, at a direction hearing, give a direction requiring the prosecution to call the maker of a written statement tendered or to be tendered by the prosecution under section 110A(3)—
    1. (a)
      to attend before the court as a witness to give oral evidence; or
    2. (b)
      to be made available for cross-examination on the written statement.
  6. [110]
    However, a magistrate must not make such a direction unless the magistrate is satisfied there are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, the maker should attend to give oral evidence or be made available for cross-examination on the written statement.[9] 
  7. [111]
    Section 110B of the Justices Act sets out the process which the defendant must comply with to make an application to cross-examine witnesses at a committal hearing.
  8. [112]
    In Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors; Palmer v Magistrates Court of Queensland & Ors [2022] QSC 227, Callaghan J stated:[10]
  1. “[60]
    The “processes” in question are those by which a criminal charge is laid by the state against an individual person or corporation. They may appear cumbersome, and their machinations are certain to cause frustration for any individual who feels that they have been accused wrongly. Such individual no doubt believes that their own case is “exceptional” and might be adamant that the “process” is an “abuse”.
  2. [61]
    However, the same procedures apply to every individual and there must be something exceptional about a case to warrant its removal from the mainstream, and its elevation to a forum in which it can receive special consideration.”
  1. [113]
    In Frugtniet v Victoria (1997) 71 ALJR 1598, Kirby J referred to:[11]

“…the strong disposition of appellate courts in Australia…not to interfere in the conduct of criminal trials except in the clearest of cases where the need for such interference is absolutely plain and manifestly required.”

  1. [114]
    In Palmer v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors; Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & ors (2020) 3 QR 546, Fraser JA (with whom Morrison JA and Boddice J agreed) stated:[12]
  1. “[39]
    …More than 35 years ago the Full Court of the Federal Court in Lamb v Moss referred to “a considerable body of authoritative judicial opinion that exceptional circumstances will generally be required before a superior court will consider interfering in committal proceedings, particularly at an interlocutory stage” and, citing a statement by Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam, held that except in special circumstances a failure to permit criminal proceedings to follow their ordinary course will constitute an error of principle. This principle has been repeatedly endorsed, including in many decisions cited by the primary judge.”

(citations omitted)

  1. [115]
    Recently, in Dupois v Queensland Police & anor [2022] QSC 241 (Dupois), Bowskill CJ commented:[13]
  1. “[25]
    In determining this application it is important to keep in mind the nature of a committal hearing. It is essentially an administrative process: an examination of witnesses before a Magistrate for the purpose of finding out if there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial of the defendant on the charge(s) in a higher court. The Magistrate does not give a determination or decision on the case – except if they discharge the defendant on the ground that there is no case.
  2. [26]
    As Fraser JA (with whom Morrison JA and Boddice J agreed) said in Palmer v Magistrates Courts of Queensland, it remains an open question whether the Supreme Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, has the power to grant a stay of committal proceedings. For the purposes of determining the present application, I have proceeded, favourably to the applicant, on the basis that the Court does, in theory, have such power.”

(citations omitted)

  1. [116]
    I, too, have proceeded on the basis that this Court does, in theory, have the power to determine the orders that the applicant seeks. I note that the first respondent submits that this is the case.
  2. [117]
    I note that Bowskill CJ in Dupois highlighted that caution should be adopted when this Court is asked to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to interfere in a committal process:[14]
  1. “[41]
    As already mentioned, it follows from the relevance of the public interest of the community in having those who are charged with criminal offences brought to trial that particular caution ought be adopted when this Court is asked to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to interfere in a committal process.”
  1. [118]
    The parties in this proceeding acknowledged that the Dupois decisions[15] were in the context of an application for a permanent stay of the committal proceedings. However, the principles elucidated are relevant to this matter.
  2. [119]
    In this case, there has not been a decision made about whether the applicant should be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses beyond what has been consented to by the first respondent.
  3. [120]
    In my view, the Magistrates Court, having the overall supervisory responsibility for any committal proceedings, is the forum in which proceedings should remain.
  4. [121]
    Nothing the applicant has raised establishes a need or requirement for the relevant process to trial be interrupted.
  5. [122]
    In this matter, the applicant complains at almost every turn, whether it be about the police, the prosecution, the magistrates, or the entire Magistrates Court. The applicant has also made a complaint about the counsel for the QPS’s written submissions, which states:

“Ultimately suggestions of corruption, coaching and perverting justice (which is submitted is not supported by objective evidence) is not a matter for determination at a hearing in relation to whether leave be given to cross examine at a committal.” 

  1. [123]
    The applicant states that such a submission amounts to a reckless attempt to pervert the course of justice. Counsel for QPS has done no such thing in making this submission. 
  2. [124]
    Counsel for the QPS has correctly characterised that these matters are not to be determined on an application for whether leave should be given to cross-examine at a committal. Even if corruption, coaching and perverting justice could be substantiated, it is not a matter for the magistrate to determine, as an existing fact, on such an application. 
  3. [125]
    An application for leave to cross-examine witnesses at a committal, or even a committal itself, are not roving commissions of inquiry to investigate these matters.
  4. [126]
    The applicant’s application to cross-examine witnesses is part heard. No determination has yet been made about this application (beyond what has been consented to by the QPS) and this matter should continue in the Magistrates Court.
  5. [127]
    In my view, the applicant has not established that there is an organised campaign of prejudice conducted by the Magistrates Court against the applicant. Whilst these propositions are advanced vehemently and repeatedly by the applicant, no proper foundation is discernible for them. It is the applicant’s theory. However, a theory without a basis. In my view, there is no evidence at all to substantiate such an egregious allegation.  

Disqualification of Magistrate Previtera

  1. [128]
    The applicant seeks that the magistrate presently seized of the matter, Magistrate Previtera, be disqualified from further involvement, as she has shown apprehended and actual bias towards him.[16] 

What is apprehended and actual bias?

  1. [129]
    The issue I need to determine is whether the magistrate was biased, whether that be apprehended bias or actual bias. The application to cross-examine witnesses remains part heard before the magistrate and this is not an opportunity for the applicant to conduct an appeal by stealth via such an application to this Court. These proceedings should not be used by the applicant as a vehicle to determine, in any way, the merits of the application to cross-examine witnesses or any of the rulings made by the magistrate.  Adverse rulings or findings, even if demonstrably wrong,[17] by themselves, do not constitute apprehended or actual bias. There needs to be more to meet the test of apprehended and actual bias. Accordingly, I have not addressed the correctness or not, of any of the magistrate’s rulings or findings unless they are relevant to the issue of apprehended bias or actual bias.
  2. [130]
    The test for determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias is “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”.[18] The test of apprehension of bias is objective. It does not require an assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question, as is necessary on an inquiry about actual bias.[19]  
  3. [131]
    The High Court in Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 95 ALJR 824 set out the two step process required:[20]

“Where, as here, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge, the applicable principles are well established, and they were not in dispute. The apprehension of bias principle is that “a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”. The principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, reflecting a requirement fundamental to the common law system of adversarial trial – that it is conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal. Its application requires two steps: first, “it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge ... to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits”; and, second, there must be articulated a “logical connection” between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits. Once those two steps are taken, the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias can then ultimately be assessed.” 

(citations omitted)

  1. [132]
    If the possibility of such a reasonable apprehension does not exist, then it will not suffice that there might be a reasonable apprehension that the magistrate will decide an issue or issues adversely to the applicant.[21]
  2. [133]
    The application of the test uses the touchstone of the “fair-minded lay observer” and that person’s reasonable apprehension. In Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213, Bond J (as he then was) summarised the application of this test:[22]
  1. “(a)
    The fair-minded lay observer has attributed to him or her awareness of and a fair understanding of the nature of the decision, the context in which it was made, and the circumstances leading up to the decision.
  2. (b)
    The fair-minded lay observer has attributed to him or her knowledge that the judge is a professional lawyer, whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial, with the result that a conclusion that there is a reasonable apprehension that the judge might be biased should not be drawn lightly. The observer does not have attributed to him or her knowledge of the character or the ability of the particular judge concerned.
  3. (c)
    The fair-minded lay observer does not have attributed to him or her a detailed knowledge of the law, but the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice, taking into account the exigencies of modern litigation.”

(citations omitted)

  1. [134]
    Actual bias, on the other hand, requires proof that a decision-maker in fact approached the issues with a closed mind or had prejudged them such that she or he was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.”[23]
  2. [135]
    In Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98,[24] Gleeson JA (Emmett JA and Tobias AJA agreeing) summarised the relevant principles in relation to actual bias: 
  1. “[68]
    A finding of actual bias is a grave matter. Authority requires that an allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved; that such a finding should not be made lightly; and that cogent evidence is required.
  2. [69]
    Where the issue is actual bias in the form of prejudgment, the appellant had to establish that the primary judge was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia.
  3. [70]
    As Gleeson CJ and Gummow J observed in that case at [71]:

“The question is not whether a decision-maker’s mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion.”

  1. [71]
    In the same case, Hayne J noted at [185] the several distinct elements underlying the assertion that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, or the assertion that there is a real likelihood that a reasonable observer might reach that conclusion. The first is the contention that the decision-maker has an opinion on a relevant aspect of the matter in issue in the particular case. The second is the contention that the decision-maker will apply that opinion to the matter in issue. The third is the contention that a decision-maker will do so without giving the matter fresh consideration in light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case.
  2. [72]
    His Honour observed at [186] that allegations of actual bias through prejudgment often fail at the third step he had identified. This was because notwithstanding whatever expression of preconceived opinions by the decision-maker, it does not follow that the evidence will be disregarded.
  3. [73]
    The test of actual bias in the form of prejudgment requires an assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question. However, actual bias need not be confined to an intentional state of mind. Bias may be subconscious, provided it is real. As Finkelstein J said in Bilgin v Minister at 290:

“The wrong involved is the failure to decide a case impartially. Whether that failure was deliberate or not should be beside the point insofar as the validity of the decision is concerned.”

(citations omitted)

The application for the magistrate to recuse herself

  1. [136]
    The applicant made an application on 25 August 2022 for Magistrate Previtera to recuse herself, relying on the 31 March 2022 hearing, in particular:
    1. (a)
      the fact the magistrate had not viewed the evidence found within the USB exhibits to his affidavits;
    2. (b)
      the magistrate’s request for submissions and not repeating the evidence;
    3. (c)
      the magistrate’s comments that she had the evidence and read it “over and over and for hours and hours and hours”;
    4. (d)
      the magistrate’s comments to the application that “just because you disagree with the evidence that the police have put before the court doesn’t mean that there’s been corruption, coaching, perverting the course of justice [sic]”;
    5. (e)
      the above comments were said in the presence, according to the applicant, of evidence supporting allegations of corruption, coaching and perverting the course of justice which the learned magistrate refused to acknowledge;
    6. (f)
      the magistrate’s comments that allegations made by the applicant may be considered libellous and are “at least, inflammatory” and irrelevant to the proceedings;
    7. (g)
      the magistrate misquoted a letter from the CCC and effectively said that the CCC are not investigating the applicant’s allegations against police officers; and
    8. (h)
      the submission that the magistrate has ignored corrupt conduct from the police.
  2. [137]
    The magistrate heard the application for recusal on 25 August 2022 and refused it.  The applicant also complains about the magistrate’s conduct on this day.
  3. [138]
    The applicant has made many complaints about Magistrate Previtera in his written submissions, including that:
  1. “13.
    Similarly, Magistrate Previtera has made comment that the correspondence from the CCC confirming misconduct or corrupt conduct from the arresting officer has no relevance, no bearing, or has no weight in a proceeding where impugning the credit of a witness is of prime importance, and where I have specified that I wish to cross examine on the issue of credit.
  2. 14.
    As a result of this extraordinary level of both apprehended25 and actual bias, Magistrate previtera ought to be disqualified from further hearing the matter.
  3. 15.
    It appears that magistrate Previtera has breached section 15(1) and section 15(2) of the Crime and Corruption Act by making this comment and her Honour ought to be referred to the Chief Justice for referral to the CCC.
  4. 16.
    By making this comment, magistrate has exhibit both apprehended  and actual Bias  and ought to be disqualified from further hearing the Applicants matter.
  5. 17.
    Firstly, by changing the meaning of a letter from the CCC by adding words to it in order to remove the power from it, secondly by stating words to the effect that if the CCC associate a police officer with corrupt conduct or misconduct then that has no bearing or relevance for justification to cross examine that police officer pursuant to s110b justices act in an application where the accused cites credibility as an issue in accordance with s110B(3)(a)(iii), thirdly by creating processes and practices that prevent consideration of material the applicant filed in order to impugn the credibility of the arresting officer that exist only in her Honours mind it clearly shows that magistrate previtera has not only prejudged the outcome of the application in that the arresting officer will not be cross examined on issues of credit involving illegalities, but that her Honour is protecting corrupt police.
  6. 18.
    In addition, her Honour has stated words to the effect that the corrupt conduct of police I've reported to the court, is nnormal behaviour in her court, and is a matter of course.
  7. 19.
    By comments her Honour made in relation to her Honours refusal to consider USB evidence before or after hearings is indicative of criminal behaviour in that if the material is not considered, then no finding of corruption can be made.
  8. 20.
    When her Honour stopped watching the USB evidence, and stopped the parties from watching it, it appears she created a new law to justify doing so.

…

  1. 23.
    Magistrate Previtera has invented laws to justify the non-viewing of material which incriminates police officers.”
  1. [139]
    Whilst the applicant, throughout his material and submissions, raises a variety of complaints about Magistrate Previtera, there are three consistent complaints about how the magistrate dealt with:
    1. (a)
      correspondence from the CCC to the applicant.
    2. (b)
      material filed by the applicant on USB; and
    3. (c)
      what the applicant regards as corrupt conduct from the police.

Correspondence from the CCC to the applicant

  1. [140]
    A key part of the applicant’s submissions relates to correspondence between him and the CCC.
  2. [141]
    The background to this is that over the period of May 2021 to April 2022, the applicant corresponded with the CCC. In particular, the applicant highlighted four pieces of correspondence from the CCC in his material,[25] including:
    1. (a)
      a letter dated 31 January 2022, which sets out a summary of the applicant’s concerns and advised that the CCC would not be taking any further action;
    2. (b)
      a letter dated 25 February 2022, which advised that the CCC would not engage in further communication with the applicant;
    3. (c)
      an email dated 22 March 2022, which advised that the CCC would not be taking any further action in relation to the applicant’s concerns as expressed in his online lodgement form to the CCC dated 22 February 2022; and
    4. (d)
      a letter dated 19 May 2022, which advised that the CCC refused the applicant’s request for a Complaint Service Review.
  3. [142]
    In relation to this correspondence the applicant claims that the CCC have confirmed police misconduct and it is relevant to show that the police have conducted a campaign to discriminate against him from the very start. He further states that:
    1. (a)
      the letter dated 31 January 2022 is written “ambiguously” and is “an attempt by the CCC to paint several officers with the weakest shade of corrupt paint possible”; and
    2. (b)
      the letter dated 25 February 2022 “confirms several police officers were investigated and that the reason that no action is being taken against them…is because they are to provide input into my matter as it has prerogative…”
  4. [143]
    I do not consider the letter dated 31 January 2022 to be written ambiguously. This letter states in no ambiguous terms that:

“The CCC will not be taking any further action on the concerns you have raised in your recent correspondence. Whilst the concerns you raise (specifically about QPS prosecutors and SCON Barker), could be considered as meeting the threshold of corrupt conduct or police misconduct under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (the Act), the CCC has decided to take no further action as it is an unjustifiable use of resources to do so. The concerns you raise about Power and the ESC’s handling of your complaints have also bee addressed below.

In relation to allegations about the conduct of QPS prosecutors during court proceedings, the CCC considers that the allegations are likely to be in issue as part of the proceedings…The CCC notes that ultimately, the courts have a responsibility to hear and determine the facts or the evidence provided by both QPS Prosecution and yourself.

In relation to your concerns about SCON Barker (i.e. complaint lodgement form ref: 1636678557), the CC considers that her statement in a bail affidavit that your demeanour during arrest was ‘erratic, enraged and unstable’ on 25 March 2021 is ultimately one to be heard and reviewed by the presiding judge as part of court proceedings. The CCC notes that SCON Barker is entitled to assess your demeanour during your arrest based on her observations and experience much like you are able to deny that your demeanour was that as described by the SCON. As aforementioned, it is the responsibility of the court to hear evidence in relation to charges against you and any context provided by arresting QPS officers before making a decision on the matter. Noting this, the CCC will be taking no further action on the matter.

In relation to concerns about your interaction with Power from the ESC of QPS on 8 October 2021 and the ESC’s overall handling of the complaints you made in late June 2021, the CCC does not consider the conduct as you have described as such that it constitutes corrupt conduct and(or) police misconduct under the Act…”

  1. [144]
    On the basis of this letter the applicant informed the magistrate that:

“APPLICANT: The prosecution case against me is fundamentally defective. I submit that no piece of evidence prepared and tendered by the arresting officer is admissible and that it was prepared by the infected hand of a criminally corrupt police officer. The evidence shows that the CCC agrees that the arresting officer Samantha Louise Parker is either corrupt or in fact misconduct.”

  1. [145]
    The letter from the CCC dated 31 January 2022 states no such thing and the magistrate told the applicant:

“HER HONOUR: Well, can I just ask you, Mr Karamaroudis, that when you’re making submissions, that you actually make correct submissions, because what you’ve said is not the same as what is in this letter. Okay. You’ve said that the CCC have substantiated your complaints. They haven’t. they’ve said  it could be considered as meeting the threshold of corrupt conduct or police misconduct but no further action will be taken. That’s what the letter says. Lets be clear.”

  1. [146]
    The applicant’s assertions regarding the 25 February 2022 letter are similarly incorrect. The letter dated 25 February does not validate allegations of corruption against QPS officers. Instead, the letter advises that the allegations of corrupt conduct “would, if proven, amount to corrupt conduct [emphasis added]”, however the information the applicant provided “is insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that the alleged conduct has actually occurred”.
  2. [147]
    Later there was a further interaction between the magistrate and the applicant in relation to the CCC letter dated 31 January 2022 and what it meant:

“HER HONOUR: - - - could be considered as meeting the threshold of corrupt conduct or police misconduct, the CCC has decided to take no further action as it is an unjustifiable use of resources to do so.

DEFENDANT: Okay. So now, I refer you to the affi - - -

HER HONOUR: If they had said, "The concerns do meet the threshold of corrupt conduct", that would be different, in which case, I suspect, they would be investigating.

DEFENDANT: Okay, so - - -

HER HONOUR: But they don't - - -

DEFENDANT: Okay.

HER HONOUR: - - - consider them other than "meeting the threshold".

DEFENDANT: Okay.

HER HONOUR: So move on to your next point - - -

DEFENDANT: Okay.

HER HONOUR: - - - because 1 am not going to be persuaded - - -

DEFENDANT: Yeah. Well, that's fine. Okay. On the 10th of- - -

HER HONOUR: - - - in my decision about that paragraph.

DEFENDANT: All right. But I don't think you're going to be persuaded. I think you've already decided what you're going to do.”

  1. [148]
    The applicant also stated that the CCC informed him in a telephone call that there would be no further action taken because his matter is outstanding.
  2. [149]
    The magistrate pointed out that the letter did not say that the CCC are “going to wait until these proceedings are over and then we’re going to investigate the police”.  
  3. [150]
    Clearly, during the 31 March hearing, the magistrate and the applicant each had a different interpretation of the CCC correspondence. The magistrate’s view is clearly open on the evidence.
  4. [151]
    In her decision as to whether she should recuse herself on 25 August 2022, Magistrate Previtera made the following comment regarding the 31 January CCC letter:

“HER HONOUR:…There was a large amount of time spent on the last occasion discussing the letter from the CCC. It came down to a matter of interpretation. I made a decision then to interpret that communication in the manner in which I considered was set out quite clearly in the correspondence. Mr Karamaroudis took a different interpretation of that. Whether or not the CCC has investigated and found issues with the police is not relevant to whether or not the police should be cross-examined in relation to matters in their affidavits within the parameters of the practice directions and sections 110 and 85AA of the Justices Act in relation to the application before the court today.”

  1. [152]
    The applicant submits that the magistrate’s comment that “whether or not the CCC has investigated and found issues with the police is not relevant to whether or not the police should be cross-examined…” demonstrates an extraordinary level of apprehended and actual bias.
  2. [153]
    The applicant highlights that this is a proceeding where impugning the credit of a witness is of prime importance, and where he has specified that he wishes to cross-examine on the issue of credit.
  3. [154]
    The magistrate has taken a view of the letter that is different to the applicant. As I have already stated, the magistrate’s view on the correspondence is clearly open on the evidence.
  4. [155]
    Notwithstanding what the applicant vehemently and repeatedly submits, I note that the CCC letter did not state that police misconduct or corrupt conduct had been proven. Meeting a threshold level does not equate with proof that the conduct has occurred. There have been no findings of misconduct or corrupt conduct.
  5. [156]
    Accordingly, there is limited, or no relevance, in cross-examining the arresting officer about this correspondence from the CCC. Indeed, the applicant at the hearing, seemed to acknowledge this:

“APPLICANT:   I mean, because they’re not denying - they’re saying that - they’re saying that it could - that it meets the threshold for misconduct, but they’re also saying they’re not going to do anything about it.  And why I’m - the reason why I’m leading the court to this evidence is in an attempt to show the court that the CCC have confirmed that it’s misconduct.

HER HONOUR:   How - none of this - this is not relevant to your stalking charge in any way, shape or form, is it?

APPLICANT:   Yes, it is.

HER HONOUR:   How?

APPLICANT:   Because it’s a - it’s - it’s indicative of - it’s an element in a broad campaign to injure me by the Queensland Police.  It’s - it’s relevant because - - -

HER HONOUR:   How would this evidence be admissible on your trial, if you could get it?  How?  How would it be admissible?

APPLICANT:   Because I could use it to show that the police have conducted a campaign to - to - to discriminate against me from the very start.  From the very start.  From even - - -

HER HONOUR:   So that’s what you would say.

APPLICANT:   - - - from five months before my arrest.  Yes.

HER HONOUR:   You would say - and you would say it would be admissible.

APPLICANT:   I don’t know.

HER HONOUR:   Okay.

APPLICANT:   I think - - -

HER HONOUR:   Well, I just want to know how you - - -

APPLICANT:   - - - you would probably know more about that than me.

HER HONOUR:   Well, I’m struggling to see how this would be admissible in your trial, or how it has any relevance to your trial.  That’s why I’m wanting to know how you say that this has got any relevance to your application - your original application.

APPLICANT:   I see, in relation to joining.  Yes.  Well, in the words of my friend, it is what it is.  So - - -

HER HONOUR:   Okay.  So - - -

APPLICANT:   I have no more to say on it.

HER HONOUR:   When you say it is what it is, is that an acknowledgement that it              doesn’t?

APPLICANT:   That is a white flag waving surrender, your Honour.”

  1. [157]
    The magistrate’s view of the relevance of the CCC correspondence, as to whether or not the police should be cross-examined on this material, is clearly open on the material and does not in any way demonstrate actual or apprehended bias against the applicant.

The applicant’s USB material

  1. [158]
    The applicant submits that Magistrate Previtera created processes and practices which prevented consideration of material the applicant filed in order to impugn the credibility of the arresting officer “that exist only in her Honour’s mind”.
  2. [159]
    The applicant further submits that Magistrate Previtera has not only prejudged the outcome of the application in that the arresting officer will not be cross-examined on issues of credit involving illegalities, but that she is also protecting corrupt police.
  3. [160]
    This submission appears to relate to Magistrate Previtera’s approach to material the applicant filed on USBs which contained a number of recordings.
  4. [161]
    In relation to the 31 March 2022 hearing, whilst the magistrate indicated that she had not viewed the recordings, it is important to note that she was dealing with an application to re-open an earlier direction hearing regarding disclosure and an application to permanently stay proceedings which she found that did not have the power to do.
  5. [162]
    On 25 August 2022, the magistrate indicated that she had not viewed the recordings prior to the court hearing.
  6. [163]
    The applicant submits that the magistrate’s refusal to consider USB evidence before or after hearings is indicative of criminal behaviour because, in his submission, if the material was not considered, then no finding of corruption can be made.
  7. [164]
    The applicant also submits that in stopping watching the USB evidence in court and preventing the parties from doing so, the magistrate appeared to create a new law to justify doing so.
  8. [165]
    There is no bases to any of the applicant’s submissions about how the magistrate dealt with the recordings on the USB.
  9. [166]
    The magistrate made it clear to the applicant that the reason that she had not seen the videos was that it would be inappropriate for her to view the videos in the privacy of her chambers without the prosecution having already also seen what was on them.
  10. [167]
    A number of recordings were then played in the court.
  11. [168]
    After the footage of the watchhouse began playing, Magistrate Previtera stopped the recording.  A lengthy exchange then occurred between the applicant and the magistrate about the relevance of the recordings in relation to the cross-examination of the arresting officer.  The magistrate made it clear that she was only going to watch footage or listen to audio that showed the arresting officer on screen or on audio.
  12. [169]
    The applicant wanted the magistrate to watch footage taken of him at the watchhouse as he stated it contradicted the arresting officer’s affidavit.
  13. [170]
    The arresting officer objected to the applicant’s bail, and in her affidavit states: 

“Whilst conducting the search at the defendant’s address, the defendant was visibly enraged by police presence and made comment about going to the victim’s address to assault her husband.

This rage did not subside over the time period he has been in custody…”

  1. [171]
    The applicant told the magistrate that the video impugns the arresting officer’s credit and shows her criminality in making a false affidavit.
  2. [172]
    The magistrate stated that such evidence was not relevant to the application and that she was not interested in the bail affidavit, because that was not the arresting officer’s statement in relation to the offence of stalking. The applicant responded that the magistrate stopped the recording because it was evidence of police corruption, and that “this court suppresses police corruption”.
  3. [173]
    However, the magistrate then informed the applicant that she was proceeding on the basis that the applicant was not visibly enraged.
  4. [174]
    In my view, considering how the applicant behaved before her, the magistrate in the circumstances showed remarkable patience with him. 
  5. [175]
    The magistrate had a significant amount of material in relation to the applications, which she indicated she had read before the hearing. 
  6. [176]
    A magistrate not viewing recordings prior to a hearing is an entirely conventional practice. It is not, as the applicant asserts, indicative of criminal behaviour in that if the material is not considered, then no finding of corruption can be made.
  7. [177]
    The magistrate then began watching the videos and listening to recordings she considered relevant to the hearing listed on 26 August 2022; she did this in court and with the parties present.
  8. [178]
    I accept that this approach was appropriate because the magistrate was allowing the applicant to play his recordings, as long as they were relevant to the application to cross-examine the arresting officer. In relation to relevance, the magistrate confined the recordings to ones which involved a witness who the applicant sought to cross-examine.
  9. [179]
    However, the magistrate was prepared to proceed on the basis that the applicant was not visibly enraged in the watchhouse video. Such a position is contrary to the arresting officer’s affidavit opposing the applicant’s bail. Counsel for the first respondent agrees that the watchhouse video does not meet the descriptions as set out by the arresting officer in her affidavit opposing the applicant’s bail:

“HER HONOUR:   So what we’ve seen here, at the watch-house, doesn’t entirely meet the description as set out in the bail affidavit.  Do you agree with that?

MR BONASIA:   I do.

HER HONOUR:   Okay.

MR BONASIA:   And all the other audio and footage that I was able to observe once Mr Karamaroudis was put into the cell, can I say, seemed to be quite pleasant from him - - -

HER HONOUR:   Okay.

MR BONASIA:   - - - and quite calm.

HER HONOUR:   Thank you.

MR BONASIA:   He spoke to his cellmate in a respectful way.  In fact, he was almost comforting the cellmate, and at one point when the cellmate was asleep, police delivered a blanket, and Mr Karamaroudis placed the blanket on the cellmate.  So there was conversations during the night over the intercom with police, where Mr Karamaroudis was critical of the police in the seizing of his phone and how he wanted his phone back, and what the phone may or may not show in support of the brief of evidence.  But otherwise, I certainly - if I was to make the submission, I would not have described him as - - -

HER HONOUR:   As that.

MR BONASIA:   - - - as high as it was in that bail affidavit.

HER HONOUR:   Yes.  It’s actually not a submission, though.  It’s an affidavit, isn’t it?

MR BONASIA:   Yes.”

  1. [180]
    This application is still ongoing, and the magistrate has yet to consider all of the applicant’s submissions and evidence. It will ultimately be a matter for the magistrate to consider whether these matters raised by the applicant in relation to the arresting officer’s credit are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, the arresting officer should be made available for cross-examination.
  2. [181]
    This application has not been finalised, and the magistrate has not yet made a final decision in relation to these issues.

Magistrate Previtera has not equated corrupt conduct with normal behaviour

  1. [182]
    The applicant submits that Magistrate Previtera stated words to the effect that the corrupt conduct of police the applicant has reported to the court is “normal behaviour in her court and is a matter of course”.
  2. [183]
    On 31 March 2022, during the applicant’s submissions, Magistrate Previtera stated:

“HER HONOUR:  - - - Karamaroudis, I'm concerned that what you fail to understand is that the police make allegations in relation to matters that they charge defendants with, and invariably there is a contest between the allegations that the police make and that the defence make. That is normal. We see it every day. So just because you disagree with the evidence that the police have put before the court doesn't mean that there's been corruption, coaching, perverting the course of justice.

DEFENDANT: But I can prove those things.

HER HONOUR: I mean, it's normal. It's called the criminal justice system.

DEFENDANT: Yeah, but I can - - -

HER HONOUR: I mean - - -

DEFENDANT: I - - -

HER HONOUR: - - - if people didn't contest what the police are saying, I'd be out of a job.

DEFENDANT: But I can - - -

HER HONOUR: That's the way the criminal justice system works.

DEFENDANT: Yeah, but - - -

HER HONOUR: The police make allegations, and defendants disagree - - -”

  1. [184]
    Magistrate Previtera repeated this position in her reasons.
  2. [185]
    The applicant submits that these comments by the magistrate are “very telling” because he believes that it is evidence of an unnatural relationship between the QPS and Magistrate Previtera.
  3. [186]
    These comments by Magistrate Previtera do not in any way equate corrupt police conduct with being normal behaviour, nor are such comments evidence of a symbiotic relationship linking the magistrate with the QPS.
  4. [187]
    Magistrate Previtera was properly informing the applicant that when defendants disagree with the prosecution case that does not automatically mean that there has been corruption, coaching and/or perverting the course of justice. The magistrate was observing that it is a normal and everyday occurrence for defendants to disagree with allegations and the prosecution case.
  5. [188]
    Taken in their proper context, there was nothing remarkable about the magistrate’s comments.  Further, a hearing in relation to whether leave should be given to cross-examine witnesses at a committal is not a miniature trial where matters of corruption, coaching and perverting justice are ultimately determined.

Magistrate Previtera’s characterisation of the applicant’s allegations

  1. [189]
    On 31 March 2022 Magistrate Previtera ruled on the application for a permanent stay of proceedings where she observed that:

“HER HONOUR:…He, in this court’s view, has the view that in any situation where a defendant disputes evidence given by a police officer that that can only mean that the police officer is corrupt, has committed perjury and has otherwise committed several offences.  He misunderstands, in this court’s view, after an extensive and, I might say, hearing exceeding two hours of discussions and submissions made by and with the defendant, the justice system, that the justice system is founded on police making allegations which they say found a criminal offence, and defendants come before the Court to either accept or dispute the allegations.

The disputing of allegations made by police against defendants forms the foundation of the justice system, and if there was or needed to be agreement with everything the police did, then we would not have the justice system.  So the defendant has interpreted that every allegation made by police against him which he disputes has occurred is, therefore, evidence of corruption, criminal offences and abuse of process.  He misunderstands the responsibilities of the prosecutorial services.”

  1. [190]
    The magistrate then later went on to comment that:

“HER HONOUR: Mr Karamaroudis then goes on to make numbers ---

MR KARAMAROUDIS: Just end it, your Honour.  Let’s go home.

HER HONOUR: --- of bald statements about police corruption in relation to which there is no objective evidence, and indeed, nothing more than Mr Karamaroudis’ opinion of what he says ---

MR KARAMAROUDIS: What about the film?

HER HONOUR:  --- is conduct ---

MR KARAMAROUDIS: What about the film, what about the footage, what about the phone calls.?

HER HONOUR: --- of the police giving rise to conduct for which there is no evidence.  He has made allegations which may, in fact, be considered to be libellous.  They are at – at least, inflammatory.  They are certainly irrelevant to the proceedings before the court, given that there are complaints made, witness statements given.”

  1. [191]
    The magistrate then went on to state that the applicant had also made allegations against police about delays. The magistrate acknowledged these delays were conceded in relation to the order made by Acting Magistrate Byrne on 17 March 2022.  However, the magistrate did also note that some of the delays also were because the applicant made allegations against his legal representatives who he accused of working with the police or being connected with the prosecution, all of which she found that there was no evidence to substantiate. 
  2. [192]
    In making these remarks, the magistrate was commenting on the many unfounded assertions of corrupt conduct that the applicant made without a basis, particularly in relation to a number of bald statements about police corruption in relation to which there was no objective evidence. The magistrate did not particularise which “bald statements about police corruption in relation to which there is no objective evidence” she was referring to.
  3. [193]
    The magistrate did not make any finding that allegations were libellous. Rather she characterised them as allegations “which may, in fact, considered to be libellous”. The magistrate did find that they were inflammatory. However, in the magistrate’s view they were irrelevant to the two applications that she was dealing with on 31 March 2022. 
  4. [194]
    The applicant does not particularise how these comments by the magistrate amount to apprehended or actual bias.
  5. [195]
    In my view, these comments do not amount to any pre-judgment whereby they might lead the magistrate to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. As Jackson J stated in Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 249:[26]

“In a pre-judgment case, the necessary logical connection is established for “a judge who has found a state of affairs to exist, or who has come to a clear view about the credit of a witness”. Whether a judge’s finding or view is of that kind can be a matter on which reasonable minds differ, as the judgments in the leading case of British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie illustrate, both in the High Court21 and in the courts below. This may be so, notwithstanding that the finding of a reasonable apprehension of bias in a pre-judgment case must be “firmly established” before recusal is required.”

(citations omitted)

  1. [196]
    In relation to the part heard application on 25 August 2022, the issue to be determined is whether the magistrate is satisfied that there are substantial reasons why, in the interests of justice, that three witnesses should be cross-examined on topics as set out by the applicant. The resolution of this question does not require the magistrate to make any assessment or findings of credit in relation to the applicant.
  2. [197]
    The magistrate will have to determine whether leave should be given to cross-examine the arresting officer in relation to her credit. For example, in the arresting officer’s affidavit opposing bail she states that the applicant was enraged.  The applicant states this is contradicted by the watchhouse video. The magistrate has already acknowledged that she will proceed on a basis that appears to be contrary to this affidavit. It will be, as I have already stated, a matter for the magistrate to determine whether this amounts to a substantial reason why, in the interests of justice, the arresting officer should be cross-examined.
  3. [198]
    These comments made by the magistrate on 31 March 2022 do not amount to an appearance of bias, or actual bias, against the applicant.
  4. [199]
    On the basis of these comments, a fair-minded observer would not conclude that the magistrate’s comments on 31 March 2022 amount to findings that a state of affairs existed, so that they might reasonably apprehend that the magistrate might not bring an impartial mind to determining whether the applicant should get leave to cross-examine the three witnesses on the topics he proposes.
  5. [200]
    Further, such comments do not prove that the magistrate has approached the issue of whether the applicant is given leave to cross-examine with a closed mind or has prejudged the application such that the magistrate was committed to refusing the application, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.

Magistrate Previtera has not deliberately caused unwarranted delays

  1. [201]
    The applicant submits that Magistrate Previtera has been ordering unwarranted delays.
  2. [202]
    To support this submission, the applicant referred to his affidavit dated 1 November 2022. This affidavit appears to contain further submissions rather than evidence but does refer to some evidence exhibited to the affidavit.
  3. [203]
    The point the applicant makes in his affidavit is that he interprets the 31 January CCC letter to contain words to the effect that the Court will take action against corrupt police officers at the conclusion of his matter.
  4. [204]
    The applicant, in his affidavit, states:
  1. “71.
    In the time period between 31 March 2022 when Magistrate Previtera started hearing the matter and 25 August 2022, the date of the last hearing, Magistrate Previtera, or her assistant directly working with a Magistrate on 7 July 2022 have facilitated adjournments totalling 7 months and 12 days. The date of the next hearing is 12 November 2022.
  2. 72.
    As evidenced by Exhibit TK-3 of Affidavit of Applicant number 2 filed 31 October 2022 on page 54 the transcript , the prosecutor only sought 5 weeks adjournment till the next date.
  3. 73.
    As evidenced by Exhibit TK-1 of Affidavit of Applicant number 2 filed 31 March 2022on page 57, line 41 of the transcript, Previtera ordered a 10 week adjournment,
  4. 74.
    As evidenced by Exhibit 6, TK-1 page 34 of the transcript, line 20, I asked for one days adjournment, and by line 31 , the prosecutor asked for no length of time for an adjournment, and her honour ordered 3.5 months.
  5. 75.
    In the time period between 31 March 2022 when Magistrate Previtera started hearing the matter and 25 August 2022, the date of the last hearing, the police prosecutors had asked for a total of five weeks in adjournments,
  6. 76.
    On the 31 March 2022 the police prosecutor asked for five weeks and on the 25 August 2022 they asked for no specific amount of time.
  7. 77.
    In the time period between 31 March 2022 when Magistrate Previtera started hearing the matter and 25 August 2022 , the date of the last hearing, I have asked for, and received 2 adjournments.
  8. 78.
    The first time was on 18 May 2022, and received a 3 weeks adjournment in order to advise a Legal Aid solicitor.
  9. 79.
    The second time was on August 25 2022, when I asked for a one day adjournment due to a severe bout of asthma.
  10. 80.
    Combined, the parties have asked for 2 months and 1 days since March 31 2022

Delay ordered by proxy

  1. 81.
    On 7 July 2022 at the Magistrates Court, the Magistrate refused to hear the matter altogether.”
  1. [205]
    Taking all of this into account, there have not been unwarranted delays as a result of Magistrate Previtera.  Indeed, there has been many delays since 31 January 2022 which have been caused by the applicant.

Magistrate Previtera has not demonstrated apprehended or actual bias

  1. [206]
    This matter is still part heard before Magistrate Previtera and the applicant is still working through the issues and presenting his case. There has been no determination in relation to applicant’s application to cross-examination the three witnesses. 
  2. [207]
    The applicant states that Magistrate Previtera has demonstrated apprehended or actual bias against him. This characterisation of the magistrate’s conduct is demonstrated by the applicant’s view that the magistrate is in a symbiotic relationship with the police or that she is part of an organised campaign of prejudice conducted by the Brisbane Magistrates Court. There is no evidence of any of this.
  3. [208]
    As Bond J stated in Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors:[27]

“What is required for justice to be seen to be done is that it must be apparent to the fair-minded lay observer that the judge will bring to the resolution of the issues an impartial and unprejudiced mind which will decide the issues according to their factual and legal merits. If such an observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not do that, then a case of apprehended bias is established. But if the possibility of such a reasonable apprehension does not exist, it will not suffice that there might be a reasonable apprehension that the judge will decide an issue or issues adversely to one party.”

(citation omitted)

  1. [209]
    The test is expressed in terms of a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind. However, it is clear that the law requires that proposition to be “firmly established” before a judge or magistrate should be disqualified.[28]
  2. [210]
    I have considered the applicant’s array of complaints about Magistrate Previtera in light of the two step process required for apprehended bias:
    1. (a)
      first, “it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge ... to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits”; and
    2. (b)
      second, there must be articulated a “logical connection” between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits.
  3. [211]
    In doing so, I have concluded that the applicant’s asserted apprehension of bias is unreasonable and unfounded in the circumstances.  In my view there is no logical connection between the many complaints raised by the applicant about the magistrate and the feared departure from the magistrate deciding the application to cross-examine witnesses on its merits.
  4. [212]
    Considering the issues raised by the applicant, either individually or cumulatively, they would not cause a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably suspect that the learned magistrate did not approach the application for leave to cross-examine hearing with objectivity and detachment and without any element of pre-judgement. 
  5. [213]
    I am not satisfied that anything the applicant has raised might lead the magistrate to decide the question otherwise than on its legal and factual matters. I have considered whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the magistrate might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of whether there are substantial reasons, and why, in the interests of justice, witnesses should be made available for cross-examination on the topics set out by the applicant. I am not so satisfied.
  6. [214]
    In relation to actual bias, such a finding is a grave matter. Cogent evidence is required, and an allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proven. 
  7. [215]
    In this case, the applicant has not satisfied me that the magistrate was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented”.[29]
  8. [216]
    This matter is still part heard before Magistrate Previtera and the applicant is still working through the issues and presenting his case. There has been no determination in relation to applicant’s application to cross-examination the three witnesses. 
  9. [217]
    I note that there have been occasions where the magistrate has disagreed with the applicant’s submissions, ruled against him, and become frustrated with his conduct; none of which amounts to apprehended or actual bias.
  10. [218]
    Indeed, in the circumstances, Magistrate Previtera has treated the applicant fairly and with patience in trying to keep the proceedings on track, as to the matters that are required to be determined, for each application.
  11. [219]
    The applicant has not satisfied me that the magistrate was biased, whether that be apprehended bias or actual bias. 

Conclusion

  1. [220]
    For the reasons set out, the applicant’s originating application must be dismissed.

Costs

  1. [221]
    I will give the parties an opportunity to consider these reasons before they are required to file and serve short written submissions on the question of costs. I encourage the parties to agree on an order for costs.
  2. [222]
    However, if this cannot occur, the parties should, within fourteen days, agree on a timetable for the exchange of written submissions and advise the court accordingly. If it is appropriate, I will then deal with the question of costs on the papers, unless either party requests a hearing. In order to facilitate that process, I will adjourn the question of costs to a date to be fixed.

Orders

  1. Leave to amend the originating application is refused.
  2. The originating application is dismissed.
  3. The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Footnotes

[1]The application also sought other relief which has become irrelevant by the events in this matter, i.e. that a hearing listed on 10 November 2022 in the Magistrates Court be vacated.

[2]Pursuant to section 110B(3) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

[3]It was agreed by the parties at the hearing that the most efficient way to deal with this issue was to hear all the applicant’s submissions and if in my view I accepted that it was necessary to hear from the proposed respondents, then I would adjourn the matter to give them the opportunity to provide submissions. In the end, this was not required as I have dismissed the application.

[4][2021] NSWCA 97 at [40].

[5][2022] QSC 81 at [46].

[6](2003) 214 CLR 1 at 14. The applicant also raised Barton v R [1980] HCA 48.

[7]Section 103B(1) Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

[8]Section 103B(2) Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

[9]Section 110B(1) Justices Act 1886 (Qld).

[10][2022] QSC 227 at [60]–[61].

[11](1997) 71 ALJR 1598 at 1602.

[12](2020) 3 QR 546 at [39].

[13][2022] QSC 241 at [41].

[14]Dupois v Queensland Police & anor [2022] QSC 241 at [41].

[15]Dupois v Queensland Police & anor [2022] QSC 241; Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 137; Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 240.

[16]Relying on section 58 of the Constitution of Queensland Act 2001.

[17]SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous [2002] FCA 668 at [38].

[18]Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11]; Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at [31].

[19]Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at [33].

[20](2021) 95 ALJR 824 at [11].

[21]Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213 at [32].

[22]Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213 at [31].

[23]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [72].

[24][2014] NSWCA 98, [68]–[74].

[25]This correspondence also makes reference to various other communications between the applicant and the CCC which were not provided by the applicant.

[26]Parbery & Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 249 at [20].

[27]Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213 at [32].

[28]Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 213 at [33].

[29]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [72].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service

  • MNC:

    [2023] QSC 72

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Wilson J

  • Date:

    14 Apr 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1980] HCA 48
Cite 2 - [1980] HCA 48
Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 95 ALJR 824
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2021) 95 ALJR 824
Cite 2 - (2021) 95 ALJR 824
Cite 3 - (2021) 95 ALJR 824
Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 137
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCA 137
Cite 2 - [2022] QCA 137
Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QSC 241
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 241
Cite 2 - [2022] QSC 241
Cite 3 - [2022] QSC 241
Cite 4 - [2022] QSC 241
Cite 5 - [2022] QSC 241
Dupois v Queensland Police [2022] QCA 240
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCA 240
Cite 2 - [2022] QCA 240
Frugtniet v Victoria (1997) 71 ALJR 1598
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 71 ALJR 1598
Cite 2 - (1997) 71 ALJR 1598
Cite 3 - (1997) 71 ALJR 1598
Hassan v Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 97
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] NSWCA 97
Cite 2 - [2021] NSWCA 97
Cite 3 - [2021] NSWCA 97
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 201 CLR 488
Cite 2 - (2000) 201 CLR 488
McEwan v Commissioner of Taxation [2022] QSC 81
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 81
Cite 2 - [2022] QSC 81
Cite 3 - [2022] QSC 81
Michael Wilson & Partners Pty Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 244 CLR 427
Cite 2 - (2011) 244 CLR 427
Cite 3 - (2011) 244 CLR 427
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 214 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2003) 214 CLR 1
Cite 3 - (2003) 214 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 205 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2001) 205 CLR 507
Cite 3 - (2001) 205 CLR 507
Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court [2022] QSC 227
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 227
Cite 2 - [2022] QSC 227
Cite 3 - [2022] QSC 227
Palmer v Magistrates Court(2020) 3 QR 546; [2020] QCA 47
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 3 QR 546
Cite 2 - (2020) 3 QR 546
Cite 3 - (2020) 3 QR 546
Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd (No 11) [2018] QSC 249
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 249
Cite 2 - [2018] QSC 249
Cite 3 - [2018] QSC 249
Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd (No 8) [2018] QSC 213
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QSC 213
Cite 2 - [2018] QSC 213
Cite 3 - [2018] QSC 213
Cite 4 - [2018] QSC 213
Cite 5 - [2018] QSC 213
Cite 6 - [2018] QSC 213
Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] NSWCA 98
Cite 2 - [2014] NSWCA 98
Cite 3 - [2014] NSWCA 98
SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous [2002] FCA 668
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] FCA 668
Cite 2 - [2002] FCA 668

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service [2023] QCA 217 3 citations
Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service [2023] QSC 1012 citations
1

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